5 Cultural Theories and Proximate-Level Explanations of Primitive War

5.1 Introduction

Evolutionary theories (in the Darwinian sense) and ultimate-level explanations of the origin of war in hominid/human evolution, as reviewed in Ch. 4, have been proliferating ever since Darwin and, after the introduction of socio-biology, especially in the last decades. In anthropology and the social sciences, however, the conception of primitive war as a social theme and cultural invention, and cultural-evolution theories of the origin of war have prevailed at least since Spencer, Tylor, Lubbock and other contemporaries of Darwin. I shall use the term 'cultural theories' in this chapter - which has no more pretense than to give a reasonably adequate and complete review of the pertinent literature - as a convenient shorthand for all theories presented by such disciplines as cultural anthropology, ethnology, sociology, psychology, psychoanalysis, etc.

By their very nature, many of these theories tend to focus on proximate-level explanations of primitive war causation and motivational analyses, and sometimes (seem to) preclude an evolutionary approach (in the Darwinian sense) altogether. Sometimes these theories are regarded as the sane alternative for the 'biological determinism' and alleged 'innateness' ascribed to the evolutionary theories. Yet, every theory, even the most anti-nativist one, does make implicit assumptions about universal human nature.

The most common implicit assumption in the cultural theories is that the human being, by virtue of being a cultural animal, has severed all ties with organic evolution, and that 'biology' (including phylogeny) is therefore quite irrelevant as an explanatory category. Human nature, in this conception, is equivalent to neonatal infinite behavioral plasticity (a tabula rasa) and subsequent cultural moulding; all behavior, including warring behavior, is essentially learned and modulated by the values and requirements of the socio-cultural milieu. Cultural evolution has totally superseded natural evolution. Such views are squarely in accordance with the established Standard Social Science Model of Man (see Cosmides & Tooby, 1992).

Yet, in view of the evidence of chimpanzee warfare, an exclusively cultural origin of war in the human species seems unlikely. It is, moreover, hard to imagine that humans suddenly and out-of-the-blue invented war and started to fight full-blown and vicious wars some centuries BC, without some prior
knowledge of and experience with the more severe and intense forms of intergroup competition and conflict (Cf. Bigelow, 1975). Finally, of course, the theory of war as a unique and one-time historical invention cannot account for the presence of war in primitive societies, unless it is assumed that it always 'diffused' to them after contact with 'advanced' cultures. Such a position - that war in primitive societies is essentially a post-contact phenomenon and that the 'simpler' societies learned the tricks of the trade from their 'civilized' conquerors or neighbors - has indeed been defended. It is certainly true that contact with expanding states more often than not intensified local antagonisms and conflicts, and uprooted entire societies, especially in the Americas and Africa (see especially Ferguson & Whitehead, 1992), but that does not mean that the practice of violent intergroup clashes was non-existent before contact.

Being aware of the ultimate reasons for the emergence of war in the evolutionary history of the human species (i.e., the selective forces) does not provide any clue to the proximate motives for waging particular wars. The merit of the cultural theories is that they may illuminate the immediate causative factors and individual motives involved in the actual behavior of both the decision-makers and the combatants who are doing the 'dirty work'. This raises the question of the relationship(s) among causes, motives and adaptive consequences (if any) of warfare. Van Hooff (1990) reasoned that a 'primitive' warrior may fight in order to restore injured honour, to make an offering to the gods, to avenge a family feud etc., without being aware that his actions will bring about changes at ecological, demographic and population-genetic levels. These changes may well influence his survival and his, and his family's, fecundity. These could be the adaptive consequences which gave a selective advantage to those, who kept to suitable cultural rules under circumstances in which these effects could arise. At the same time the cultural system concerned would be successful. Even a primitive man, who cannot see through the maze of causal connections involved here, may nevertheless feel that things will be better for him and his kin, if he keeps himself to certain rules; therefore, he had better obey his gods (van Hooff, 1990).

The train of thought underlying such a view seems to be the following: An evolutionary-theoretical perspective may provide some insight in understanding the relationships between, on the one hand, causes and motives of primitive war, and, on the other hand, the proximate and ultimate effects of warfare. These relationships can be envisaged as a multiple-feedback regulating mechanism or cybernetic system. Within an evolutionary framework, one might expect that the ultimate effects of a certain kind of behavior (in casu warring behavior), will, through feedback, have a selecting and directing influence on the motive systems of the
individuals exhibiting such behavior, in the sense that the motive systems as a rule will result in these ultimate effects (on the condition that these ultimate effects do indeed contribute to the inclusive fitness of the individuals concerned). This does not mean, however, that in the motive systems of the individuals concerned the ultimate effects also function as the goal states, the target values or Sollwert of the regulating mechanism. For example, in human sexual behavior, procreation (the ‘ultimate’ effect) is generally not the proximate motive to engage and indulge in it.

The motives of individuals will, also as a rule, be related to the causes of the behavior, but they can diverge, deviate from the latter to a certain extent, and acquire some degree of autonomy. Headhunting, with its magico-religious beliefs and practices, for example, may serve to decrease the local competition; the replenishment of game animals; a greater share of the protein supply to the successful warriors, which, in turn, gives the warriors a greater chance of reproducing; and the community acquires the trophies which it finds instrumental in magically influencing the capture of game or the growth of the crops, or the placation of the spirits. Whatever the initial motives behind the headhunting, the beneficial effects are clear to see for all parties involved, except of course the unfortunate victims.

The immediate effects of a behavior are perceived and evaluated by the individuals involved on the basis of their connection to the motives, whereas the ultimate effects, not necessarily identified as such by the individuals concerned, will affect the conditions of life in such a way as to assert a directing and selecting effect on the pertinent motive systems. When the discrepancy, the gap grows too vast between the effects resulting from the proximate motives, on the one hand, and, on the other, the effects which should have been produced for the conditions of life for the individual to relatively improve, then such a motive system - with its adherent cognitions, ideas, attitudes, emotions, etc. - will be at a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis a better adapted motive system. In the Darwinian bio-logic of reproductive success, this means that the individuals and societies that waged war erotically or for rather bizarre, capricious, or trivial purposes did not achieve the same reproductive success as those that fought prudently for, evolutionarily, relevant and sound reasons.

Even when caught in a virulent war-complex, trapped in a stalemate of fear and antagonism, societies are all absolute losers, but some of them are relative winners in that they are more reproductively successful (van Hoooff, p.c.).

The discrepancy between motive and adaptive effect will be greatest among the hunter-gatherers. As the socio-cultural revolution progresses, and man gains a better comprehension of the circumstances on which his existence depends, for example, farming, cattle-raising, storage of produce and equipment, the economic and political-strategic motives will start to coincide more and more with the adaptive consequences of war.
But even in the most advanced cultures immaterial, psycho-social and ideological motives emerge, whether or not to disguise material motives. Let’s return to primitive cultures. Here one finds the greatest diversity of belligerence. And it is also here that immediate material profit from a war is least visible. That is why some find it useless to regard the development of belligerence as an adjustment to ecological circumstances, let alone as an aspect of phylogenetic adaptation (van Hooff, 1990).

5.1.1 Warrior versus Soldier

Why review cultural theories? They are unlikely to illuminate the problem why war evolved (in the Darwinian sense) in the course of hominid/human phylogeny. They can, however, throw considerable light on the corollary question why humans, or rather human males, fight wars at all. This is a question of proximate causes and precipitants of particular wars, and the motives to participate in the actual fighting of the individuals involved, i.e., not only what is known in contemporary military sociology as the question of 'combat motivation', but what, in general terms, may be called 'the psychology of the warrior'.

The psychology of the warrior is perhaps revealed best when contrasted with that of the contemporary soldier in a conscription army. The psychological ingredients which make an effective and efficient contemporary soldier are only remotely, if at all, related to the requisite qualities of the band-level or tribal warrior.

Obedience to authority, submissiveness and servility, courage and bravery, contempt of death and unconditional self-sacrifice, and other qualities which are expected of the soldier are hardly relevant for the warrior, whose 'code of honor' would contain a considerable dose of 'healthy cowardice'. A true-blooded warrior would not allow himself to be abused as cannon-fodder, and would probably look at the battlefields around Verdun in utter disbelief.

The warrior’s ferocity is, to a large extent, fake; his ‘aggressive’ posture make-believe and bluff; his showing-off, intimidating and theatrical gestures a cloak, his vain-glorious callisthenics and histrionics an excellent ‘show of ferocity’ (Chagnon, 1968): It is better to have a reputation of bravery and valiance, for whatever reason, than actually to be a brave and valiant warrior. Such dramatic expression of ‘aggression’ has, as Jagers (1982) aptly observed, nothing to do with uncontrollable drives or spontaneously erupting impulses, but, on the contrary, everything with self-control and self-restraint.

The overriding objective in primitive warfare is, generally speaking, the avoidance of casualties in one’s own ranks, while at the same time inflicting some damage to the enemy. This is the (tactical) reason behind the preference for surprise raiding, ambush and sneak attacks (Feest, 1980), which, as we have seen in Ch. 2, are much more prevalent than pitched battles in primitive
Raiding and ambushes, with dawn attacks on unsuspecting settlements, or the killing of a solitary worker (be it man, woman or child) in the field in order to obtain a trophy, is not conducive to martial valor. On the contrary, these stealthy tactics more often than not lead to acts which we would unhesitantly classify as 'cowardly', 'foul play', 'treacherous', 'guileful' and 'cruel' if practiced by contemporary soldiers.

"Since the purpose of the raids was to return with a human head, the Kalinga of Luzon considered themselves lucky if they could ambush a lone man, an old woman, or a child, because it was less dangerous to kill them" (Feest, 1980). Also among the Plains Indians, many tribes regarded the killing of a woman or a child as a feat entitling to war honors (Lowie, 1954).

The methods of fighting and the 'code of honor' of the warrior are adjusted to such surreptitious tactics and the demands of military exploits totally different from those of massive drilled armies of anonymous soldiers clashing on a mechanized battlefield, or remotely destroying each other from a comfortable position in front of a computer terminal. In terms of sheer survival chances and cost/benefit considerations, the behavior of the warrior is more (bio)logical than that of the modern soldier.

In contemporary conscription armies very serious coercive measures (death penalty) against desertion are commonly implemented (in itself a sign that butchering each other is not man's favorite sport). In primitive communities, on the other hand, the able-bodied male is a warrior on a relatively voluntary basis, and he can be coaxed, but not coerced to participate in raids or even in communal defense (with the exception of chiefdom-level societies and pristine states). He has to be coaxed by prospects of booty and beauty, or glory and renown - at low cost to himself. And even in the heat of battle (or when perceiving a 'bad omen' on the warpath) an individual warrior might decide

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1 The Anggor of New Guinea even consider a pitched battle a tactical failure because a successful raid should become a rout, not a battle (Huber, 1975).

2 Among the Plains Indians, for example, a bad omen sufficed to make the warriors give up an intended raid. Only if inspired by a supernatural being — a spirit appearing in a dream or vision — did a Crow venture to go on the warpath (Lowie, 1954). Similar accounts of this blending of supernaturalism and warfare can be found in numerous ethnographies. Elkin (1938) relates how 'fear of the unknown' affected the 'wars' of the Australian aborigines: "Not infrequently a local group sets out full of vim and boastfulness to go some distance away to attack another tribe, but some days later returns in 'ones' and 'twos' and 'threes' and so on, without having sighted the group in the other tribe whom they set out to annihilate. Had they met the latter, they would have been brave enough, performed the preliminaries and had the fight — or if their heart had kept up, might have successfully attacked the 'enemy' camp at dawn. But as they got away from their own tribal territory, they passed into country of unknown totemic heroes and spirit-centers some of which might be lethal to those who did not know how to approach them. Moreover, they were in a region where the forms of magic, being unknown, were endowed by their imagination with special potency, and might cause them disaster. And so, one by one, in face of the terrors of the unknown, they gave in and turned back".
that fighting is not conducive to his health and corporeal integrity, and leave
the scene, without repercussions. The warrior keeps his self-interest keenly in
mind, and - not being drilled and conditioned to be an efficient 'killing
machine' nor to be an equally efficient piece of cannon-fodder - his martial
prowess and callisthenics easily change into athletic feats of tactical retreat if
the situation so requires. Even among the fierce Yanomamö, who have been
described as among the most violent and belligerent peoples in the world, the
dose of 'healthy cowardice' I mentioned earlier is easily discernible and very
evident. "Despite the Orinoco-Macava Yanomami's reputation for ferocity,
their [the headmen's] efforts to organize war parties meet with resistance,
counterarguments, and a high rate of 'deserters' (Biocca, 1971: 218; Chagnon,
1977: 115, 130; Lizot, 1985: 182-83)" (Ferguson, 1992). This may be one of the reasons why Turney-High (1949) regards the primitive
warrior as militarily inept, despite all his pranks and occasional bloodshed.

5.1.2 A Brief Digression on 'Causes of War'

There is no general classification of primitive war theories. Otterbein (1973)
tried to bring some order in the chaos, but his classification of Causes of
War is a curious hodgepodge of presumed causative factors on various and
heterogeneous levels of analysis. He lists as Causes of War: innate aggression
('instinct of pugnacity' approaches); frustration-aggression (hatred of the
enemy); diffusion (spread of invention); physical environment (a culture's
mode of adaptation to its natural environment); goals of war (values of men);
Social structure (fraternal interest group theory); military preparedness
(efficient military organization); and cultural evolution (level of sociopolitical
complexity).

Simple as the words 'causes of war' may prima vista seem, a second look may
teach otherwise.
To some, as Q.Wright (1942, 1965) noted, a cause of war is an event,
condition, act, or personality involved only in a particular war; to others it is a
general proposition applicable to many wars. To some it is a class of human
motives, ideals, or values; to others it is a class of impersonal forces, condi-
tions, processes, patterns, or relations.
In the historic sense a cause is any event or condition figuring in the descrip-
tion of the relevant antecedents of an effect. The historic causes of war are

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3 Bancroft (1875), however, mentions some kind of 'losing face' as a punishment incurred from
cowardice among the Mohave. If a Mohave warrior is taken prisoner and later returns, "his mother
even will not own him". And Speke (1908) states that runaways among the Wahuma were tortured
to death. Such statements are, however, exceptional in societies 'below' the chiefdom-level of
sociopolitical organization. Bravery in battle, on the other hand, may be encouraged, as Holsti
(1913) suggested, by the fear of being ridiculed, especially by wives or paramours.
sometimes subdivided into ‘immediate causes’, ‘special causes’, and ‘general causes’. The historians of particular wars have usually distinguished idealistic, psychological, political, economic, and juridical elements in their causation. In the practical sense a cause is any controllable element in the statement of the origin, treatment, solution, or meaning of a problem or situation.

In his *opus magnum* Q. Wright himself uses the Aristotelian distinction of ‘efficient causes’ and ‘final causes’ (comparable to necessary and sufficient conditions). In his study the term ‘causes of war’ refers to ‘efficient causes’ which precede the outbreak of war. Wright concludes his review with the rather all-embracing statement: "War has politico-technological, juro-ideological, socio-religious, and psycho-economic causes".

In his influential *Man, The State and War*, Waltz (1959) asserts that the corpus of thought on war clusters about three basic images (or levels of explanation) of why conflict arises in international relations.

According to one view, the locus of the major causes of war is found in the nature and behavior of man. Wars, according to this image, result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity, from lack of information, etc.; other causes are secondary and have to be interpreted in the light of these factors.

In the second image the basic causes of war are found in the political structures and social, economic conditions of the separate states, or comparable actors in the political arena. Theorists of the second image emphasize the aggressive nature of certain states seeking to advance their power, prestige, and wealth.

In the third image, the locus of major causes is found neither in men nor in states but in the state system itself: the anarchic character of international society with its lack of an effective machinery of social control and sanction.

Waltz acknowledges that most scholars combine the three images in their thought, but tend to give prominence to one. *Mutatis mutandis*, these three levels of analysis may also be applied to the study of primitive war.

In his *Causes of War*, Bernard (1944) presents a list of contrast pairs, distinguishing incidental/fundamental causes, superficial/underlying, accidental/purposive, unpremeditated/premeditated, temporary/persistent, transitory/continuous, proximate/remote, efficient/final, initial/ultimate, original/derivative, concrete/abstract, simple/complex, special/general, open/concealed, specific/circumstantial, human/natural, explicit/obscure, personal/social, single/multiple, contributing/exclusive, reputed/actual, ostensible/real, and physical/psychological.

In contemporary quantitative studies of war, a distinction between ‘underlying causes’ and ‘proximate causes’ or precipitants (Vasquez, 1993) is generally made. The underlying causes are generally situated on the systemic level.

In increasing order of complexity, one might also distinguish between (a) *Anstoß* causality, a simple Newtonian-mechanical cause-effect chain as in two billiard balls clashing (in which the ‘cause’ energy is proportionate to the ‘effect’ energy); (b) trigger causality, in which the energetic effect (the bullet speeding
from the barrel) is many times amplified and disproportionate with respect to the event which released it (the finger on the trigger); and (c) network causality, in which a change in one parameter of a system's components reverberates through the entire system, or a distortion of one mesh in a net ripples through the net as a whole. In most complex systems this also implies feedback to one or more of the sensors, such that the end result may be either damping oscillations (in the case of negative feedback) or the collapse of the system (in the case of positive feedback). On the social level, events have aspects of all these three forms of causality in various combinations.

In historical studies it is not unusual to encounter the, sometimes implicit, distinction between structural, conjunctural, and situational determinants of events such as wars. Many contemporary war researchers consider wars to be over-determined, and their model, accordingly, is one of multicausality or equifinality (See e.g., van der Dennen, 1980).

In their case study of Quechan (Yuma) warfare, Kroeber & Fontana (1986) distinguish between motives and origins or causative factors. According to these authors, motives are overt and are triggers for particular battles, series of battles, or even prolonged enmities. Origins are the covert and latent wellsprings of warfare. Motives are immediate causes; origins are ultimate causes. What one scholar regards as the causes of war, another one considers to be the motives, and 'vice versa'.

In this chapter I shall use the terms 'motive' and 'causative factor' in a rather loose sense as referring to any observable or hypothetical factor in the total network of conditions eventually resulting in war.

Not all researchers agree that it is useful and worthwhile to uncover the causes of war. For instance, Service (1975) holds that "It is usually idle to talk of the 'causes of war'; it is the evolution of various causes of peace that can be studied in the human record; and a large and essential part of the evolution of political organization is simply an extension and intensification of peace-making means."

4 "Chagnon, along with Sahlins (1968) and Service (1967, 1975), invokes Hobbes to argue that war is the normal state of existence for 'tribal' peoples who have no overarching authority to prevent war. By simple inference, or by direct implication in the case of Chagnon (1974: 195; 1977: 163), this proposition suggests that war is the normal state of existence for all societies, because even modern nations are not subject to an overarching power able to prevent war. And if war is normal, then it requires no special explanation. Chagnon states this view quite clearly in the second edition of Yanomamö: 'Warfare among the Yanomamö — or any sovereign tribal people — is an expectable form of political behavior and no more requires special explanations than do religion or economy' (Chagnon, 1977: 163). That statement remains in the third edition of Yanomamö (1983: 213), although some of the supporting argument has been cut. Given the widespread use of Yanomamö in introductory anthropology courses, the proposition is of more than theoretical concern. Thousands of students every year are learning that war between sovereign political groups is normal, expectable, and need not be questioned" (Ferguson, 1984).
5.2 Sociocultural Selection and Evolution of War

The idea of cultural (also called social or sociocultural) selection is explained as follows by Carneiro (1970), one of its most ardent advocates. When societies fight, he contends, the cultural equivalent of natural selection comes into play. This 'cultural selection' operates in two ways; within societies and between societies.

In *intrasocietal* selection, two or more variants of a cultural trait compete for the same 'cultural slot', with the more efficient one eventually displacing the less efficient. This is an example of the 'principle of competitive exclusion' (Gause, 1932), an important principle in organic evolution.

In *intersocietal* selection, however, the unit on which selection operates is not the culture-trait as such, but the society bearing it. As societies compete, the "less well adapted tend to fall by the wayside, leaving outstanding those best able to withstand the competition".

From the point of view of the traits involved, the two forms of selection produce the same effect; more efficient traits survive and spread, while less efficient ones decline and disappear. Tylor (1871) saw this clearly when he wrote: "[T]he institutions which can best hold their own in the world gradually supersede the less fit ones, and... this incessant conflict determines the general course of culture". Cultural selection, which operates even on traits of little or no adaptive value (in the biological sense), acts with special intensity on traits directly concerned with survival. And since there is generally no greater challenge to a society's existence than war, it is here that we find selection operating most rigorously. Both forms of selection are at work in warfare. For example, the gun displaced the bow-and-arrow as a weapon of war, not only because bow-using tribes abandoned the bow and took up the gun but also because peoples who relied on the bow were engulfed or exterminated by those with the gun.

As Vayda (1968) has noted, war is often regarded as a "nonfunctional, pathological condition of society". But, Carneiro holds, to consider warfare as nothing more than this is to allow emotion to cloud understanding.

From the time that cultural-evolutionary theory developed, in the mid-nineteenth century, scientists have proposed theories of sociocultural evolution which relate the development of war to various levels of political centralization. These theories have in common the notion that as societies evolve (become more complex sociopolitically), they come to wage war in more efficient ways. Sometimes war is seen as producing the evolution of societies; sometimes it is the political level of the societies which is seen as being responsible for the type of war waged. In either case, level of political centralization or sociopolitical complexity and degree of military efficiency are
viewed as being functionally related (Otterbein, 1970).
Bagehot, 1872; Spencer, 1874 et seq.; Sumner, 1911; Holsti, 1913; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Keller, 1915; Sumner & Keller, 1927; van der Bij, 1929: Davie, 1929; Malinowski, 1941; Chapple & Coon, 1942; Q.Wright, 1942; Turney-High, 1949; White, 1949; Newcombe, 1960; Sahlins, 1961; Service, 1962; Andreski, 1964, 1968, 1971; Fried, 1967; Hunter & Whitten, 1976; Carneiro, 1970 et seq.; Harris, 1979, 1980; Feest, 1980; among others, all imply stages of cultural evolution and changing war patterns in their theories. An avowed cultural evolutionist, White (1949) argued that as Man’s cultural heritage increases, economic and political goals become the causes of war. According to White, warfare is virtually non-existent among many primitive tribes; when cultures have progressed to the point where it is worth fighting over hunting or fishing grounds, grazing lands or fertile valleys, warfare emerges.
Also Malinowski (1941) argued that warfare only slowly evolved as a mechanism of organized force for the pursuit of national policies. He described six types of armed contest, each of which, he said, "presents an entirely different cultural phase in the development of organized fighting". Only two of these types Malinowski considered to be war. Turney-High (1949) similarly argued that only the 'advanced' societies have reached the 'military horizon', by which he meant the military efficiency to wage 'true' war.

5.2.0.1 Biphasic Theory of the Evolution of War: Endemic vs Instrumental
In 1929, a Dutchman, van der Bij, wrote a dissertation entitled Ontstaan en eerste ontwikkeling van den oorlog [Genesis and initial development of war], in which he envisaged some kind of two-step or biphasic model of the evolution of human warfare on the basis of his findings (and quite in accordance with the results of Hobhouse et al., 1915; and Q.Wright, 1942) that the more 'simple' the people the more peaceful it tended to be. Van der Bij concluded that in the initial phase of human evolution war did not play any significant role, and most probably was lacking altogether. Only in a more advanced phase or stage of human evolution did war emerge.
Later, Mühlmann (1940) and Meyer (1977 et seq.) proposed a similar trajectory for the evolution of human war.

The evolution of war as the most important form of collective violence is attributed by Meyer (1977 et seq.) to developments in Man's psycho-cultural sphere. Nevertheless, it is the 'deep grammar' of the bio-social level that sets the general frame within which the different ideas, social organizations, etc.

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vary.
The psycho-cultural level in Man, mainly the combination of vast perception, the algorithmic character of data processing and simultaneous feedback with built-in constancies of expectation seem to produce two closely interrelated results: An increasing demand for causal explanation, and fear.
Among the characteristics of primitive society, the unified, unfragmented character of its cosmology seems most relevant for the topic of power and violence. Human action is intertwined with cosmic order, thus every single act might endanger this order. The all-pervasive importance of order in this stage seems to be a manifestation of the basic psychological problem: The necessity of delimiting the self-conscious individual or psycho-cultural entity from the surrounding chaos. The 'in-group' represents form, whereas the 'out-group', including aspects of the natural environment, represents formlessness, and therefore is alien and dangerous (See Ch. 6).
Collective violence between groups, at this stage, seems to be caused by their mythologies. The strategic concept in these mythologies is power; actors strive for power in order to improve their positions. An analysis of such socio-cultural systems must take the close interrelation of empirical and transempirical processes into account. Power, being essentially a quality of the transempirical realm, nevertheless is also the decisive quality of empirical social life. The psycho-cultural level is interrelated with the social level, where the subsequent blood feuds enhance the tendency towards an incessant cycle of violent interaction. The state of war between such societies may thus be characterized as endemic war - a relation between societies where war seems to be an end in itself rather than an instrument.
Fear as the universal motive behind primitive warfare has been most eloquently exposed by Meyer: "Die Manifestationen kollektiver Gewalt erscheinen vielmehr einer Atmosphäre der Furcht vor dem Fremden zu entspringen, die, den Angriff des Fremden antizipierend, diesem zuvorzukommen trachtet" [The manifestations of collective violence appear to spring from an atmosphere of xenophobia which, anticipating the attack by the stranger, leads to pre-emptive attack] (Meyer, 1981a). Such fear-inspired pre-emptive attack is embedded in the extreme ethnocentrism of primitive societies.
The decisive breakthrough in the evolution of war came about with the instrumentalization of collective violence, promoted by the development of specialized warrior societies or classes, technical inventions (weapons), and social inventions, mainly the idea of incorporating defeated social groups.

Subsequently, Meyer (1987 et seq.) emphasizes the absence of economic motives for collective violence among hunter-gatherer societies, together with the insight that war is not a unitary phenomenon throughout social evolution. Quite to the contrary, the institution of war has changed its form, its underlying causes, and consequently its general 'function' for society as a whole during sociocultural evolution. Furthermore, he disputes that 'aggression' can account
for any relevant aspect of war. Explanations in terms of ultimate causality can account only for a very basic layer of aggressive dispositions. Such dispositions are not suited at all for an explanation of war (Meyer, 1981; van der Dennen, 1986); while aggression is an individual attribute, war is a special form of collective violence.

Meyer stipulates that "people don't fight for resources but for ideas of resources". What, then, are the ideas of resources that can motivate primitive peoples to invest their most precious resource (i.e., life) into 'senseless' wars? The answer is that non-materialistic and metaphysical notions of resources prevail in the stage of endemic war. The major objective of primitive war seems to be the restoration of the metaphysical and legal status quo ante, exemplified by revenge feuding. In many tribal societies another typical motivation of recurrent raiding is head- and trophy-hunting, in which power, as essentially a cosmic property, resides. Participation in a war party is considered an important rite de passage; the acquisition of the power of the slain enemy gives additional power and 'magic fertility' to the victor.

Another important characteristic of cultures at this endemic stage of warfare is the absence of a clear-cut separation between the state of war and the state of peace.

Feuding and other forms of violent interaction were quite common among primitive societies, and ethnographers interested in explanations found that the underlying enmity appeared quite natural and self-evident to the persons concerned. When asked about their reasons for this enmity, tribal people very frequently hinted at their group's identity which was defined by its antagonistic relation with other groups. According to these views, membership in group A is defined by non-membership in groups B and C. Moreover, groups B and C are, by their very existence, a sort of negation of A, endangering its identity. From an evolutionary point of view this delimitation may not be surprising at all since it is a common feature of social life. Animal species have visual, olfactory and various other signals at their disposal enabling them to distinguish 'us' from 'them'. This ability to make such distinctions obviously is a necessary concomitant of any type of sociality. Human sociality, however, additionally entails some cultural mechanisms which intensify the necessary distinctions between groups. The human mind succeeds in the functional integration of a purely informational system with an evaluative system, the first processing signs, the latter processing Gestalt qualities, images and their affective-emotional concomitants. Following this interpretation, the construction of identity in a hypothetical tribal situation combines a sort of 'logic' peculiar to sign systems with evaluative standards from human affectivity. Unlike animals, humans have to define their identities by a peculiar logic of semiotic systems. An influential feature of such systems is, according to Bateson (1983), the feasibility and necessity of negation, of 'no' and 'not'. Term A can only be defined by reference to the difference between A as compared to B, and as compared to C, etc. A's identity can only be defined, in other words,
by the use of non-identities or contrasts. Cultural identity may be viewed as an expression of cooperation; it pays for actors to comply with social expectations. Such actors will gain in terms of social status, which will enable them in turn to reproduce their views and ideas, and themselves, at a higher rate than others. Numerous studies of tribal society have pointed out that usually permission for marriage was only granted after having successfully taken part in warfare. It is felt that such deeds impart 'magic fertility' to warriors who will in turn be paid tribute to and, most importantly, will be allowed to marry and have children.

Thus tribal warfare is imbued with a peculiar logic, the understanding of which requires cultural categories. While the motives of warfare undoubtedly are of a psychological and cultural nature, their effects are, also beyond any doubt, of a biological character. Some members of a population will reproduce at a higher rate than others and this, of course, is at the heart of evolutionary theory. Natural selection does not favor destructiveness as such, but reproductive success. Violent interaction makes evolutionary sense only if it serves reproduction.

Contrary to the agonistic behavior of animal species, numerous human cultures have employed concepts of 'magic fertility' which require a maximum toll of lives as a criterion of success. Ethnographic reports on tribal warfare among the Mundurucu and Jivaro exemplify uses of this concept while Aztec wars offer an example of a more complex society’s adherence to the concept of 'magic fertility'.

In a situation of intertribal anarchy and insecurity, self-help (i.e., revenge and retaliation) is the only way to restore the political and metaphysical status quo. The talion law (lex talionis) and revenge is a mechanism of 'primitive' distributive justice: a litigatio. At the same time, this stage of 'primitive war' is not an 'Agent of Progress', as has been widely claimed, but its exact opposite (Cf. Mühlmann, 1940; Meyer, 1990). As Meyer (1990) observed: "[T]he virtually incessant cycles of primitive war did not set in motion anything relevant for social evolution".

This is not surprising because in rampant war complexes (i.e., in regions where warfare is endemic), war, in the form of periodic and mutual revenge raiding and/or headhunting, functions primarily as a strategy for the maintenance of territorial integrity and ethnic group identity, with only occasional, opportunistic, territorial expansion.

If, as Agent of Progress theorists claim, intergroup competition/warfare has been a motor of human evolution, it should be possible to find evidence for this thesis in rampant war complex areas. We should see the motor of progress in

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6 Cf. "Although war can be an important part of sociocultural evolution, it is not the prime mover" (Ferguson, 1994; Cf. Claessen & van de Velde, 1985).
statu operandi so to speak. But on the contrary, in Amazonia, precolumbian Coahuiltecan Texas, and New Guinea (to mention only the best known of these areas), there is no evidence of (1) arms-technological improvement; (2) progress in logistics, tactics and/or strategy of warfare; (3) socioeconomic, psychocultural or political development.

Paula Brown (1978), in her analysis of New Guinea Highlands warfare, clearly noted the sociopolitical stagnation, rather than development, in her discussion of 'big men' who lead the fights:

"In the highlands, such exceptional men of great renown never established a long-term domination of any large group. No kingdom, establishment, permanent control, or continuity of leadership has ever occurred there. Highland leadership has always been the big man's personal following, from his clan, tribe, kin, and affines, which did not survive him. It is difficult to imagine any long-lived political unification emerging from such a pattern".

Lee (1990), commenting on Carneiro's environmental circumscription theory of the origin of chiefdoms and states, noted that "Tropical forest South America and highland New Guinea both exhibit high levels of warfare, but they have not produced chiefdoms".

It may be argued that instrumental war, war for economic, predatory reasons and territorial expansion and annexation is a relatively late, political invention that apparently has been made by only a minority of peoples. Mühlmann (1940) observed that war probably originated in and evolved from the blood feud. The least warlike peoples have only retaliation as a goal of war. That war opens the possibility of benefit, of economic gain, that war can be productive, is a discovery that is gradually made in the course of development. The discovery of economic goals of war is related to the valuation of wealth. Such valuation arises only at a fairly advanced level of cultural evolution7.

The fact is, Mühlmann (1940) explains, that in the majority of primitive peoples "das Bestreben der scharfen Selbstbegrenzung den Ausdehnungsdrang überwiegt; und es ist gerade der rein defensive Character dieser Selbstbegrenzung, der diesen Völkern den Weg zu politischer Größe versperrt und sie auf der Stufe von Naturvölkern verharren läßt" [the striving for sharp ethnic boundaries prevails over expansionistic tendencies; and it is exactly the defensive character of this self-insulation that precludes sociopolitical progress and keeps these peoples on a primitive level].

"Regarding the diffusion of violent types of inter-societal relations, the cultural

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7 "Daß der Krieg die Möglichkeit einer Vorteilserrung, eines ökonomisch ausdrückbaren Gewinnes bietet, daß er produktiv sein kann, ist eine Entdeckung, die erst im Verlaufe der Entwicklung allmählich gemacht wird... Nimmt doch der Krieg seinen Ausgang von der Blutrache. Die am wenigsten kriegerischen Völker kennen nur die Vergeltung als Kriegsziel... Die Entdeckung wirtschaftlicher Kriegsziele ist an die Schätzung des Reichtums geknüpft. Diese Schätzung stellt sich erst bei höheren Naturvölkern ein" (Mühlmann, 1940).
invention of the instrumental benefits of such collective behavior may be considered the single most important cause of the spread of violence" (Meyer, 1993). Once the threshold between primitive and full-fledged, instrumental, war was crossed a major push was exerted on social evolution, at times favoring the evolution of more complex political structures, sometimes fostering less complex solutions. The evolution of archaic empires and their succession by the less complex feudal societies demonstrate these alternating states of complexity. It may be argued that, prior to this invention, warfare was mostly synonymous with revenge feuding and other types of low-level and small-scale violence.

5.2.0.2 The Four-Stage Model of the Evolution of War
Probably the best known typology of war as a product of cultural evolution (and vice versa) is that developed by Fried (1967) and Hunter & Whitten (1976), and the typology of military organization as a function of political organization as developed by Feest (1980). Also Andreski (1964, 1968) proposed an elaborate typology of idealtypical and transitional types of military organization in primitive cultures, which will be briefly discussed.

Sahlins (1961) and Service (1962) proposed a scheme of social evolution in four stages: the band, the tribe, the chiefdom and finally the state, whereby ‘civilization’ made its entry into history. A band is only an association, more or less residential, of nuclear families. A tribe is of the order of a large collection of bands but is not simply a collection of bands (Honigmann [1964] distinguishes three types of tribes by referring to their form of political organization: non-segmentary acephalous tribes, segmentary acephalous tribes, and the centralized tribes). A chiefdom is particularly distinguished from tribes by the presence of centers which coordinate economic, social and religious activities, and redistribute a large part of the production of local communities. Then the state appears, reinforcing this centralization and constituting a political structure definitely superior and exterior to the local social groups, transforming social inequality of rank into class privileges. When the distribution of warfare among groups described in the ethnographic literature is examined, a well-defined pattern in the evolution of warfare emerges.

Fried (1967) and Hunter & Whitten (1976) also identified four levels or stages in the cultural and sociopolitical evolution of society (which has, with minor variants, become the standard paradigm among cultural evolutionists): egalitarian society, rank society, stratified society, and state-level society. These authors assume that this sequence represents a cultural-evolutionary development, not just the different levels of sociopolitical organization found in the world today. The nature of warfare as it is conducted at each of these levels of sociopolitical organization appears to differ in a systematic way.
Egalitarian Societies

In egalitarian societies, which provide valued social positions for every member, subsistence activities are limited to food collecting - that is, hunting and gathering. Living in loosely defined territories at population densities approximating perhaps three people per square mile, these societies make all of nature’s strategic resources available to all members; only nonstrategic resources (such as personal adornments) are regarded as private property. This situation obviously makes irrelevant one of the major origins of conflict in more complex society: "The significant sources of food available to simple societies are not foreclosed to any member of the group and... usually are available to outsiders as well" (Fried, 1967).

Given these features of social life, and given that virtually no power hierarchy exists, the following characteristics of the very limited amount of warfare waged at this level of sociopolitical development are hardly surprising: (1) No time is devoted to preparing for war; (2) no fortifications are built; (3) no food or supplies are stockpiled; (4) nobody engages in specialized training in the arts of war; (5) there is no specialized military technology - ordinary hunting weapons are used in warfare; (6) combat intensity is low; (7) prolonged actions such as sieges or campaigns do not occur; (8) the most typical action is a raid, involving a brief clash between the two sides; and (9) there is a complete absence of a command hierarchy and consequently minimal combat organization (Fried, 1967; Hunter & Whitten, 1976). Also Harris (1980) holds that warfare was probably practiced by Paleolithic hunters and gatherers but on a small scale and infrequently.

To this sociopolitical level belong Q.Wright’s (1942) categories of Defensive and Social War. If war is never embarked upon except for immediate defense of the group against attack, military organization is usually nonexistent, tactics consist in the spontaneous use of methods and weapons employed in the hunt, and war is generally regarded as a calamity when it occurs. Groups with these characteristics are almost universally characterized as unwarlike. Even more does this characterization apply to the few tribes who do not even defend themselves from attack.

If war is never embarked upon for economic or political purposes, but is regularly utilized to slaughter extra-group individuals or groups for purposes of revenge, religious expiation, sport, or personal prestige (Social War), there is seldom a specialized military class, though all boys are likely to have military training; tactics follow established methods of raid, ambush, and pitched battle, utilizing specialized military weapons; and portions of the tribe, at least, are inclined eagerly to embark upon war as a laudable and sporting adventure. While some writers characterize groups with this practice as warlike, and undoubtedly they are more warlike than groups of the first type, it seems appropriate to regard them as less warlike than those who utilize war for providing economic necessities (Q.Wright, 1942).
Rank Societies

In rank societies "positions of valued status are somehow limited so that not all those of sufficient talent to occupy such statuses actually achieve them" (Fried, 1967). Although in rank societies the labor is divided mostly in terms of age and sex, as in egalitarian societies, work itself is confined to smaller, well-defined geographical territories and generally involves the planting and harvesting of domesticated plants (Hunter & Whitten, 1976).

"All the sources of interpersonal conflict found in egalitarian society persist in rank society, as indeed they persist in all subsequently evolved types of society. Certain kinds of irritation not present in egalitarian society make their appearance in rank societies, although their expression may be relatively subdued. For example, while access to basic resources within the corporate unit is not significantly altered, there tends to be much more consumer’s property in rank society. Patterns of reciprocal exchange do operate to keep these things in circulation, but there is a qualitative break with egalitarian societies as accumulation of nonstrategic values is often the basis or means of validation of rank distinctions" (Fried, 1967).

An outstanding feature of rank societies is their combativeness. Many seem to be in a relatively constant state of warfare, with group anxiety about war providing a psychological mechanism through which social cohesion is maintained - a crucial factor in the competition for survival. In rank societies, then, warfare is quite intense, and there are distinct military leadership roles. It appears that societies at this sociopolitical level interact with other such societies primarily in terms of military confrontation. However, the actual wars are generally quite brief: Periods between clashes are much longer than the clashes themselves. Thus Fried argues that rank societies are more accurately described as ‘oriented around war’ rather than continually ‘at war’ (Hunter & Whitten, 1976).

After the development of permanent villages, with large investments in crops, animals, and stored foods, the form of warfare changed. Among hunter-gatherers, warfare involved a high degree of individualized combat directed toward the adjustment of real or imagined personal injuries and deprivations. Although the combat teams may have had a temporary territorial base, the organization of battle and the consequences of victory or defeat reflected the loose association between people and territory. The victors did not gain territory by routing their enemies.

Warfare among village-dwelling cultivators (horti- and agriculturalists), however, frequently involves a total team effort in which definite territories are fought over and in which defeat may result in the rout of a whole community from its fields, dwellings, and natural resources. Although village peoples were not the first to practice warfare, they did expand the scale and ferocity of military engagements. Warfare among village cultivators is likely to be more costly in terms of battle casualties than among seminomadic hunters and gatherers (Harris, 1980).
To this, and the next, sociopolitical levels belong Q.Wright’s (1942) categories of Economic and Political War.

If war, in addition to utilization for defensive and social purposes, is an important method for acquiring slaves, women, cattle, pastures, agricultural lands, or other economic assets essential to the life of the group, there are usually age groups specializing in warfare, trained in techniques of mass attack and mutual support, directed toward the most efficient achievement of the intended economic objects, and the group usually regards war as a necessary routine in its economic activities. As the objects of such war usually include the taking of women or slaves, enemies are, if possible, made prisoners instead of being slaughtered. Consequently, this type of war may seem more humane, and groups using it are by some considered less warlike than those in the second group. It appears, however, that the casualties of this kind of war are usually greater in proportion to the population than in purely social war. When defending his possessions, the enemy is more formidable than when his sole object is to save his skin or his head, for which purpose flight is adequate. Furthermore, groups which use war for economic purposes usually also employ it for social purposes, such as the provision of victims for human sacrifice or for blood revenge, frequently on a larger scale than do people in the second group.

Finally, if war is fought not only for defensive, social, and economic purposes but also to maintain a ruling class in power and to expand the area of empire or political control, there is usually a specialized standing army, trained in mass maneuver, obedience to command, and the construction of artificial defenses. War is conducted by complicated operations often involving the cooperation of specialized military services, and war is regarded as particularly honorable and praiseworthy. It seems appropriate to regard people employing this type of war as the most warlike of all, not only because of their peculiarly favorable attitude toward war but also because they receive and inflict the greatest losses of population from war of any primitive people. The high morale which armies developed by people of this type customarily display enables them to endure more mutual slaughter than can the less-disciplined warriors involved in other types of primitive warfare. Furthermore, the tactics and weapons used by people of this class are more efficient for purposes of slaughter.

Stratified Societies

At this level of evolution societies are organized in such a way that "members of the same sex and equivalent age status do not have equal access to the basic resources that sustain life" (Fried, 1967). In other words, basic resources that are still available to all individuals in rank societies have been converted from shared, communal property to privately owned property in stratified societies. At this stage, warfare is even more frequent than among rank societies, and stratified societies have the resources in food surpluses to support military specialists and to wage highly sophisticated combat. "What is more, the
cultural development of warfare is more likely to receive special attention in a stratified society as owners can make economically rational decisions to divert resources and labor into military activities" (Fried, 1967). Examples are the wars of the Polynesian chiefdoms and African kingdoms. Wood (1870) relates about the wars of the Samoans: "The causes of war may mostly be reduced to four; namely, the desire of political supremacy, disputed succession to chieftainship, revenge for the murder of a chief, and infringement of the strange marriage laws of the Samoans. The first of these causes is always ranking. Each island is divided into several districts, and when one begins to show signs of special prosperity, another is sure to take umbrage at it and go to war in order to secure the 'Malo', or political supremacy". The sweep of conquest of the Zulu, when Shaka had introduced system and discipline into warfare, throughout a huge portion of Africa, is well-known: "His troops swept over the country like an army of locusts, consuming everything on their way, and either exterminating the various tribes, or incorporating them in some capacity or other among the Zulus" (Wood, 1868).
Sahlins (1961), and many others after him, argued that one specific type of sociopolitical organization, the so-called segmentary lineage, is particularly suited for predatory expansion.

The State
Once social stratification emerges, conflict develops between the ruling classes, who control access to basic resources such as land, and those classes who must pay for the right of access to these resources. At this point the state - "a collection of specialized institutions and agencies, some formal and others informal, that maintains an order of stratification" (Fried, 1967) - arises as a mechanism by which the ruling classes maintain their position of advantage. The state protects itself against both internal and external attacks. It has the social, economic, and organizational resources to engage in extended and highly advanced forms of warfare and has the political flexibility to engulf and administer conquered peoples and territories. The state, not surprisingly, is the most warlike of all sociopolitical forms (Hunter & Whitten, 1976).
But at this sociopolitical stage we have definitely left the domain of 'primitive' warfare.

5.2.0.3 The Levels of Military Organization
To the levels of sociopolitical organization presented above correspond the levels of military organization as distinguished by Feest (1980):

War-Chiefs on Basis of Reputation
This level is exemplified by the Amazonian Jivaro, once notorious for their headhunting. The Jivaro ordinarily do not have a chief because there is no need
for a centralized political authority. Day-to-day decisions are made by the heads of kinship groups; they also settle disputes arising between those groups. Only in times of war will the Jivaro submit to the authority of an experienced warrior, whose commands in matters of war they obey strictly. Here, as in many similar cases, a war-chief is selected on the basis of proven ability, which illustrates the general rule that military leadership is more frequently based on achievement than is civil authority. The size of a raiding party will usually depend upon the reputation of its leader, whose following will increase with success and diminish with failure. Recruitment and participation in a war-party is voluntary and optional. Among the Plains Indians, for example, war parties were to a large extent private enterprises, organized on the personal initiative of some renowned warrior. A man who scored repeated successes as a leader came to be famous for his ‘war medicine’, attracting young novices eager to share in its blessings (Lowie, 1954).

Dual Leadership: Formal Peace- and War-Chiefs
A more formalized distinction between the organization of a group in war and in peace is illustrated by the case of the Cherokee, a farming tribe of the southeastern United States. Each Cherokee town, a politically autonomous unit, was organized by two complementary authorities. White or Peace chiefs, consisting of clan leaders and respected elders, would rule by consensus in all matters relating to the internal affairs of the community. Red or War chiefs, drawn from the ranks of younger warriors, were responsible for the town’s external relations, including trade, hunting expeditions, and warfare. In their sphere they supplied assertive leadership. All townsmen were members of both organizations. Which of the two took precedence depended on the situation prevailing. See also Paula Brown (1978) for war and peace ‘big men’ in the New Guinea Highlands societies.

Some societies are themselves dually organized, divided into moieties (‘halves’) or sodalities (nonexogamous moieties). Among some Pueblo Indian communities, such as the Tano, Keres, Taos, Picuris and Isleta, it was the kiva sodalities, for example, that organized communal hunts and retaliatory warfare under the direction of the moiety chiefs (Jorgensen, 1980).

Hereditary Chiefs and Primordial Warrior Society
By contrast, male members of the Dinka of Sudan either belong to a hereditary class who have a monopoly of ritual power and are exempt from military service; or else they are warriors. The religious specialists contribute to military affairs by praying for victory. There is a tendency to select war leaders from a specific kin group, but in practice ability counts for more than inheritance.

Among the Masai of Kenya and their pastoralist neighbors, on the other hand, the class of warriors is defined strictly on age-grade principles. Those who, by a ceremony of circumcision, have passed the stage of boyhood, join the ranks
of the warriors until they get married, at which time they retire from active military duty. The warriors live segregated from the rest of the community and form a strongly integrated group. They are not allowed to drink beer, but are entitled to promiscuous sexual relations with unmarried girls.

**Full-Blown Military Societies**

An example of even more specialized organization is supplied by the military societies of the North American Plains Indians. These fraternities provided bonds across kinship groups, policed important communal events (such as the bison hunt) and acted as military units in times of war. Membership of such a society was indicated by special regalia, by which officers could also be distinguished from rank and file members. Within the fraternities a warlike spirit was cultivated. Membership sometimes entailed the obligation to be brave up to a certain point, for example, not to retreat behind a lance rammed into the ground (See § 5.3.3, note 5). While some of these societies were age-graded, so that throughout his life a man would acquire membership in all of them in succession, others were not hierarchically ordered and members competed to outdo one another.

**Standing Armies**

Only with the emergence of a strong central authority do professional bodies of warriors gain prominence. In African kingdoms (but also in some other centralized chiefdoms) there were usually certain elite troops, such as border or palace guards, which were specially trained and supported by tributes paid to the ruler. Their duties might include construction and repair of public buildings to keep them busy during times of peace.

Andreski (1964) distinguished six idealtypical types of military organization on the basis of 3 variables: Military Participation Ratio (M.P.R.: the number of warriors/soldiers relative to the total population), cohesion, and subordination.

(1) **Tallenic** military organization is characterized by high M.P.R., low cohesion and low subordination. We should expect to find it, therefore, in egalitarian societies with rather inarticulate, amorphous political organization. High M.P.R. means that since all able-bodied males are supposed to be warriors if need be, there is no specialized warrior stratum, having the monopoly of arms, and thus able to acquire privileges. Nor are there, in view of the low degree of subordination, any rights to command which would enable their holders to elevate themselves above the common crowd. Indeed, any cohesion that there is in such societies stems from either far-reaching kinship links (e.g., the Tallensi) or from the consciousness of cultural identity. This type of military organization is found only in small, isolated tribes, usually situated in inaccessible places (e.g., the Tallensi, the Eskimo, the Australian aborigines). It cannot survive in conditions of intensive and frequent warfare.
(2) The *Masaic* type of military organization differs from the Tallenic only in its greater cohesion; M.P.R. remaining high and the degree of subordination low. It is usually found in societies which are small and unstratified, but possess definite political organization, even though this organization is extremely democratic. Its cohesion is mainly the result of military cohesion necessitated by constant warfare. The Masai and practically all small and warlike societies belong to this category. They can have leaders, who are, however, as a rule of charismatic type, and whose authority is very circumscribed.

(3) The *Mortazic* (called after the mercenaries, or *mortazeh*, of the Abbaside Caliphate) type of military organization is characterized by low M.P.R., high cohesion and high subordination. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is found in societies which are steeply stratified and monocratically ruled. The organization of these societies may be segmentary (e.g., the Kitara Kingdom in Central Africa). This type of military organization can exist in very large societies, like the Roman Empire or Manchu China, but also in very small ones, like Milan under the Sforzas.

(4) The *Homoic* type of military organization is characterized by low M.P.R., high cohesion and low subordination. Typically, it is found in nobiliary republics marked by steep stratification, high cohesion and egalitarianism within the ruling stratum (e.g., Sparta).

(5) The *Ritterian* type of military organization is marked by a low M.P.R., low cohesion and low subordination. The political form which usually accompanies it is that of a nobiliary republic or feudal society. It seems inappropriate to apply the term feudal to all societies where a warrior stratum, possessing the monopoly of arms, rules unarmed masses. As such a type of society is, however, common enough, Andreski proposes to call it *bookayan*, and the dominating warrior stratum a *bookay*. These terms are derived from *buke* - the Japanese word for the military nobility.

(6) The *Neferic* type of military organization is marked by high M.P.R., high cohesion and high subordination. It is generally found in totalitarian, bureaucratic, and despotic societies. The societies whose military organization was most purely neferic - the Ch’in (Qin) and the Inca states - were also the most despotic and totalitarian.

Andreski also outlined in great detail the possible transitions from one type to another as a correlative of internal and external dynamics.

5.2.0.4 *Simple vs Middle-range Societies and the U-shaped Trajectory of Violence*

Recently, Knauft (1991, 1994) made a distinction between ‘simple’ and ‘middle-range’ societies, and their concomitant patterns of (collective) violence. He proposed that the overall trajectory of violence and sociality in human evolution may be U-shaped instead of linear.
In simple human societies, according to Knauft’s analysis, lethal violence may be high in aggregate statistical terms, but the pervasive ethos is one of active cooperative affiliation among diverse groups of relatives and nonrelatives. Food sharing in simple societies is both an index of cooperation and a key symbol of what it is to be human. More generally, an ethic of communalism and equal access to resource production is highly developed. Perhaps the most striking thing about simple human societies is how decentralized they are. Instead of individuals’ striving to be "first among equals", aggressively assertive, or powerful striving to be big-men there tends to be active and assiduous devaluation of adult male status differentiation and minimization or denial of those asymmetries of ability that exist. Self-aggrandizing behavior is disparaged and open coercion considered highly improper. Leadership is rudimentary and uninstitutionalized, and political life is communal. Patriarchy and elders’ authority are minimal, and leadership is itself rarely a matter of assertion, dispute, or competition.

The cultural norms of sociality in these societies seem to be both strong and prone to lethal contravention within the local group. The violence that does occur has relatively little to do with territorial rights, property, ritual status, or male leadership concerns and is based more on consensually approved status leveling among men than on status elevation. Rather than being valued or associated with kin-group or ethnic oppositions, violence emerges sporadically among local cooperative groups, especially as a social-control mechanism or as an expression - commonly displaced - of male sexual frustration. Such incidents are relatively uncontrolled and likely to result in homicide. This pattern of violence and sociality contrasts in very broad terms with that found in more complex prestate societies. In these 'middle-range' societies (including complex hunter-gatherers and tribes and chiefdoms), sedentism, property ownership, and male status differentiation are more developed, and conflict tends to arise from overt and chronic political status competition, both within and between groups, and from competition over access to resources. In contrast to that in simpler human groups, violence in middle-range societies tends to be valued as a dimension of masculinity, frequently takes the form of collective reciprocating conflict (i.e., warfare), and is often linked with fraternal interest groups, social boundedness, and ethnocentrism. In the evolution of Homo sapiens sapiens, it is likely that coercion and violence as systematic means of organizational constraint developed especially with the increasing socioeconomic complexity and potential for political hierarchy afforded by substantial food surplus and food production (e.g., Testart, 1982; Campbell, 1985; Gellner, 1989; Tiger, 1990; see Ch. 5).

Among complex hunter-gatherers and with the advent of sedentism and horticulture/agriculture, male status differentiation and the potential for material wealth differentials increases. Opportunities increase for selective
control of the flow of information and material resources and the development of social inequality; competition over access to positions of control intensifies; and various forms of leadership and status hierarchy emerge (gerontocracy, headmen, war leaders, priests, big-men, and chiefs).

As Collier & Rosaldo (1981) have noted, marriage and legitimate sexual access to a woman are predominant markers of male adulthood, and these rights are fervently protected. Correspondingly, much of the severe violence that occurs in simple societies is ultimately related to male sexual disputes over women. Displacement of affinal or sexual tensions also appears to underlie much of the seemingly irrational violence over ‘trivial’ issues that occurs in many egalitarian societies. Sexual tensions in these societies are normally kept in check by norms of affinal harmony, group cooperation, and personal propriety. When they are ultimately galvanized, however, they are frequently quite intense. This threat is exacerbated by the absence of political leaders or dominant individuals who might exercise control and of institutionalized or formalized redress mechanisms. Indeed, violence occurs in significant degree to prevent some individuals from acquiring sexual dominance.

In most simple societies, too aggressively self-interested persons may be killed with the consent or active collaboration of the community at large. This responsive violence can in a sense be considered a form of execution or capital punishment.

Often, however, the rationale for violence in simple societies is not so clear-cut. Violence often seems to erupt suddenly in a displaced, distorted, or noninstrumental manner. Cognitively displaced and projective aggression may also occur as violent scapegoating of persons within the community. Some forms of violence in simple societies thus appear almost more dysfunctional than functional and bear at least a passing resemblance to the syndrome of ‘phylogenetic regression’ described by Bailey (1985, 1987). On the other hand, ethnocentric violence is rare.

In simple human societies, exclusivity and boundedness of social groups are largely precluded by shifting resource availability, fluid population movement, lack of fixed property, and the need for intergroup alliance and support. Territorial rights, while often formally recognized, are rarely enforced when permission to hunt or forage is requested.

Given migratory patterns and resource dispersal, resources are difficult if not impossible to defend, and the cost of such defense typically outweighs its benefit. Likewise, the cost of defense and retaliation against armed aggression is typically great; it is more expeditious to move away. This tends to short-circuit patterns of feud and systematic raiding or warfare. There is evidence of reciprocating collective conflict, sometimes ethnically based, among simple foragers (e.g., Balikci, 1970; Lee, 1979; Clastres, 1972; Griffin, 1984; Robarchek, 1990). Feuding or warfare does not, however, appear pronounced except where, as among the Ache, Agta, and Waorani, large-scale
intrusion by agricultural societies resulted in conflict over land and internal societal reorganization.

In significant contrast to simple human societies, great-ape and middle-range human ones display similarities, or at least analogies, between male dominance and differential sexual access. The evidence suggests therefore, Knauft submits, that the trajectory of male status differentiation and violence in hominid/human evolution is U-shaped rather than linear. In tribal and chiefly societies polygyny is both an index and a reflection of status or rank, as it is in great-ape societies.

In middle-range societies, social competition increases with the increase in fixed, high-value resources, sedentism, and population density. Even where population density is low, valuable movable resources such as large domesticated animals may become a source of intergroup antagonism and systematic hostility. With sedentism and/or significant domestication of plants or animals there is a proliferation of corporate groups that stress exclusive membership and rituals of allegiance (e.g., Plog, 1990). Ethnic differentiation and ethnocentrism become more pronounced, and fraternal interest groups become increasingly important in armed conflict to protect or extend access to valued rights and resources. Johnson & Earle (1987) suggest that in "increasingly widespread and increasingly successful efforts to restrict access to critical resources, we encounter the beginnings of warfare."

Some researchers, including Haas (1990), suggest that increased warfare in sedentary societies is a key dimension of what is termed ‘tribalization’. Others, such as Braun (1990; Braun & Plog, 1982), emphasize multidimensional adaptations of sedentary communities. But, in either case, both the potential for and the incidence of collective armed conflict would appear to increase. Feinman & Neitzel (1984) found warfare to be the single most commonly reported function of leadership in sedentary prestate societies in Mesoamerica. Black (1990) has suggested that chronic vengeance as a mode of conflict management is especially pronounced when social groups are characterized by immobility, social distance, equality, and organization all typical of middle-range societies. In a cross-cultural analysis of aggression, Ross (1985, 1986) documents, among other things, a direct association between socioeconomic complexity and external warfare in prestate societies. The tendency toward warfare may yet be greater when paramount chiefdoms are created through conquest (Carneiro, 1981, 1990) and is also highly associated with if not partly causative of the rise of the state (e.g., Carneiro, 1970; Haas, 1982; Gabriel, 1990; cf. Claessen & Skalnik, 1978). Several authors, including Wrangham (1987); Manson & Wrangham (1991); Foley (1988); Foley & Lee (1989); and Ghiglieri (1987, 1989) posit a similarity between prestate human organizational patterns and chimpanzee patterns of male philopatry (males breeding within their natal group) and
violent male attacks on outside groups (See Ch. 3). These pongid patterns may provide an analogy with some sedentary human societies and complex hunter-gatherers, but they are highly questionable as a model for simpler human groups (Barnard, 1983; Knauf, 1991; Stanford & Allen, 1991). No single species is apt to provide an adequate model of early human social organization. Knauf concludes his analysis:

That the evolutionary period characterized by simple human societies may have been many times longer than that characterized by middle-range ones suggests that findings about violence and sociality based on selected case studies of the latter may be limited in their evolutionary implications. From the present perspective, the evolution of Homo is likely to have proceeded in large part among groups that had relatively open social networks, nonhostile intergroup interactions, and a significant degree of institutionalized if not monogamous pair bonding. Generalizations about human societal evolution are easily biased by HRAF samples weighted heavily with middle-range societies, which are far more numerous in the ethnographic record than simple ones though they have persisted for a much shorter period of evolutionary time (Knauf, 1991).

Rodseth (1991) and Abler (1991) pointed out that Knauf leaves open the question whether his 'simple societies' are simply products of the marginal environments they exploit and the resulting low population densities. Simple foraging societies as known from the ethnographic record may not be representative of such societies in the Pleistocene and may in fact be radically different, precisely because they have adapted to marginal areas outside the 'main currents of human social evolution'. While simple human societies may be simpler than any others known to ethnography, they also may be simpler than those of earliest Homo sapiens (or even earlier hominids) known only from the archaeological record.

The alternative scenario, as envisaged by Rodseth (1991), has the common ancestor of humans and African apes living in relatively closed, male-philopatric groups, then spreading out from central areas where resources were concentrated into marginal habitats where resources were dispersed. In these marginal areas, the open, flexible groupings characteristic of extant hunter-gatherers would have emerged, but in the central areas even simple foragers would have remained in relatively closed, male-philopatric communities. Eventually these would have been transformed smoothly into patrilocal tribal societies, with no intervening stage of flexible social organization. The U-shape of human social evolution proposed by Knauf would, on this account, be an illusion created by casting an adaptation to extreme conditions as a global evolutionary stage.

Also troubling is Knauf’s failure to consider the effect of state or imperial
expansion (both military and economic) on middle-range societies (e.g., Ferguson, 1992; Ferguson & Whitehead, 1992; Wolf, 1982).

5.2.1 Warfare as Macroparasitism: The Prevailing View

In contrast to the, mostly implicit, assumption of many evolutionary (in the Darwinian sense) theories of the origin of warfare, viz. that warfare is a concomitant of human evolutionary history and therefore existed from the dawn of mankind, there is another rather prevalent and popular view that envisages warfare as a relatively late (recent) cultural development. This is the view of warfare as macroparasitism. McNeill (1976) most cogently pointed out the parallels between the microparasitism of infectious diseases and the macroparasitism of military operations: "Only when civilized communities had built up a certain level of wealth and skill did war and raiding become an economically viable enterprise. But seizing the harvest by force, if it lead to speedy death of the agricultural work force from starvation, was an unstable form of macroparasitism... Very early in civilized history, successful raiders became conquerors, i.e., learned how to rob agriculturists in such a way as to take from them some but not all of the harvest".8

Leakey & Lewin's (1977) vision is fairly representative of the prevailing one. War, they write,

is a battle for power over people and for resources such as land and minerals, neither of which were relevant in hunting and gathering societies. With the growth of agriculture and of materially-based societies, warfare has increased steadily in both ferocity and duration, culminating in our current capability to destroy even the planet: powerful leaders have found more and more to fight about, and increasingly effective ways of achieving their ends. We should not look to our genes for the seeds of war; those seeds were planted when, ten thousand years ago, our ancestors for the first time planted crops and began to be farmers. The transition from the nomadic hunting way of life to the sedentary one of farmers and industrialists made war possible and potentially profitable (Leakey & Lewin, 1977).

The territoriality and economic surplus generated by the Agricultural Revolution thus commits people to defending the land they farm. "To run away in the face of hostility is to face certain loss: a year’s labour may be invested in

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8 Related to this macroparasitism paradigm, with strong cataclysmic connotations, is another popular metaphor, the epidemiological one: War as a disease periodically afflicting mankind or specific subdivisions of mankind (See especially Alcock, 1972; and Beer, 1981), or as a pathological condition of society. While the methods of epidemiology may be fruitfully applied to wars, the conception of war as a disease of the body politic is not a very useful one.
the fields, and that cannot be given up easily... As well as land that requires defending, agriculturalists tend to acquire property, both personal and communal, that needs to be guarded" (Leakey, 1981). The accumulated property also creates the temptation of, and the incentive for, macroparasitism. One of the most eloquent of the advocates of this 'conventional' view of war is Boulding (1978), who states:

A strong case can be made for the proposition that war is essentially a phenomenon of the age of civilization and that it is inappropriate both to precivilized and postcivilized societies. It represents an interlude in man's development, dated 3000 B.C. to, say, 2000 A.D. It is particularly associated with the development of cities by the expropriation through coercion of the food surplus from agriculture. It is significant that the neolithic villages which preceded the development of cities, in which agriculture was practiced but the surplus from agriculture was not yet collected into large masses to feed urban organization, seem to have been very peaceful... We can hardly doubt that there were many violent encounters between the neolithic farmers and the paleolithic hunters and food gatherers whom they so largely displaced, but these were not organized as war... War, therefore, is peculiarly a property of a system of deterrence under urban - that is, civilized - conditions (Boulding, 1978).

Also Schneider (1950; 1952) maintains that "war is an invention of relatively late origin". Warfare as we know it, he explains, originated in Mesopotamia, where early civilization had built a military organization to penetrate the hinterland in search of land and resources and to defend itself against raiding nomads. Similar views have been proposed by White (1949) and his school of cultural evolutionists, and virtually all writers of international relations, political science, and general history textbooks (e.g., Mumford, 1960; Bronowski, 1973; Starr, 1974; Vasquez, 1993).

It is clear that the Agricultural Revolution, the transition to a settled existence

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9 The only problem with the 'progress' from hunting-gathering to agriculture is the assumption that the agricultural revolution made the quantum jump in population possible. In view, however, of the facts that life expectancy of agriculturalists actually decreases in comparison with hunter-gatherers (Cohen, 1977, 1987; Slurink, 1993); that farmers have to spend more time and labor for less energetic returns; that the diet of hunter-gatherers is calorically quite adequate and richer in variety, vitamins, minerals, and proteins than that of agriculturalists; that hunting-gathering involves activities widely preferred to those of agriculture and provides foods widely preferred for consumption to the main agricultural staples; and that the food supply of hunter-gatherers is more reliable than that provided by primitive agriculture (Roele, 1993), the 'progress' may actually have been a regress, a deterioration necessitated by prehistoric overpopulation. In other words, it may not have been the discovery of agriculture which led to population explosion, but overpopulation which led to the adoption of agriculture by necessity (Cohen, 1977, 1987).
and in its wake urbanization, centralization of political control, and the economic surplus and organizational ability to maintain standing armies, constituted a major turning point in human history. In his *Parable of the Tribes*, Schmookler (1984) sketched the following scenario of the consequences of this revolution, as summarized by Cashman (1993).

Agricultural societies eventually encountered limits to their growth posed by the existence of other communities. This typical Malthusian problem could be resolved either by more intensive use of the land or by expanding one’s territory at the expense of one’s neighbors by means of force. The more highly organized emerging city-states pursued the latter course. In response, peaceful societies had essentially four possible options: Destruction by their neighbors, subjugation, withdrawal through migration, and imitation. Imitation proved to be the preferred choice of most communities.

In order to survive, agrarian societies were compelled to emulate their most bellicose rivals. They built large communities through consolidation and aggregation; they constructed large-scale political organizations in order to efficiently mobilize their populations; they initiated taxation systems to make the wealth of society available to those governments; and they created military institutions to protect and extend their power. In reality, certain avenues of cultural evolution were closed off. More highly organized societies drove out the less highly organized; the large drove out the small; and the more warlike cultures drove out the more peaceful cultures into marginal habitats. Social evolution proceeded in only one direction: Toward the creation of ever more powerful and ever more militant societies. These militaristic societies spread throughout the world, and wars between them became endemic.

In an interesting variant of this scenario, Mumford (1960; see also Wittfogel, 1957) suggests a basically religious origin of war in the early civilizations. With the agricultural revolution arose totalitarian bureaucracies supervising the gigantic public works (irrigation systems, canals, roads, walls, pyramids) based on forced labor or slavery, which in turn gave rise to despotic power (both sacred and secular), divine kingship and the related institution of human sacrifice; the underlying conception being that communal life and prosperity could be preserved only by sacrificial expiation, at first of the divine king himself but later of sacrificial substitutes.

"As the demands for such victims increased in times of trouble, these substitutes were sought outside the community, by violent capture. And what began as a one-sided raid for captives in time brought about the collective reprisals and counterraids that became institutionalized as war. Back of war lay this barbarous religious sanction: only by human sacrifice can the community be saved. War, then, was a specific product of civilization - the outcome of an organized effort to obtain captives for a magical blood sacrifice". The capability to produce unprecedented, relentless violence and massive destruction became the symbol of royal power.
No doubt, part of the attractiveness and persistence of this prevailing view is due to the fact that the beginning of war coincides with the commencement of *codified* history, with written records (from Akkad, Sumer, Babylon and Assyria) of predatory and internecine warfare and horrible accounts of devastating destruction, massacres of entire populations, and remorseless, unimaginable cruelty.  

5.2.2 Marxism-Leninism

The Marxist-Leninist views on war are broadly compatible with the cultural invention paradigm. Orthodox Marxism-Leninism conceives of war as an instrument in the political class struggle, and consequently contends that war is a social phenomenon coexistent with class society. In other words, wars first occurred once class societies (i.e., states) had emerged. Marxism-Leninism thus assumes that

(a) there was no war in primitive societies: "The theory of Marxism-Leninism has proved that in the society of the primitive community, where no states and classes existed, no wars occurred, as an organized armed struggle for political goals. When states appeared, wars also appeared" ("Voina" in Bolshaia Sovietskaya Entsiklopedija, 2nd ed., Vol. 8, 1951; Cf. Lider [1977] for other references). This ‘narrow’ view is based on Lenin’s concept of war (derived from his notes on Clausewitz’s *On War*).

(b) that armed clashes in primitive society must be considered to be a predecessor of war in their technical-military aspects (Kuzyakov, 1972). "There was war in its initial form as a social phenomenon in the tribe societies, but it only developed when state and division of the society in classes have appeared" (The Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, 1969). This ‘broad’ view is derived from Engels (1878, 1884), following Morgan’s *Ancient Society* (1877). Primitive society, Morgan had contended, was basically communistic, lacking

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10 “When Shalmaneser took Arzashku, the royal capital of Urartu (near Lake Van in eastern Turkey), he impaled the defenders on sharpened stakes and then piled their severed heads against the city’s walls. We know this because he boasted of his deed on bronze gates he had erected in the city of Imgur-Enlil, near his capital of Niniveh. The Assyrians had the reputation of being particularly ruthless even in the ancient world, but Shalmaneser’s behavior was by no means unusual.

One of the very earliest records of Egypt, dating from around 3200 B.C., shows the Pharaoh Narmer (who may have been the man who united the entire kingdom for the first time) with the headless bodies of slain enemies. The oldest inscription that has survived from Mesopotamia is the Stele of the Vultures, which shows carrion birds fighting over the entrails of soldiers killed in the battle in which Eannatum of Lagash defeated the rival city-state of Umma. War has been the constant companion of civilization, and most of the time it has been waged with savage cruelty toward the defeated — far more remorseless and efficient cruelty than most of the world’s ‘savages’ have ever displayed. And the reason for this is contained in the way that civilization was born” (Dyer, 1985).
important commerce, private property, economic classes, or despotic rulers. Increased productivity in some primitive societies had led to increased trade, and consequently to private property and classes of rich and poor. After Marx's death Engels published the products of their joint appreciation of Morgan's materials in his *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* (1884). Essentially, the book was an expanded version of the basic ideas germinated by Morgan: Certain primitive societies had improved the technological means of production, the surplus product of which was traded; as this process was expanded, society perforce changed from a production-for-use economy to a production of commodities, and with commodity production unearned increments arose due to differences in efficiency, in supply and demand, and in the activities of middlemen; thus, with the rise of private differences in wealth, economic classes appear. Here is the economic genesis of the state: From their material (economic) beginnings, classes become gradually social, and finally political as well when the rich erect a structure of permanent force to protect their class interests. The political state is thus a special means of repression by the propertied class (Service, 1975). Engels discusses the breakdown of the *gens* system of social organization, which, following Morgan, he believed to be the key to mankind's prepolitical history. Pressure of population drove tribes to merge their separate territories into the aggregate territory of the nation, i.e., a social unit defined by the territory in its permanent possession (Gallie, 1978). "Thereupon war and the organization for war became a regular function of national life... the wealth of neighbors excited the greed of nations... Pillage seemed easier and even more honorable than acquisition of wealth by labor. War, previously waged only in revenge for attacks or to extend territory which had become insufficient, was now carried on for the sake of pure pillage... and became a permanent branch of industry" (Engels, 1884).

War in this latter sense goes back to the very beginnings of mankind: "[W]ar was as old as the simultaneous existence of several adjacent tribal communities" (Engels, 1878).

The 'narrow' view was, however, at least in the former Soviet Union, the prevailing one (See especially Lider, 1977). On the vicissitudes of the Marxist-Leninist conception of (primitive) war see also Kara (1968) and Gallie (1978).
5.2.3 Theory of the Unique Origin of War: The Diffusionists

The theory that warfare is a relatively recent one-time cultural invention which diffused from one or a small number of centers in which the invention was made has been proposed by Perry (1917 et seq.), Rivers (1922), G.E.Smith (1924; 1929; 1930), and MacLeod (1931). The corollary of this theory, which in essence dates back to the classical Greek philosophers, is of course that before that invention mankind lived in a 'Golden Age of Peace', in which, in spite of the discomforts and anxieties of daily life, men cheerfully enjoyed a state of Arcadian simplicity, of which poets have been writing for thirty centuries. Letourneau (1895) had been one of the first to assert that among the most primitive men "warlike conflicts have generally been retaliatory: they have assumed a juridical character and have been rare and not bloody. From this point of view, there was a golden age of the human race".

The most elaborate and extreme exposition of the diffusionist theory has been that by Perry (1917; 1923) who contended that war was uniquely invented in predynastic Egypt and subsequently gradually diffused throughout the world from that focal country. After man had existed as a peaceful food-gatherer in a Garden of Eden for over half a million years, the inventions of agriculture, irrigation, class society, human sacrifice, slavery, civilization and war were all made in the valley of the Nile by a 'sun-worshipping aristocracy', because to obtain victims for sacrifice (a practice associated with agriculture all over the world) and slaves to engage in cultivation and to maintain the ruling class in power, more violence was necessary. "The hypothesis that warfare originated among a sun-worshipping aristocracy is therefore in accordance with the facts... It can be shown that the motive which led the 'children of the sun' to the ends of the earth, was that of the exploitation of wealth" (Perry, 1917).

Perry marshalled a considerable body of evidence for his theory (See for a synopsis Q.Wright, 1942). The opponents of his theory, however, marshalled a no less formidable body of evidence, most of it summarized by Spinden (1927) and Q.Wright (1942), which led - like old soldiers who never die, but just pass away - to the demise of the Diffusionist school.

Others, especially evolutionists, rejected the notion of a 'Golden Age of Peace' and supported the Hobbesian conception of 'natural' man: "There was no Arcadian peace and simplicity in the elder ages. Men always quarreled, if they did not fight it was because they were too broken, cowed-down, or cowardly. It was only as time went on that peace was found to be a more expedient policy... Generalization as to the warlike or unwarlike disposition of the savage must take account of many varying types; but it is fair to infer that mutual suspicion and fear were the rule among the scattered groups of early man, competing as they were for precarious sustenance" (Sumner & Keller, 1927).
5.2.4 War: A Social Theme and Cultural Invention

The philosophy of John Dewey and the anthropological researches of Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and others have, after the era in which instinctivism ruled supreme, provided a new aperçu to understand the problem of (primitive) war.

Dewey (1922) reasoned that Man is essentially a creature of (learned) habit, and that social institutions and human cultures, which shape those habits, show a high degree of diversity. Applying these considerations to war, Dewey declared that war is just a 'social pattern' like slavery. Aristotle thought slavery was rooted in original human nature, and therefore natural and inevitable, because (he thought) some persons were by nature endowed with the power to plan and command, while others had only the capacity to obey. But, like slavery, war is not a psychological necessity, but a social institution, and is not rooted in original human nature, any more than slavery or polyandry.

"What does our knowledge of cultural diversity and variety in social organization show? We have to give up antiquated ideas such as that competition is rooted in human nature, or that war is an inevitable result of man's pugnacity, or that man has an instinct for private property. Marriage, slavery, war - these are 'social themes'" (Dewey, 1922), which may or may not be used in some cultures, and used for different purposes and in different contexts. What is considered to be valuable in one culture may not be so in another (Murty & Bouquet, 1960).

On the other hand, Dewey leaves no doubt that he locates the root cause of war in human psychology: "The trouble lies in the inertness of established habit. No matter how accidental and irrational the circumstances of its origin, no matter how different the conditions which now exist to those under which the habit was formed, the latter persist until the environment obstinately rejects it".

Cultural anthropologists, such as Ruth Benedict (1934), reinforced the arguments and conclusions of Dewey. Certain cultures, she stated, have no place for the institution of war; and in those cultures which use it, it is used for achieving "contrasting objectives, with contrasting organization in relation to the state, and with contrasting sanctions" (Benedict, 1934).

Margaret Mead (1964) asserts in a similar vein: "Warfare... is an invention like any other of the inventions in terms of which we order our lives, such as writing, marriage, cooking our food". War is, in Mead's most poignant formulation, "only a cultural invention, not a biological necessity" (Mead, 1940). She argued that some primitive societies, of which the Canadian Eskimo are the prime example, lack organized warfare because they simply do not have, and cannot grasp, the concept of war. "So simple peoples and civilized peoples, mild peoples and violent, assertive peoples, will all go to war if they have the invention... Warfare is just an invention known to the majority of
human societies" (Mead, 1940).

Man *an sich* (whatever that may mean) would be peaceful, it is his culture which transforms him into a belligerent creature. Such an unspoken assumption seems to be implied by this school. Such cultural relativism tends to deteriorate into empty phraseology, however, as soon as it is cross-examined. For example, why do originally peaceful people create cultures in which it is possible to 'invent' war; why was the institution of war invented at all; why was it invented in so many cultures, and left 'uninvented' in so few? (Cf. Klineberg, 1960).

5.2.4.1 Cultural-Learning Theory

Malinowski (1941), the most influential anthropologist of the middle years of this century, had argued that "All types of fighting are complex cultural responses due not to any direct dictates of an impulse but to collective forms of sentiment and value".

Malinowski's viewpoint paved the way for cultural-learning analyses of primitive and civilized war, of which May (1943) is the first and most important representative. He states: "If man is more aggressive and warlike than he is peaceful, it is to be attributed not to perverseness in his nature or even to original sin, but rather to the fact that life, as he has been compelled to live it, has been such as to reward pugnaciousness and the use of force more than other forms of adaptive behavior... A group that has relatively little and wants much will employ aggression as a means to the achievement of its ends provided its members have learned that aggression pays. On the other hand, if a group has learned that aggression does not pay, at least in the type of situation that is confronting it, some other technique for achieving its ends will be employed or the ends will be renounced" (May, 1943).

Other psychologists have not entirely abandoned the notion that some phylogenetic predisposition might enter into the human propensity for war or the learning of warlike behaviors. For example, Hebb & Thompson (1964) have pointed out that mammals seek excitement, and that this search has desirable possibilities in society as well as extremely undesirable ones. "The plain fact is that the primate is only too ready to become a trouble-maker when things are dull and we had better stop comforting ourselves with the accurate but insufficient statement that man has no instinct to make war. He also needs no special coaching to discover a taste for 'adventure' and some of his adventures may be socially disastrous... Making war is not instinctive; neither, unfortunately, is an aversion to certain forms of excitement that may lead to war" (Hebb & Thompson, 1964). Knight (quoted in Cashman, 1993) formulated a similar maxim: "What people really want is trouble, and if they do not have enough of it, they will create it artificially".

Against the "War is not in our genes" argument (Carrighar, 1968), Hebb &
Thompson would probably have replied: "Neither, unfortunately, is peace". In a similar vein, Macdonald (1975) contends that of the five factors in the etiology of war - biological, psychological, social, economic, and political - the biological is the basic one and its influence has been greatly underestimated. He considers the human affinity with, and fascination by, weapons to be basically biological: "The term 'biological' implies that our use of weapons is not purely cultural in origin but that our genetic code conveys a message which renders resort to weapons a likely response to stimuli which threaten, or appear to threaten, the individual or group".

Other behavioral scientists have argued that man is not by nature endowed with strong propensities for either peace or war. "Would it not be far more parsimonious to begin with the assumption that men are by nature neither aggressive nor peaceful, but rather are fashioned into one or another as the result of a complex interaction between a widely, but not infinitely, modifiable set of biological givens and the shaping influences of the biological environment, the cultural envelope, and individual experience?" (Eisenberg, 1972).

Similarly, Leakey & Lewin (1977) hold that "Humans are not innately disposed powerfully either to aggression or to peace. It is culture that largely weaves the patterns in human societies".

As one may deduce from these quotations, in the Anglo-American language area generally, the opposite of peace is not simply war, but a much more generic and encompassing concept: 'aggression'. Unfortunately, the term aggression has been used as a descriptive category on all levels-of-analysis (from single organisms to nations and empires) as well as an explanatory category (and, to make the confusion complete, a legal category in international law). Many scholars have invoked 'aggression' in attempts to explain the institution of war, the occurrence of war, the propensity to war, (parts of) the processes and behaviors resulting in war, and the motivational make-up of the individuals fighting the war. To this enchanted domain we now turn.
5.2.5 Frustration-Aggression Displacement Theory

5.2.5.1 The Concept and Theories of Aggression

'Aggression' is a rather elusive concept. It has been described as a "semantic jungle" (Berkowitz, 1981), a "portmanteau term which is fairly bursting at the seams" (Storr, 1968), and "an ill-defined array of different responses" (E.O. Wilson, 1978). In a 1980 publication, I have listed 106 more or less different definitions of aggression from all disciplines, and many more of related concepts such as 'agonistic behavior' and 'violence' (often regarded as the more destructive forms of 'aggression'). Ethologists, psychobiologists, sociobiologists, geneticists, psychopharmacologists, psychopathologists, neuropathologists, clinicians, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, psychologists, sociologists, criminologists, anthropologists, political scientists and peace researchers - all have contributed some vision on the phenomena of aggression and/or violence. Considering their different and heterogeneous perspectives, disciplinarian traditions, paradigms, anthropological axioms, ontological assumptions, etc., it is no wonder that confusion and controversy are rampant; students muddling through the aggression quagmire, thrashing around in murky concepts and ill-defined terms; and theoretical positions seemingly irreconcilable.

Aggression has been variously conceptualized as an instinct, appetite, drive, tendency, disposition, subinstinct, manifestation of energy or power, motivation, genetic trait, character or personality trait, subroutine, behavior, social interaction, a manner or style or intensity or vigor of behaving, custom or learned habit, script, and culture pattern. And definitions range from the simple "fighting instinct in animals and man" (Lorenz, 1966), through "the behavior intended to hurt or harm, or to inflict pain or noxious stimulation" (e.g., Dollard et al., 1939; Buss, 1961; Berkowitz, 1962), to the rather obnoxious "kinetic energy capable of accelerating a given system's tendency towards entropy or thermodynamic equalization" (Laborit, 1978).

For some aggression is equivalent to self-manifestation, the assertiveness and self-imposition of being; for others it is the employment of force or coercion in interpersonal interactions; for others it is the proximate mechanism of contest competition; for still others it is a behavior that results in personal injury; and for still another category it is equivalent to the workings of a 'death instinct', periodically resulting in massive destruction, wars and atrocities.

In their laboratories, scientists have studied the mouse-killing behavior of rats, the slapping of Bobo dolls by presumably frustrated children, the delivery of fake electric shocks or bursts of white noise in so-called learning paradigms, the hose-biting behavior of restrained monkeys following an electric tail shock; and have mutilated the bodies and brains of laboratory animals in all imaginable ways in order to understand some aspect of 'aggression' and general human nastiness.
Controversies reign over questions whether ‘aggression’ is a unitary construct or a multifactorial one comprising distinct types of behavior; whether to include or exclude assertiveness (self-imposition); whether to include or exclude violence; whether to include or exclude intentionality; whether to include or exclude predation (as ‘interspecific aggression’); whether to include or exclude motivational constructs or limit the concept to observable behavior only, etc. Each proposed solution to these problems brings in its wake its own problems and limitations. For example, ethologists generally find no need for the concept of intentionality, while psychologists (hard-core behaviorists excepted) cannot reasonably do without it. In the Anglosaxon literature ‘aggression’ and ‘violence’ are generally coterminous and coextensive, while in the assertiveness and motivational formulations of aggression, manifestations of aggression are usually considered to be distinct from manifestations of violence.

Comparatively, aggression is identifiable only at a broad functional level. Wind (1982) suggested that aggression "is, in fact, part of a vaguely circumscribed cluster of behavior modes which, due to our pattern recognition capacities, are usually classified as aggression. It is therefore a statistical concept following from a deeper level of behavior modes that are recognized in the species as a whole. These are probably the consequence of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy particular to that species. The described behavior, therefore, occurs on the phenotypic level, whereas the second, cluster-like, phenomena have to be localized on a deeper, i.e., genotypic, level as determined by its selective value in many previous generations”.

It would seem logical in terms of available evidence and what we think we know of phylogenetic orders and relationships, to view the design characteristics of aggressive activities as being homologous across the mammalian phyla including that of the human primate (Carpenter, 1968).

So many subdivisions and dimensions of the concept of aggression have been proposed in the literature that the concept borders on the verge of meaninglessness. These range from simple dichotomies such as offensive versus defensive aggression, constructive versus destructive aggression, arousal (affective, angry, hostile, annoyance-motivated) aggression versus instrumental (incentive-motivated) aggression, physical versus verbal aggression, active versus passive aggression, benign versus malignant aggression, direct versus indirect aggression, antisocial versus prosocial aggression; other-directed versus self-directed aggression, individual versus collective aggression (to mention only the most salient), to elaborate typologies based on differential neurophysiological and endocrinological substrate involvement and situational diversity of eliciting cues, as proposed by van Sommers (1972), Moyer (1968 et seq.), and E.O. Wilson (1975) a.o. These latter typologies are mainly derived from animal models, and may be hard to
apply to most human situations. Moyer, for example, distinguishes predatory, antipredatory, intermale, fear-induced, maternal, sex-related, irritable, instrumental and territorial aggression (the last category was deleted from later works), and Wilson distinguishes territorial, dominance, sexual, parental disciplinary, weaning, moralistic, predatory and antipredatory aggression. See van der Dennen (1980) for an extensive overview of other typologies and taxonomies.

It is small wonder that several researchers have proposed to abandon the concept of ‘aggression’ altogether (e.g., van Es, 1978; Leyhausen, 1979; Tedeschi et al., 1974; van der Molen & van der Dennen, 1982; Tedeschi, 1983).

Theories of (human) aggression can be categorized under the headings of

(a) *Instinct or appetite theories*, including the hydraulic (also irreverently called ‘toilet flush’) model of the Lorenz school of ethology, and the *Trieb* (instinct/drive discharge) models of some psychoanalytic schools.

According to the German ethological school (Lorenz, Leyhausen, Eibl-Eibesfeldt), aggression is a genuine instinct, as well as fear (*Angst*). They only make sense together (Leyhausen, 1967). In everyday life we ‘spend’ our aggression (*Kampfantriebe*) and fear ‘in small coins’, through rather innocent outlets. That is, aggression is virtually never so pent up as to need paroxysmal or cataclysmic outbursts. The dynamic instinct conception of this school implies an endogenous, relatively autonomous, self-regulating energetic system of drives (*Antriebe*) in temporal homeostasis. The performance of Fixed Action Patterns (FAPs), such as in sexual behavior, aggression, feeding, etc., depends upon the accumulation of energy specific to these activities in centers of the central nervous system. Inner rhythmicity and outer world are synchronized to a certain extent by means of Innate Releasing Mechanisms (IRMs) consisting of a sensory receptor component sensitized or tuned to certain releasing stimuli in the environment (called *Auslöser*, signal-, cue-, key-stimuli), constituting the *Umwelt*, and a releasing component, eliciting, activating, or disinhibiting the drive. In exceptional cases, the threshold lowering of eliciting stimuli can be said to sink to zero level, since under certain conditions the particular instinct movement can ‘explode’ without demonstrable external stimulation (called *Leerlauf* or vacuum-reaction).

The psychoanalytic *Trieb* formulations of aggression are considerably less specific regarding mechanisms of (energy) accumulation and release.

Curiously, aggression had no place in Freud’s topographical theory of psychic structure. In 1908, Adler proposed the idea that aggression was an innate, primary, instinctual drive (soon reinterpreted in terms of ‘masculine protest’). Not until 1915 (*Instincts and their Vicissitudes*) did Freud consider aggression to be a component of the ego instincts: Frustration of behavior aimed at gaining pleasure and avoiding pain led to (furious) aggression. Finally, in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud developed the 'death instinct' hypothesis. Freud's idea of a 'death instinct' (Todestrieb, also called Thanatos, Destrudo, Mortido) - in which human destructiveness is explained as an externalization of this self-destructive tendency - was adopted by Melanie Klein (1932 et seq.) and Federn (1932) a.o., but has never found many followers, though some interesting attempts at reinterpretation have been proposed (Menninger, 1938; Deutsch & Senghaas, 1971; Fromm, 1973; and others). According to Ferguson (1984), only one anthropologist (Henry, 1941) has ever explicitly invoked the death drive in explaining a primitive war complex.

After 1920, Freud devoted considerable attention to the role of the destructive instinct in group formation and civilization. The most detailed exposition of his views is to be found in Civilization and its Discontents (1930), where he states that a powerful share of aggressiveness must be counted among the instinctual endowments of man, which may "manifest itself spontaneously and reveal men as savage beasts to whom the thought of sparing their own kind is alien". Such a gloomy view of the human condition was *grosso modo* repeated in Why War? (1932): "We are led to conclude that this instinct functions in every living being, striving to work its ruin and to reduce life to its primal state of inert matter". Thus Freud came to envisage aggression as primarily to purely destructive, without any apparent biologically adaptive function. Some kind of organic or psychological 'law of entropy'.

Most neo-Freudians and contemporary psychoanalysts have fused some drive conception of aggression with ego-psychological mechanisms, making it more compatible with frustration-aggression (Horney, 1937, 1939, 1960; Anna Freud, 1936 et seq.; A.Freud & Burlingham, 1943; Fenichel, 1945; Hartmann, Kris & Loewenstein, 1949; Sullivan, 1953 et seq.; Erikson, 1965; Mitscherlich, 1969; Fromm, 1973; Bender, 1973; a.o.) and social or cultural learning-theory formulations (Hacker, 1971; Horn, 1974; a.o.); have formulated dynamic psychiatric conceptions of aggression (e.g., Ammon, 1970), or have singled out narcissistic aggression as a contemporary problem (Kohut, 1973; Fromm, 1973; Kernberg, 1975). Others have attempted to synthesize psychoanalysis and Marxism (e.g., Marcuse, 1955), psychoanalysis and Lorenzian ethology (e.g., Storr, 1972), or psychoanalysis and sociobiology (e.g., Badcock, 1989 et seq.).

(b) Frustration-aggression (F-A) theories, including many major modifications, reformulations and minor subvariants. Though receiving its classic expression in the work of a group of Yale psychologists (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer & Sears, 1939), the theory was proposed much earlier by McDougall (1908) and Freud (1915). The basic assumption of the Yale school was that "aggression is always a consequence of frustration. More specifically, the proposition is that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of
frustration always leads to some form of aggression". This was a rather
exorbitant claim and led two years later already to a major modification:
"Frustration produces instigation to a number of different types of responses,
one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression" (Miller, 1941).
Aggression was regarded by the Yale group as a desire to hurt and injure
others, and frustration was defined as an interference with an ongoing goal
response (goal inaccessibility through thwarting, obstruction, a blockage or
barrier). They also posited a direct proportionality between the amount of
frustration and the instigation to aggression. The amount of frustration was
thought to depend on the strength of the drive toward a goal, the degree
of interference, and the number of frustrated responses. The resulting instigation
to aggression could then be directed toward the agent of frustration, or could be
redirected toward another person or the self (displacement). The act of
aggression, finally, was thought to reduce the instigation to aggression
(catharsis). The Yale school borrowed many concepts from psychoanalysis,
though the theory was phrased in (quasi) behaviorist terminology.
The original reactive-mechanistic F-A hypothesis of the Yale school has not
stood up against the evidence. It soon became apparent that frustration did not
invariably result in aggression, and that aggression was not automatically the
result of frustration. Other instigators to aggression, such as threat or insult,
proved much more effective than frustration. It was also overlooked how much
human aggression is actually instrumental in character (McCauley, 1990). Yet,
the simplicity of the F-A notion led to a widespread acceptance (despite the
rather pessimistic implication of the theory, which went largely unnoticed, that
because frustration was considered to be ubiquitous, aggression also would be
ubiquitous). Social experiments in the United States to raise children in
frustration-free educational environments failed dismally. The kiddos turned
out to be unmanageable cookie-monsters rather than the unaggressive, stable
and harmonious personalities the parents had hoped for.

The most fervent critic-cum-advocate of F-A theory, Berkowitz (1962, 1965,
1969, 1982) proposed a major reformulation, as follows. The perception of
frustration (now including ‘annoyers’ and aversive stimuli) is considered to
arouse anger, which functions as a drive. In other words, the emotional reaction
(anger) to the frustration creates a readiness to commit aggressive acts.
Aggressive behavior will not occur, even given this readiness, however, unless
evoked by suitable external cue stimuli. The suitable cue stimuli may then lead
to aggressive behavior by arousing previously learned but latent aggressiveness
habits, and the occurrence of the aggressive behavior is an inherently satisfying
response to the anger. Anger is conceived as an inborn reaction to goal
blockage (The Yale school left the question whether the F-A linkage was
considered to be ‘learned’ or ‘innate’ unanswered). Prior learning may influence
how a given situation is perceived and interpreted, and therefore define the
appropriateness of the behavior. Only a narrow range of objects provides
satisfying targets for the aggressive response, but almost any form of aggression can be satisfying as long as the angry person believes that he has in some way injured or hurt his supposed frustrater. Other theorists envisaged some kind of energy pool of 'free-floating aggression' as a result of cumulative frustration (a basic idea in frustration-aggression-displacement theory). The mobilization of energy due to continued and cumulative frustration "tends to flow over into generalized destructive behavior" (Stagner, 1965).

Other revisionist theories within the broad framework of F-A theory have been developed by McNeil (1959), Feshbach (1964 et seq.), Kaufmann (1970), Schuh & Mees (1972), J.Goldstein (1975), Larsen, 1976; Baron (1977), Zillmann (1979), Kornadt (1981), A.Goldstein (1983), among many others. Few contemporary theories have escaped the impact of F-A theory, though its extensive reformulations have made it rather nebulous and virtually useless (e.g., Selg, 1975; Ferguson, 1984; Krebs & Miller, 1985; McCauley, 1990; Cf. Cofer & Appley, 1964; Rummel, 1977; van der Dennen, 1980).

(c) Learning theories, including cultural learning theory (e.g., Alland, 1972) and social learning theory (e.g., Mowrer, 1950; Bandura, 1973 et seq.; Bandura & Walters, 1959) with a number of subvariants: Operant conditioning (Skinner), social interactionist (Patterson), transactional (Goldstein), cognitive script (Eron, Huesmann), and cognitive-neoassociationist theory (Berkowitz). According to cultural learning theory, man is not aggressive, but cultures are. Aggression is seated within the culture, and it is learned, or rather absorbed, by the individual in the same way a language is acquired. The proper focus of research should thus be the cultural context of aggression, and its function in the maintenance and development of the culture. In social learning theory formulations aggression, rather than being a drive in search for gratification, is considered to be acquired through learning and experience, more specifically, by means of familial and subcultural socialization practices, behavioral (role) models and scripts, symbolic modeling, observational or vicarious learning and imitation, reinforcement, rewards, social facilitation, sanctioning and approval, conditioning, and similar processes. An important observation of social learning theory is that in the process of development and socialization, human beings learn a great variety of ways to express aggression and hostility other than in open and direct attack. "People ordinarily do not aggress in conspicuous and direct ways that carry high risks of retaliation. Instead, to protect against counterattack, they tend to hurt others in ways that diffuse or obscure responsibility for detrimental actions. The injurious consequences of major social concern are often caused remotely, circuitously, and impersonally" (Bandura, 1976, 1978). Particularly insightful are Bandura's observations on the self-absolving cognitive maneuvers for performing injurious and cruel behavior without the pangs of a bad conscience.
The conception of aggression as an acquired drive (e.g., Miller & Dollard, 1941; Dollard & Miller, 1950; Sears et al., 1953), habit (e.g., Buss, 1961), etc. may be subsumed here, as fundamentally the same learning processes are considered to be involved.

(d) **Self-esteem theory**, also called self-esteem restoration, self-consistency, existential validation, status-threat, or third-trend theory, developed out of humanistic (self-actualization) psychology (Maslow, Erikson, Fromm, May, White & Lippitt, Yablonsky, Feshbach, van Dijk, Siann, Heller, Rummel), and is only remotely related to F-A theory. Basically, the sole source of aggression, as seen by this school, is the frailty, shaky, vulnerable character of our self-esteem. Violations of self-esteem, be it threats to one's status or prestige; challenges to one's integrity, masculinity, or intrinsic worth; insult or humiliation; coercion or thwarting; moral indignation; personal failure, powerlessness or insignificance; mobilize the need to restore self-esteem, and one way of restoring self-esteem, and demonstrating one's power, is (violent) aggression. Yablonsky (1962), in particular, has pointed out that the most quixotic and disgusting acts of violence, as in gang wars and massacres, may be understood as attempts at existential validation. Or, as Fromm (1973) summarized the basic tenet of this school: "If man cannot create anything or make a dent in anything or anybody, if he cannot break out of the prison of his total narcissism, he can escape the unbearable sense of powerlessness and nothingness only by affirming himself in the act of destruction of the life that he is unable to create". In essence, therefore, aggression is an 'escape from insignificance' (and, if successful, may provide deep satisfaction, which, at least in part, explains its appeal and contagiousness, and even the 'esthetic' pleasure inherent in destruction and vandalism, as implied by 'esthetic' theories [e.g., Allen & Greenberger, 1980]).

(e) **Aggression as a subroutine or subsidiary instinct; the hierarchico-cybernetic model.** The spontaneous, specific energy accumulation implied in the hydraulic model of aggression has been seriously challenged especially by neurophysiology, neo-ethology and evolutionary biology. Scott (1958 et seq.) was one of the most outspoken and fervent critics of the Lorenzian proximate model of aggression - Lorenz's ultimate explanation of the evolution of aggression and its social functions was, as we saw in Ch. 1, firmly rooted in group selectionism (Das sogenannte Böse was actually for the benefit of the species), and unable to explain the lethality of much animal agonistic behavior. Scott pointed out that "All of our present data indicate that fighting behavior among the higher mammals, including man, originates in external stimulation and that there is no evidence of spontaneous internal stimulation. Emotional and physiological processes prolong and magnify the effects of stimulation, but do not originate it". In other words, there exists what may be called a physiological disposition, "an internal physiological mechanism which has
only to be stimulated to produce fighting" (Scott, 1968).
It was also observed by many ethologists and psychologists (Craig, 1918, 1928; Tinbergen, 1953; Hinde, 1960, 1970, 1974; Marler & Hamilton, 1966; Scott, 1968; E.O. Wilson, 1971, 1975; Crook, 1973; Schuster, 1978, among others) that an instinct of aggression as envisaged by the Lorenzians, or an endogenous tendency, an intrinsic motive to fight for its own sake would be selected against.
Accordingly, the term 'instinct' was gradually abandoned in favor of concepts like 'wiring diagram' (Berkowitz, 1967), 'biogram' (Count, 1973) or 'biogrammar' (Tiger & Fox, 1971), and the notion of aggression as a subroutine or subsidiary 'instinct'. In psychology the concept was introduced by Scherer, Abeles & Fischer (1975). In their view, aggression is not a general instinct in its own right, but rather a part of more general instincts such as reproduction, feeding, or defense. They argue that "it seems more reasonable to assume aggressive subinstincts in the service of important species-preserving instincts than to posit a general aggressive instinct whose consequences would be dysfunctional during much of the individual's life span" (despite the appeal to 'species-preserving instincts', the message is clear).
A similar concept of aggression as a low-level subroutine is implied in the hierarchico-cybernetic model of motivation developed by Tinbergen (1950, 1969) and Baerends (1956, 1960, 1976; see also: Baerends, Beer & Manning, 1975; Archer, 1976; van der Dennen & van der Molen, 1980; van der Molen & van der Dennen, 1982). The original versions of this motivational model were presented as tentative explanations of the complex organization of the reproductive behavioral system in certain fish and bird species. According to this model, the goal-orientedness of the reproductive system is based on the activity of hierarchically structured functional centers in the central nervous system. The reproductive system as a whole is considered to be activated by global inputs from the environment. More specific stimuli from the environment determine which concrete action patterns are subsequently displayed by the animal. The effects of these patterns are continuously fed back to the higher centers of the system. The perception of certain global goal situations would result in the behavioral system as a whole being switched off.
Such a model can also fruitfully be applied to the agonistic behavioral system. The proximate model of aggression in the ultimate context discussed in Ch. 3 would then correspond to a species-specific subroutine conception of aggression (or a cluster of coevolved subroutines). A subroutine is a part of a wider program (the motivational system which evolved in the service of reproductive success), and can be called upon request (also by other subroutines). It does not have appetitive properties (Eigenappetenz) as most instinct or drive conceptions imply (i.e., a drive that builds up inside the organism and has to be worked off by fighting).
Phylogenetically, the subroutine is probably derived from the repertoire of behaviors involved in self-defense and offspring-protection (Scott, 1976;
Albert, Walsh & Jonik, 1993), and it is still intimately (neurophysiologically and endocrinologically) connected with the fear/flight system (for the details see van der Dennen, 1985), such that fear-induced self-defensive aggression, when escape from the situation is somehow blocked (the 'cornered cat phenomenon'), is the most vehement and lethal (Archer, 1976; Rasa, 1981, 1982; van der Dennen, 1985).

As aggression is extremely costly behavior, with potentially high benefits, it is supervised by sensitive cognitive (involving, for instance, the decision which stimuli are potentially noxious, or what resource is particularly desirable) and appraisal mechanisms (assessing e.g., indicators of the fighting ability of the opponent, the presence of potential allies, etc.), which can be calibrated and fine-tuned by feedbacks from the organism's situational and accumulated experience.

At the level of manifest behavior the system shows a number of context-sensitive levels of escalation depending on the balance between internal motivation and external cues.

The appraisal/assessment mechanisms (which may well be sexually dimorphic, reflecting the differential parental investment strategies of the sexes) may, under certain neuro- or psychopathological conditions, become un-calibrated or out-of-tune, resulting in hypo- or hypertrophied escalation levels, or manifestation of aggressive behavior in inappropriate contexts (for a review of the neuro- and psychopathology of aggression see van der Dennen, 1983).

Such a conception of aggression as a subroutine is comparable to E.O. Wilson’s (1975) idea of aggression as a "genetic contingency plan - a set of complex responses of the organism’s endocrine and nervous systems, programmed to be summoned up in times of stress", in which any of its components may have "a high degree of heritability" and is therefore subject to continuing evolution.

The relatively long-term stable human attitude complexes and sentiment structures such as vengefulness, vindictiveness, rancorous resentment, hostility, enmity, hatred, animosity, etc. (what Fromm would call malignant aggression, as opposed to benign aggression), are commonly thought to be derivations or transformations of some malicious aggressive drive, but have probably more to do with the uniquely human cognitive capabilities of symbolizing, memory and anticipation, and fear/apprehension as a result of hypertrophied threat perception in combination with a vulnerable self-system. Hatred would be quite unthinkable without long-term memory, enabling the individual to recall and ruminate on previous humiliating experiences. Man 'incorporates' his enemy so to speak.

In a major application of the hierarchic motivational model by Archer (1976; see also Toates & Archer, 1978; Toates, 1980; Bolles, 1970; Leshner, 1975), he reasoned that the common factor involved in situations evoking attack and/or fear is that they provide a discrepancy of some magnitude from the
animal's expectation model of its environment (the neuronal representation or template of the stable properties, spatial as well as temporal, of its surrounding area). Any such perceived discrepancy activates the orienting response (general alert), and, if sufficiently large, the attack/fear system. Fear behavior includes two contrasting types of responses: Freezing (tonic immobility, lethosis; presumably evolved as an anti-predator device) and fleeing. When escape is physically blocked, the motor command for escape is changed to attack, even though no general tendency to attack exists and the animal still shows the autonomic signs of fear.

Van der Dennen & van der Molen (1980) and van der Molen & van der Dennen (1982) developed the model still further by integrating it with the conflict- or ambivalence hypothesis of motivational states (e.g., Tinbergen, 1952; Baerends, Brouwer & Waterbolk, 1955; Krujft, 1964; Hinde, 1966; Baerends, 1975), the 'emergency-system' hypothesis as developed by van Rooijen (1976), Kortmulder's (1974) 'behavioral expansion' hypothesis, reversal theory (Smith & Apter, 1975; Apter & Smith, 1979; Apter, 1982), the mathematical branch of catastrophe theory (Thom & Zeeman, 1974; Zeeman, 1976), and a new theory of positive and negative learning spirals and concomitant growth of skills and unskills, to account for the sudden (catastrophic) changes from flight to fight and vice versa but also the gradual and sudden changes from playful to full-scale agonistic interaction. The most surprising prediction derived from the resulting tri-stable system model (see Fig. 5.2) is the inevitability and involuntary nature of learning; the individual willy-nilly launches itself periodically into trouble through paratelic (explorative) action, and thus continues to accumulate experiences in relevant areas of life. A less surprising prediction involved the predominant role of threat perception and fear in all kinds and forms of human aggression and violence. This, of course, has been discovered again and again from Thucydides onward (See van der Dennen, 1985). Fear as the root cause of human aggression and violence in general has been identified by Bovet (1928), Browne (1938), Rombouts (1938), Marmor (1964), Carp (1967), Stagner (1967), Bychowski (1968), Horn (1969), Fromm (1973), Groen (1974), Vestdijk (1979), and its role in the genesis of war has been recognized by Mühlmann (1940), Turney-High (1949), Senghaas (1968), Horn (1970, 1972), Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (1971), Scott (1974, 1976, 1981), Meyer (1977 et seq.), Taylor (1979), Humble (1980), among many others. Fear is also the most commonly reported emotion in battle (e.g., Marshall, 1947; Potegal, 1979).

I have dwelt somewhat on the subject of aggression because 'aggression' (however conceived of) is an all-time favorite 'explanation' of war. Under closer scrutiny, however, the 'explanation' soon turns out to be tautological or circular. For example, war is often defined as a (special) category of aggressive behaviors (intergroup aggression), and subsequently 'explained' by 'aggression' (an aggressive drive seeking release, an uncontrollable aggressive instinct, a
Destrudo, or similar construct). E.O. Wilson (1978) answered the question "Are human beings innately aggressive?" in the affirmative by pointing to the ubiquity of primitive warfare as irrefutable evidence. In an examination of the alleged aggression-warfare linkage (van der Dennen, 1986), I have attempted to show that these and similar statements contain a number of non-sequiturs and fallacies, of which the so-called cumulative fallacy is the most prominent: Wars do not result from the summated aggressive tendencies of individuals. It is not simply accumulated and aggregated individual aggression. Primitive warfare is predominantly to exclusively a male business. Are women not afflicted by 'innate aggression', or not counted as human beings? Only a small proportion of the male population actually engages in combat. The majority of the population never fights in war. Should we believe that in that majority the 'innate aggression' is inoperative? Or, that for some mysterious reason the 'innate aggression' manifests itself only in the warriors?

Of course, in the face-to-face combat of primitive warfare, it might be highly profitable for the warrior to develop some kind of combat readiness or 'fighting spirit', if only to overcome or suppress fear. This actually often has to be induced artificially by means of ritual chants, war dances, incantations to the spirits, shamanistic practices ensuring invulnerability, and intoxication by alcoholic beverages or other psychotropic drugs. But a delirious mind, and a body geared for explosive, paroxysmal action should not be confused with aggression.

For the contemporary situation, Levi (1960), among many others, has noted that there never seem to be enough 'aggressive' men flocking to the recruiting stations during war, so that everywhere men are drafted to perform such services. Once drafted into the military, they need a heavy dose of conditioning, drill, training and indoctrination to turn them into efficient fighters in face-to-face combat. And even so, when actually engaged in combat, most soldiers do not even bother to pull the trigger (Marshall, 1947): "They were willing to die for their countries, but they were not willing to kill for them" as Cashman (1993) remarked.

Studies of combat motivation have pointed primarily to factors as obedience, conformism, sense of duty, loyalty to one's own primary combat unit, camaraderie, fear to lose 'face' or self-esteem, considerations of individual self-concern and survival, and, to a lesser extent, conviction and commitment, patriotism and moral indignation; rather than to motivations such as aggression or hatred of the enemy (though occasional, transient episodes of rage - when a buddy is killed or wounded - may accompany the war activities) (Marshall, 1947; Stouffer et al., 1949; van Meurs, 1955; Ashworth, 1968; Moskos, 1969, 1971, 1976; Gray, 1970; Shirom, 1976; Ellis, 1982; Kellett, 1982, 1990).

11 "Nowhere has the element of fear become more apparent than in nonliterate man's military preparational ceremonies" (Turney-High, 1949). See also Kennedy (1971).
In brief, explaining war by invoking aggression is no more convincing than invoking human stupidity or original sin. "Even if aggression is a universal human trait, war is not" (Ferguson, 1984).

5.2.5.2 Personal Aggressiveness and War
One of the most ambitious explanations of the connection between personal ‘transformed’ aggression and war was attempted by Durbin & Bowlby (1938). Though intended to be a theory of modern war, it clearly claims universal validity and applicability to pre-state level warfare.

Man, they pointed out, is a naturally sociable animal and spends much more of his time at peace than at war. How does this natural sociability break down? There are 'simple causes of fighting’ among animals, especially primates, and children: Possessiveness, including jealousy; intrusion of a stranger (ethnocentric-xenophobic aggression); and frustration.

In adults, however, these simple causes of fighting are modified or transformed by two facts. In the first place, the superordinate group interest: "[T]he aggression of adults is normally a group activity. Murder and assault are restricted to a small criminal minority. Adults kill and torture each other only when organized into political parties, or economic classes, or religious denominations, or nation states. A moral distinction is always made between the individual killing for himself and the same individual killing for some real or supposed group interest".

In the second place, the superordinate group mentality or ideology; adult aggression is covered with a rich patina of ratiomorphic nonsense and rhetoric: "[T]he adult powers of imagination and reason are brought to the service of the aggressive intention. Apes and children, when they fight, simply fight. Men and women first construct towering systems of theology and religion... before they kill one another".

At least three mechanisms, Durbin & Bowlby suggest, operate to transform personal tension into group aggression: (1) Animism (the universal tendency to attribute all events in the world to the deliberate activity of human or parahuman will). (2) Displacement (though not the ultimate cause, is a direct channel of the ultimate causes of war): "[T]he transference of fear or hatred or love from the true historical object to a secondary object simplifies life". (3) Projection. This consists essentially of crediting others with the aspects of one’s recognized and unrecognized motives that one most dislikes.

But why do states/tribes/polities/groups wage war? For two reasons: "In the first place... the expression of aggression on a group scale appears to restore to it simplicity and direction. In the civilized adult the original and simple causes for fighting are forgotten and overlaid with every kind of excuse and transformation. But when aggression is made respectable by manifestation through the corporate will of the group, it resumes much of its amoral simplicity of purpose". In the second place, because of the pressure of transformed aggression within their members. The members of the group may
be so frustrated, and so unhappy that the burden of internal aggression may become intolerable. They have reached a point at which war has become a psychological necessity. Ambivalence is so severe, internal conflict so painful, fear and hatred of the scapegoat so intense, that a resolution of the crisis can only be found in war. In such cases war will be fought without adequate objective cause. It will have an objective occasion, some trifling incident or dispute, but the real effective causes will be elsewhere, within the tormented souls of the members of the aggressor group.

5.2.5.3 'Belly hot with anger': Redirection of Aggression

Examples of the attempt to interweave psychological (frustration-aggression) and sociological (massive redirection as Ventilsitte) principles into an explanation of primitive warfare are e.g., Whiting's (1944) analysis of Kwoma headhunting, and Murphy's (1957) analysis of Mundurucu warfare. Their analyses are based on frustration-aggression theory, the basic tenet of which was, as we saw, that aggression is always a consequence of frustration. Warfare is considered by these authors as a more or less 'safe' outlet for accumulated aggression (a tenacious idea repeated until today; e.g., Maryanski & Turner, 1992): Aggressive manifestations "are enjoined in war where the expression of aggression serves a socially useful end" (Dollard et al., 1939). Such deflection of internally generated aggression upon an outside target is called redirection or the frustration-aggression displacement syndrome. As Otterbein (1973) succinctly summarized the theory: "The frustrations of everyday life create an aggressiveness that is often channeled into warfare".12

The Kwoma are a small tribe situated in the mountains just north of the Sepik River, New Guinea, and about 250 miles from its delta. As they dwell in a head-hunting area, they live in constant fear of being murdered in raids carried out against them by neighboring tribes. Whiting states about them: "The Kwoma also carry out head-hunting raids against tribes who have not directly frustrated them. They frequently displace to the outgroup, aggression which was generated within the tribe. This is evidenced by the fact that the only two raids, about which I was able to question participants, began with in-group quarrels. One informant said that he has organized a raid because his wife had teased him for not showing himself a man by taking a head. When he started to beat her for taunting him, she

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12 Frustration-aggression displacement has also been a favorite and pervasive explanation of contemporary wars: "Any nation, or any society, where there are major frustrations may easily be led into war. It is not that there are warlike peoples so much as that when persons are frustrated long enough, they take recourse to war" (Gardner Murphy, 1945). The main problem of this theory concerns the degree or intensity of frustrations, and especially the distribution of the frustrated individuals. Should a frustrated group be equally and homogeneously frustrated? Or only the dominant group? Or only the leader(s)? Or only a certain percentage? And, if so, to what degree? Etc. etc. (Valkenburgh, 1964). All in all, it obscures more than it clarifies.
accused him of being a woman-beater but afraid of men. With his 'belly still hot with anger' he had then organized a raid, in which he had taken a head. Another raid, organized during the period of field work, also grew out of a quarrel between a husband and wife" (Whiting, 1944).

A similar 'belly-hot-with-anger' case is that of the Nakoaktok (Kwakiutl) man, whose brother was taken prisoner by an unknown northern group. He "determined to go fighting and to attack whomever he should meet" (Curtis, 1915). Codere (1950) explains such reactions from the "desire to answer death with death". This desire springs from the conviction that "the death of anyone outside the local group could cancel out the effects of the death of one of its own members" (See also § 5.2.10.5 on the paranoid elaboration of mourning).

Among the South American Mundurucu, warfare operated, according to Murphy (1957), to maintain social cohesion by providing an outlet for frustrations and hostile feelings generated by the social organization of the group. As Murphy states: "[T]his type of social structure actually generated the bellicose activities and attitudes that functioned to preserve it, and... this circular relationship allowed Mundurucu society to continue through a period during which it was subjected to severe internal and external threats... Intercommunity cooperation in warfare was facilitated by the peculiar juxtaposition of matrilocal residence and patrilineal descent". Intervillage matrilocality distributed Mundurucu males throughout the cultural area, producing a social structural situation in which related male kinsmen resided in different communities with their affines. If overt conflict were to occur, Mundurucu villages would be torn to pieces. This did not occur because men repressed their grievances, since they could not rely upon the support of their kinsmen residing elsewhere. This repressed hostility then achieves release through warfare against distant enemy tribes (Otterbein, 1973).

"Paradoxically", Murphy states, "for a people who considered all the world as an enemy, the true cause of enmity came from within their own society". Also Ellis (1951), in a review of Pueblo Indian warfare, concludes that "warfare served to provide legitimate outlet for the frustrations and aggressions arising from unpermitted competition or suspicions thereof among peoples of the same general culture". Similarly, Steward & Faron (1959) suggest that the need for social harmony in crowded Tupinamba villages resulted in frustrations that found expression in relentless warfare. See also Wedgwood (1930) and Kluckhohn (1949) for similar internal-fuel-for-external-war formulations. Ferguson (1984) observes that most anthropologists would agree that pent-up hostilities within a group can be redirected toward outsiders, but that not all of them would accept this mechanism as a cause or explanation of war (e.g., Newcomb, 1960; Leeds, 1963; Hallpike, 1973).
5.2.6 Schismogenesis

An important concept relevant to understanding some instances of warfare, according to Harrison (1973), is the process termed schismogenesis, first described by Bateson (1936) in his psychological-anthropological study, *Naven*, of the Iatmul people of New Guinea. Schismogenesis, as defined by Bateson (1967), is "a process of differentiation in the norms of individual behavior resulting from cumulative interaction between individuals". Schismogenesis leads not only to greater differentiation in norms but also mutual opposition and rivalry within the context of the interaction as well. While Bateson describes this interactional, relational process generally in terms of individual behavior he suggests its application for groups and for understanding some of the conflict relations within and between nations as well (Harrison, 1973). Such behavior may occur in either one of two forms. The first is that of complementary schismogenesis: "If, for example, one of the patterns of cultural behavior, considered appropriate in individual A, is culturally labelled as an assertive pattern, while B is expected to reply to this with what is culturally regarded as submission, it is likely that this submission will encourage a further assertion, and that this assertion will demand still further submission. We have thus a potentially progressive state of affairs" (Bateson, 1967).

The second type of schismogenetic relationship is termed a symmetrical one. In this dyadic relationship the behavior of one individual or group leads alter to respond with similar behavior: "If, for example, we find boasting as a cultural pattern of behavior in one group, and that the other group replies to this with boasting, a competitive situation may develop in which boasting leads to more boasting, and so on" (Bateson, 1967).

Such a situation is exemplified by the pitched battles of primitive peoples, of which so many ethnographic accounts exist. Such behavior in which both sides challenge and taunt their foes and display bravery, would continue until either both parties decided to call a halt to the proceedings by truce or until one side was routed by the other.

The potlatch of the Kwakiutl and other American Northwest Coast Indians, as described by Codere (1950), may also be regarded as a kind of symmetrical schismogenesis. In this situation the feasting, gift-giving or destroying of property by one group would eventually lead to an escalated response by those being hosted. This process would continue in stepwise fashion until it was no longer possible for one set of the participants to maintain or increase the intensity of interaction (Harrison, 1973).
5.2.7 Conflict Theories

In a major review and analysis of New Guinea warfare, Paula Brown (1982) summarized the range of other possible interpretations of primitive warfare. Koch (1974) attributes warfare in Jalé society to the pattern of socialization and absence of accepted authority to settle disputes. Hayano (1974) considers warfare in the highlands generally as a means of settling inter-village disputes. Hallpike (1977) has stressed the apparent lack of population pressure and beneficial ecological consequences in the practice of warfare among the Tauade of highland New Guinea: "Tauade pig-rearing, feasts and dances, fighting and vengeance are not biologically adaptive, or even socially useful in any objective sense. They form a complex of traits which is given coherence by the... cognitive orientation and the value system of the society".

Rappaport (1968) and Heider (1979) provide cultural, ideological, and ritual explanations, showing that warfare is part of cultural tradition and religious beliefs. The Maring cycle of pig production, ritual, and feasts permits warfare at certain times (Rappaport, 1968); the Dani belief that ghosts help living relatives kill enemies and also require warfare to avenge deaths (Heider, 1979). Sillitoe (1978) explains New Guinea warfare as the rivalry of big-men for followers and control. His conclusion that war is politically motivated rejects ecological, demographic, and similar causes of war. It emphasizes social and political relationships within and between groups. This introduces the factor that links these studies to conflict theory, following Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956), which is also the basis of Paula Brown's (1982) interpretation of Chimbu (Simbu) warfare.

Simbu clans and tribes are good examples of Simmel's notion of the integrating role of antagonism and opposition. The continuing pressure, danger, and tensions between groups serve to ally the members of clans and tribes. This has been impressed upon many observers and is a basis of the idea of political autonomy of the groups. Simmel's other observations - that war is a form of contact between groups, that one fights under the mutually recognized control of norms and rules, and common membership in a larger social structure - also applies to this situation.
5.2.8 Exchange Theory, Reciprocity and War

Sahlins (1965, 1972) identified three kinds of reciprocity in human social life: Generalized, balanced, and negative. Exchanges that are long-term and generally beneficial and not tallied, and made between members of the same household and others closely related by kinship or special ties constitute generalized reciprocity. Balanced reciprocity refers to equal exchanges, such as trades, that are not necessarily repeated and are characteristically made between distant relatives, intracommunity nonrelatives likely to interact repeatedly, and persons from other, non-hostile communities.

In situations of negative reciprocity one partner gets something for nothing, or if articles are exchanged, one partner receives something he values more highly than what he gave in return. The most blatant negative exchanges between communities are the spoils of war. Negative reciprocity is characteristic of dealings between a home community and strangers and enemies far beyond its boundaries (See also Ch. 6).

Schwimmer (1979), in an analysis of reciprocity in Orokaiva, another Papua New Guinea society, considers ceremonial exchange as an activity among the Orokaiva, and permanent war a form of negative reciprocity characteristic of relations with the mountain tribes outside this social realm.

For structuralists (e.g., Lévi-Strauss, 1943; Mauss, 1967; Rubel & Rosman, 1978) generally, war is the other side of exchange within a structure of relations; "war is an exchange gone bad, and exchange is a war averted" (Ferguson, 1984).

Moore (1978) considers primitive warfare complexes and trading rings to be functional equivalents in a world of cultural climax. "The primitive world at its most complex involves the two closely related institutions of warfare and trading rings... we shall see that these area wide systems integrate many communities in a precarious, fragile balance that is preserved by diplomatic exchanges oscillating between negative and balanced reciprocity. Such competitive alliances or communities constitute a 'cultural climax' that falls short of the simpler, more effective social organization of civilization. The climax is a saturation, leading nowhere".

Primitive warfare, according to Moore, is a partial attempt to maintain long-term diplomatic equilibrium among circles of communities.

The expeditions against the enemy and the alliance making of primitive warfare seem strange to us precisely because their overall function is to maintain the status quo, to keep many peoples over a broad area in long-term equilibrium, in which no one conquers anyone else and no one wins real victories.

Such systems of war and trade are all symbolic treadmills, for no one makes a profit, no one gets something for nothing in the long run. And in spite of the many victories tallied to the multiple scores, no one ever wins, because there is
no victory, only constant efforts to achieve a balanced exchange on every side and on all scores.

5.2.9 Unrestricted Primitive Warfare and Trap Psychology

Tefft (1988, 1990) explored this cul-de-sac of unrestricted primitive war (i.e., conflicts without institutionalized checks limiting the levels of intertribal violence) in greater detail. He suggests that political communities can become 'entrapped' in violent patterns of interpolity behavior even though such collective aggression leads to total destruction of many of the polities involved. Therefore, Tefft argues, that unrestricted war in the long run, proves to be detrimental to the welfare of the participating polities or, in other words, unrestricted war is 'maladaptive'.

Unrestricted war seems to entrap polities in repeated cycles of continued violence. "Initially, aggressiveness may have been of survival value to the tribe" states Rapoport (1974) but "eventually this contribution to survival potential may have vanished but the traditions related to aggressiveness and violence may have become internalized to the extent that they can no longer be modified or dislodged". In a similar fashion Hallpike (1973) has suggested that "we should recognize that there are likely to be many situations... where the society in question is caught in a vicious circle... and that while the society may not be wiped out, the institution may be perpetuated because there is no way to stop it, not because it is performing some vital function for that society" (Hallpike, 1973; italics added).

Also Peoples (1982) points out that the assumption that because all local groups in a regional population participate in the warfare all must benefit from this behavior, is erroneous. See also Harris’ (1975) idea of war as an 'ecological’ trap (§ 4.4.1).

There is considerable ethnographic and ethnohistorical evidence which suggests that unrestricted war was widespread among tribal peoples, especially in those areas where war was 'endemic' (Meyer, 1981 et seq.). Enemies tried to totally destroy each other (e.g., Langness, 1973 for Papua New Guinea). There is constant danger that communities may be annihilated or subjugated.

Why do such unrestricted, internecine wars persist? Tefft invokes modern trap psychology and social learning theory (Cross & Guyer, 1980; Bandura, 1978, 1986) for a reanalysis of Mae Enga and Maori warfare. These theories suggest that as a result of actual or perceived rewards, symbolic reinforcement, ignorance of the long-term effects of various actions, miscalculations of the risks, and vicarious satisfactions, members of political communities fall into 'social traps', here referred to as 'war traps'.

Cross & Guyer (1980) differentiate between various types of social traps. Time-delay traps occur when current rewards reinforce the wrong actions. Since undesirable consequences occur only after a considerable time lag, punishment has little effect on inhibiting future recurrence of the same trap.
The negative consequences of a pattern of behavior may not be sufficiently contiguous to it to encourage a selection of alternatives. Miscalculations occur because "events are typically related to each other probabilistically rather than invariantly (and) such causal uncertainty leaves much room to err in judging why things happen" (Bandura, 1986). Relationships between cause and effect are unclear because the effect follows the cause by some period of time, or because the immediate cause cannot be distinguished from other possible causes (Kasper, 1980). Public occasions on which community leaders revivify past provocations or debate the threatening future create a social climate in which peoples’ emotions are stirred in such a way that they will support aggressive actions regardless of the future danger (Bandura, 1973). Consequently, people perceive their enemies as an external evil so threatening to their security that any violent collective action, no matter how desperate, is justified (Clark, 1986).

The sliding-reinforcer traps refer to situations in which past positive reinforcement results in a continuation of a behavioral pattern "long after the circumstances under which that behavior was appropriate has ceased to be relevant, producing negative consequences which could have been avoided easily and the behavior stopped earlier" (Cross & Guyer, 1980). Moreover, over the long term rewarded behavior may have unintended effects that accumulate slowly. Sliding-reinforcer traps may be merely forms of time-delay traps.

So-called external traps occur when the acts by a particular individual or group bring harm to other individuals. When the separate and independent acts of numerous individuals, groups, or polities bring collective harm to all, a form of externality trap called a collective trap has occurred. The collective trap is a form of externality trap in which similar behavior by individuals or social units, operating independently, bring collective harm to all the participants.

Why would groups continue behavior that brings collective harm? Each independent decision-making unit perceives that there are no alternatives that bring immediate payoffs. Therefore it will be reluctant to abandon established behavior regardless of the ultimate adverse consequences. The long-range collective harm produced by the acts of individual units will not inhibit their behavior. The short-term benefits to each participant in the system may encourage imitation by other participants, thus compounding the collective harm that eventually results.

Tefft suggests that the unrestricted wars initiated by the pastoral Dassanetch (Almagor, 1977, 1978a,b; Collins, 1961), living north of Lake Turkana, is the result of such an externality trap. It occurs because young warriors pursue their own interests - by conducting devastating raids against their enemies - in a way in which they ultimately involve the whole tribe in destructive intertribal conflict. The self-interest of the warrior cliques forces the Dassanetch into a war trap contrary to the interests of the elders and probably the majority of tribal members.
5.2.10 Psychoanalytic Theories

In the preceding paragraphs we already encountered psychoanalytic concepts and terminology. The following paragraphs focus on more 'orthodox' psychoanalytic theories, points of view and insights regarding primitive war. Freud's name has been eminently connected with the topic of 'war and civilization', and, indeed, there is no consistent theory on primitive war causation from his hand. Yet, some of his insights may be relevant to our subject-matter.

In *Totem and Taboo* (1913) Freud followed Darwin's suggestion that the primordial human society consisted of family hordes, and formulated his theory of the 'primal event' (or 'primal horde'), and the basis of the incest taboo and the Oedipus complex. The workings of the speculative and rather obnoxious *Todestrieb* never inspired to any serious theory formation, in contrast to the Oedipus complex.

Money-Kyrle (1937) described three psychoanalytic theories of primitive war, the first of which is what he calls the 'sexual theory' of war (merely based on phallic symbolism). The second is the 'Oedipal theory' (actually the reciprocal of the Oedipal complex; see § 5.2.10.3). The third is the paranoiac theory, based on Melanie Klein's (1932 et seq.) good/bad objects theory. According to the paranoiac theory of war, intergroup conflicts are transformed into war because real differences are not dealt with through realistic procedures, but rather through distortions of reality and through the assumption of a radically destructive attitude toward the other. The killing of enemies, Money-Kyrle believes, "is often an obsessional or ritual act, which, on account of its magical attack on his unconscious bogies, saves the savage from his neurotic fears". Wars among primitive peoples may have rational motives, such as the defense of or attack on land, pillage, slave raiding, etc., but, Money-Kyrle asserts, there is always some admixture of the irrational motives connected with the unconscious need to negate the bad presences and to firmly establish the good ones.

5.2.10.1 The Sadomasochistic Theory of War: 'Destructive orgasm'

Glover's (1947) reflections on war mainly concern the role of sadistic and masochistic impulses in primitive and civilized armed conflicts. According to him, war provides perhaps the most dramatic piece of evidence that destructive impulses can be completely divorced from biological aims. Accordingly, he considers the political and economic theories of war (which regard war as the expression of a fight for self-preservation) reactionary and obscurantist because, he asserts, the real functions of war are purely destructive. Glover further maintains that the same basic mechanisms that are operative in the cannibalism of primitive tribes are also operative in war; both phenomena are traceable to Man's unconscious sadism.
Primitive tribes do not hesitate to declare that they want to make war in order to give their enemies a reason for mourning, while civilized peoples strive to consider their wars justified by objective motives, such as economic interests or the defense of a political system (Fornari, 1974).

Glover regards war as a manifestation of conflict between human impulses, an attempt to solve some problem, "a mass insanity, if you like, provided you remember that insanity is simply a dramatic attempt to deal with individual conflict, a curative process initiated in the hope of preventing disruption, but ending in hopeless disintegration".

Glover notes that masochism contributes considerably to an unconscious readiness to tolerate or even welcome situations of war. And it does so because the acceptance of suffering, in addition to being a primary form of gratification, represents a primitive method of overcoming unconscious guilt.

Glover views war as a mental disorder of the group mind. Conceiving the relations between groups as mutually sadomasochistic, Glover in effect puts the aggressors and the defenders on the same level. He notes, in fact, that the 'attacked' are sometimes even more determined to win their 'defensive' war than the 'attackers' their 'aggressive' war. Through war, then, society allows the individuals to experience the destructive orgasm which usually cannot be reached on the individual level (Fornari, 1974).

A comparable idea was elaborated by Bataille (1962). According to him, the origins of war, sacrifice and orgy are identical; they spring from the existence of taboos set up to counter liberty in murder or sexual violence. These taboos inevitably shaped the explosive surge of transgression.

Towards the end of the Upper Paleolithic ten or fifteen thousand years ago, the transgression of the taboo orginally forbidding the killing of animals, (considered as essentially the same as men), and then the killing of Man himself, became formalized in war. Primitive war is, according to Bataille, rather like a holiday, a feast day, and even modern war almost always has some of this paradoxical similarity. War was first another outlet for the feelings that are given expression in ceremonial rites; originally war was a luxury. It was no attempt to increase the peoples' or rulers' riches by conquest; it was an aggressive and extravagant exuberance, with the character of a destructive orgy.

Rather enigmatic is DeMause's (1977) assertion that "Groups go to war in order to overcome the helplessness of being trapped in a birth canal, through means of a sadomasochistic orgy in order to 'hack one's way out' of the mother's body".
5.2.10.2 Herd Instincts

As we have seen in Ch. 2, instinct psychology flourished around the *fin de siècle* period, exemplified by McDougall's (1908) 'instinct of pugnacity'. Some early psychoanalysts held that any primitive instinct, when obstructed, might result in war without the intervention of a fighting instinct. For example, Beatrice Hinkle (1925) stated: "War instincts as such do not exist. The so-called war instincts are not instincts in themselves, but are compounds of numerous other primitive impulses. There is, however, an instinct, or impulse to action, of a kind which has enabled man to dominate his environment and to overcome the handicap of his original weakness... This same impulse to action, which subdued and changed his natural environment to suit his will was turned against his own kind, other humans, who also were part of his environment, when at any time they encroached upon the group organism with which the particular individuals were identified or stood in the way of his desired advance".

Trotter (1915) developed a theory of three types of herds and of three corresponding 'isotropic' herd instincts: The lupine or wolf type, the sheep form, and the bee type.

The sheep never fight, while the bees fight only to protect themselves against invasion. The wolves, on the other hand, are aggressive, rapacious, cruel and treacherous. They are hell-bent on conquest and the enslavement of other peoples. They depend on force, intimidation and fraud to achieve their ends. But once they are whipped they behave like curs and retreat into their lairs to await another opportunity to bare their teeth and march to the slaughter. With such people in the world there can never be any adequate security and war will remain a constant menace and even an inevitability (Bernard, 1944).

Such reasoning engendered much speculation on 'herd instincts'. MacCurdy (1918) developed such a theory (which is, in fact, an early formulation of a group selection theory of ethnocentrism; see Ch. 6). Briefly stated, it holds that primitive Man, moved by fear and sense of insecurity, identified himself closely with his group or herd - so closely in fact that the interests of the group took precedence over his own individual interests, which were merged in those of the group. This leads him to look with suspicion upon all outsiders, all people who have strange dress, manners, customs, or even beliefs. Primitive Man, as does modern Man, readily kills the outsider and willingly risks his own life for the protection and preservation of the lives of his fellow herdsmen or nationals. War, MacCurdy says, "is never far from consciousness when such suspicious rivalry is in the air".

MacCurdy believes that there is a "deep-lying instinct for the preservation of the species" which makes this sort of loyalty or patriotism possible. This 'herd instinct' he accepts as a true cause of war. There is, as Bernard (1944) observed, no need of assuming any underlying herd instinct, or instinct to preserve the species, or any other general instinct as
a basic or fundamental cause of war. There is, furthermore, nothing particularly psychoanalytic about this theory, except that it is put forth by a psychoanalyst.

5.2.10.3 Filicide and Intergenerational Male Hostility

"The governing bodies and leaders of the nations of the world are made up predominantly of older males who recurrently produce mass murder, in recurring 'wars' of younger males of each new generation who are... deprived of civil rights. This would strongly suggest an intense and murderous, albeit unconscious, hostility of older males for younger males" (Walsh, 1971).

Some psychoanalysts have elaborated a theory that throws heavy responsibility on something they call 'filicide', which is the reciprocal of the well-known Freudian Oedipus complex. Where the Oedipus idea emphasizes the son's unconscious fear and hatred of the father, mostly because of his jealous love for the mother, filicide refers to the unconscious hatred of the father for the son, upon whom the former may displace feelings of jealousy and hostility felt at an earlier stage of life toward siblings and indeed toward the father (Cf. Rascovksy, 1970, 1974; Rascovksy & Rascovksy, 1972). And what better way, they hold, of finding expression for filicide than by sending the youth out to die in a war? How often indeed has it been remarked that "wars are made by the old for the young to die in?" (Brodie, 1973).

Bouthoul (1951 et seq.) elaborated the same idea, which he (Bouthoul, 1970) later would call 'infanticide différé' [deferred infanticide]. He coined the sacrificial phenomenon involved 'le complexe d'Abraham' (also called 'Medea complex' and 'Isaac syndrome': Charny, 1973; Shoham, 1976; Corelis, 1980): An intergenerational conflict, in which the older male generation (the patriarchs) feels threatened in its hierarchical, economic and sexual privileges, and contemplates the sacrifice of the sons.

Walsh (1971) relates 'recurrent mass homicides' (i.e., wars) especially to this strong and largely unconscious hostility of older males against younger males resulting from the Oedipal situation, i.e., the early competition of the father and the son for the mother, plus the jealous need of the older male to preserve his position which is progressively threatened by the arrival of the younger male at sexual maturity in late adolescence.

Walsh & Scandalis (1975) subsequently developed this theory of war as an institutionalized form of intergenerational male hostility still further. They hypothesize that primitive male initiation rites and organized warfare are equivalent as cross-cultural expressions of psychosocial transitions. "In other words, war, i.e., recurrent mass homicide, is a culturally disguised representation of an unconscious symbolic acting out of the same psychic phenomenon expressed in initiation rites, though modified by cultural values, history, and traditions".

Walsh & Scandalis believe that sexual rules which favor older males constitute a culture trait which augments tension between generations of males with
consequent envy on the part of the younger males and fear of the consequences of this envy on the part of the fathers. "Wars are caused by the decisions of men as members of organizations, whether they are military organizations or governing bodies" Otterbein (1968) states.

Another culture trait which may well increase the hostility between fathers and sons is the high rate of polygyny in which older men are married to many of the young women. It is also probable that in cultures in which adolescent and young male adult sexual needs are not satisfied because of social prohibitions, there may be a correlation between such prohibitive behavior and warlike behavior.

Boastfulness, indicative of envy, is another culture trait correlated with warfare (Textor, 1967). The material objects which appear to be the basis of the envy are merely symbolic of an unconscious envy of something more basic. Acquisition of wealth and material goods demonstrate masculine power. Young males desire and envy this power, which is characteristic of the fathers, and so are often nonreluctant participants in both initiation rites and warfare. In many societies a significant proportion of the young men are, indeed, killed each year in war.

5.2.10.4 War as Purification Rite

Leach (1965), famous anthropologist with psychoanalytic sympathies, views primitive war as primarily a purification rite, a cleansing operation, a 'removal of dangerous dirt'. Primitive warfare is a kind of ritual game; any benefits that it may bring are metaphysical rather than material, virtue rather than loot. This is best exemplified by headhunting.

Leach argues that primitive people conceive of the world 'out-there' as composed of the concentric circles of the near, intermediate, and the far. The intermediate 'out-there' consists of the neighboring villages, affinal relatives with whom 'we' exchange wives, enemies against whom 'we' make war, wild animals and spirits. People, ideas, ghosts, and matter cross from one range to another. Dirt is intermediate matter, and hunting, sacrifice and war are a removal of dangerous dirt.

Running through all Leach's themes is a principle of duality. This has its ultimate paradigm in our human recognition of the difference between life and death, and in our animal recognition of the difference between the sexes. In every case, both in reality and in ritual, fertility and life are the outcome of an activation of the relationship between the 'I' and the 'other' which results from male aggression, which may be either sexual or combative. In a sexual context the 'other' is a woman; in a headhunting context, it is 'the enemy'; in a sacrificial context, it is 'God'. Thus, he says, "Killing is a classifying operation. We kill our enemies; we do not kill our friends".

Illogically, yet very fundamentally, the slaughter of the enemy and the slaughter of one's own side are both felt to be 'the supreme sacrifice', a mystical sexual union of man and God.
There is a very widespread human tendency to make an association between the notion of 'divine power' on the one hand and two different manifestations of aggression ('killing' and 'male sexuality') on the other. This is a curious triangle of ideas and it seems to arise because, even at the subhuman animal level of existence, killing and male sexuality are very closely interlocked. Man has created institutions which channel the dangerous aggressive urges of the individual into modes of expression which are relatively harmless to the home society, whatever the consequences may be for those in the world outside. Warfare, religious ritual, and exogamous marriage are all institutions of this kind. Leach’s theory cannot be easily summarized, and I therefore refer the reader to his original (and insightful) article.

5.2.10.5 War and the Paranoid Elaboration of Mourning

One aspect of the war phenomenon that most readily lends itself to psychoanalytic investigation, Fornari (1974) asserts, is the magico-religious aspect war assumes among primitive peoples. The magico-religious world against the background of which wars are waged among primitive peoples appears to be traceable to man’s primal reactions in the face of death. The gods of primitive peoples are barely distinguishable from the ghosts of their departed ancestors. Because of their invisibility, and the powers ascribed to them, ghosts are more terrifying than animals and living men. In the eyes of primitive men it is preferable to wage war on visible enemies who can be killed than to be at enmity with invisible spirits who are immortal and cannot be overcome.

In order to escape misfortune, therefore, they must appease the spirits. Although the spirits are felt to be hostile, primitive men cannot wage war against them but must attempt to appease them by sacrificing to them, by providing them with the things they desire. If this is not done, the spirits become angry and show their displeasure by sending calamities of all kinds. This ghost fear cannot be controlled except by the paranoid mechanism of projective identification through which the bad parts that constitute the mysterious reasons for which the dead are filled with desires of revenge against the living, are projected onto the enemy tribe.

While the propitiatory rites and the idealization of the relation to the ancestor-gods may be understood as the elaboration of the depressive anxieties of mourning (since he who performs propitiatory rites as acts of reparation does

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13 See also Moeller (1992) who concludes that "der Krieg nicht den Tod als letztes Ziel für Augen hat, sondern die Weiterentwicklung des Lebens... Der Krieg erscheint als getarnter kollektiver Geschlechtsakt. Die verborgene Absicht hinter der Zerstörung ist die Befruchtung... Der Akt der Slacht ist der Akt der Geschlechter", meaning that the ultimate purpose of war is not destruction but procreation. In Greek mythology, he notes, the goddess of love Aphrodite and Ares, the god of war, had a passionate liaison.
so because he feels that he himself has offended his gods), war-virtue, understood as a propitiation of the ancestor-gods, is based on a process of projection owing to which a tribe becomes convinced that its gods have been offended by the enemy. The slaughter of enemies, or any atrocity committed against them, acquires the character of virtue inasmuch as it is a battle against, and a punishment of, the projected bad parts of the self that are displeasing to the spirits. This is what Fornari calls the 'paranoid elaboration of mourning'. Since the injuries fathers inflict on boys during initiation rites - injuries which at times are so severe as to cause death - intensify the boys’ wish to kill their fathers, the fact that initiation rites are the rites of initiation into warfare leads Fornari to believe that war itself is intimately connected with the struggle against patricidal impulses projected onto the enemy tribe. A primitive tribe at war with another primitive tribe makes the other the receptacle of its own guilt needs, for which reason the slaughter of the enemy, who is perceived as guilty of the death of one's relatives or fellow tribesmen, is sensed as blood revenge and serves to avoid the depressive pain of mourning. The paranoid significance of a primitive tribe’s relation to an enemy tribe, as a relation to the projected bad parts of the self, is also revealed by their belief that all whom they kill in this world will serve them as slaves in the next.

In connection with the relation between the magico-religious world of primitive peoples and war, Davie (1929) held that the religion of primitive man fosters war. In Fornari’s view, it seems more correct to say that both religion and war originate in the elaboration of psychotic anxieties connected with mourning, and that each of them constitutes a socialized mode of defense against such anxieties.

The intimate bond between war and the paranoid reaction to mourning becomes particularly evident if we consider the close connection between war and the belief that death is caused by the hostile magic of alien tribes. The need to accuse someone else of the death of a loved person, Fornari asserts, is the most obvious proof of man’s incapacity to bear guilt in the occasion of mourning. Among primitive peoples this incapacity to elaborate mourning is intimately associated with the outbreak of war. Headhunting, with its magico-religious contents, appears to be comprehensible in the terms in which Melanie Klein (1932 et seq.) described the mechanism of omnipotent sadistic control as the manic defense against persecutory anxieties.

Strehlow (1910) gives an explanation of war among the primitive tribes of Australia that is surprisingly close to Fornari’s theory of war as a paranoid elaboration of mourning: "The aim of the avenging expedition is to give the inhabitants of another camp the same reason for mourning that they have had". Marett (1933) referring to wars of revenge as "safety valves for the emotions", writes:

We must recognize it, in fact, as originally no more than a quite blind and
undirected act of baffled rage, following hard upon the heels of an unmeasured grief... It is as if the demented mourners thought to discharge their random weapons at death itself, and thereupon some wretched mortal intercepted the blow... Just as he would not himself go down before death without a struggle, so through the sympathy of his kinsmen he continues to challenge the force that would annihilate him, and reaches a happy release for himself in and through their relief at finding a vent, however inappropriate, for their desire to maintain the fight against the common enemy (Marett, 1933).

Through their propitiatory and expiatory rites, some primitive tribes seem to be able, on the psychological level, to master the paranoid position toward the enemy. The expiatory post-war rituals often show in a striking manner the sense of guilt that accompanies the killing of enemies among many primitive peoples (See Ch. 7).

5.2.10.6 War as the Supreme Feast

In a chapter dedicated to the psychological aspects of war, Bouthoul (1951) described the 'new psychological world', i.e., the radical transformation of values brought about by war.

The charging of the enemy with guilt seems to be of fundamental importance in escaping the sense of guilt which war provokes in man; it also marks the moment when peace turns into war, by ceremonially inaugurating the new psychological world established by war. Following this rite, homicide, pillage, and rape become legal for a given period. From that moment on, men are willing to give and receive a violent death, to appropriate by violence the enemy’s goods and to lose their own, as if the sense of guilt, though eluded through projection, still involved the mobilization of self-punitive mechanisms.

The splitting of the world into friend and enemy represents an extreme simplification whereby the good and the bad are no longer integrated in the same instinctual situation and in the same object relationship, but the same situation assumes different characters according as it is consummated upon the self, or upon the other, in the paranoid aphorism of mors tua vita mea. The enormous weight of human ambivalence is suddenly lifted when love and hate find two separate objects of attention.

In Bouthoul’s opinion war has all the characteristics of a feast, whose principal function, according to Durkheim, is to unify the group. The most typical psychological aspects of a feast, in the sociological sense of the word, are the following: (1) It brings about a meeting of the members of a group; (2) it is a rite of expenditure and dissipation; (3) it is accompanied by a modification of certain moral laws; (4) it is a rite of collective exaltation; (5) it brings about a state of physical insensibility; (6) it is accompanied by sacrificial rites. As everyone of these characteristics is found in war, war might be regarded as ‘the supreme feast’.
The sociological theory of war as the supreme feast is in agreement with Abraham’s (1955) psychoanalytic interpretation of war as a ‘totemic feast’.

5.2.10.7 War-Breeding Complexes

One of the essential differences between individual aggressiveness and the warlike impulse, according to Bouthoul (1951), is that while individual aggressiveness is momentary and transient, felt specifically as such and usually limited to one individual, the warlike impulse is a generalized, profound emotional state. Often it is a general state of acceptance and approval of future violence rather than a manifestation of violence itself. The warlike state corresponds, that is, to a sense of the need for a period of violence and destruction rather than to genuine aggressive excitation.

In a subsequent publication, Bouthoul (1972) discussed the emotional processes in the genesis of ‘collective aggressiveness’ and what he calls ‘war-breeding complexes’ such as the Oedipus Complex and the Abraham Complex, among others.

The principal war-breeding complexes all share a common feature; they converge by different paths on the choice of an enemy. They mark the psychological process of the transition from diffuse aggressiveness to specific animosity. They show how, as the ‘aggressive tonus’ rises in a group, it unconsciously begins to seek an appropriate enemy; that is, another group of humans on whom to place the responsibility for all its ills and frustrations. This scapegoat group becomes the object to be hated, destroyed or humiliated. This search for an enemy is accompanied by the formulation of justifications to legitimize in advance the unleashing of the destructive institutions of war, persecution, ostracism, genocide, etc.

The main lines of this process appear to Bouthoul to be as follows:

1. Inevitably, societies cause suffering, anxiety, thorny problems or exasperation, and, equally inevitable, they produce collective aggressiveness.
2. The most general reaction then consists in seeking people on whom to pin the blame for the unrest and disturbance. So, any society projects its anxieties about the future, its negativeness, its deaths, its destruction complexes, its terror and anger, on an enemy group that it holds responsible.
3. This pseudo-identification produces a first result; the fact of localizing the ill, even in an illusory fashion, produces considerable relief. Once the diagnosis is completed, people now ‘know’ who will have to be dealt with. It is no longer a question of a hostile nature, fatalism, or of supernatural and incomprehensible threats. The ill is personified in men like us whom one can attack. This makes it possible to go from impotent terror to active anger.
4. From this moment on the remedy appears very simple: Destruction of the enemy.
5.2.10.8  *The Emotional Satisfactions of War*

A last category of psychoanalysts seeks to find the answer to the war enigma in the emotional satisfactions war can provide. In his *Man, Morals and Society*, Fluegel (1950) thinks that the psychological appeal of war is based on (1) man’s zest for adventure, i.e., the desire to lead a dangerous life; (2) his need to have a feeling of harmony and cooperation with his fellow-men and participate in collective enterprises, i.e., social unity; (3) the desire for freedom from personal worries and moral restrictions which a great common and dangerous concern like war gives; and lastly, (4) the need of an outlet for man’s aggression, i.e., for finding an object on which his vices can be projected. Also Sturm (1972) outlined four kinds of emotional satisfactions of war: The first is ‘excitement’; the second involves ‘relaxation-satiation’; the third participation in ‘meaningful social rhythms’; the fourth area is ‘freedom from aversiveness’. Fromm (1941, 1973) pointed to the escape from insignificance and debilitating tedium which war can bring. It is highly doubtful, however, as Murty & Bouquet (1960) criticize, whether all men are animated by the spirit of adventure and the desire to lead a dangerous life. Mass inertia and mass apathy seem to be greater realities than a mass craving for adventure.

After this, admittedly sometimes too selective, review of the main proximate theories and explanations of primitive war to be found in the literature, I now turn to another, fascinating, attempt at understanding the war mystique: The reports of the motivations of the individuals involved. What makes them tick?

5.3 *Assessment of Motives*

War is carried on from one of the following motives: to kill one’s fellow-men for the sake of using them as food; to deprive them of their women; to obtain booty from them; to impose a religion, certain ideas, or a type of culture upon them (Novikow, 1912).

The most proximate approach to understanding primitive warfare is the assessment of the motives of the people fighting those wars - either as reported by the belligerent parties themselves or inferred by an observer. Such motivational assessments are usually to be found in the descriptive accounts of warfare in the bulk of the ethnographical literature. And, not surprisingly, the whole gamut of human motives is reflected in the literature on this subject.

*Table 5.3*: A classification of motives for warfare as found in the literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I) SELF-DEFENSE</th>
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<td>Although it is not <em>a priori</em> obvious that a people reaches for its arms to defend itself</td>
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when attacked (some did and do not), this category is not an exclusive war motive. Defensive war is generally not voluntary, but forced upon one. One kind of self-defense, however, is the striving for security and safety, which in extremis may lead to preemptive strikes and offensive war.

(II) PSYCHOSOCIAL MOTIVES

Meaning (1) motives originating in efforts at consolidation and reinforcement of internal cohesion, solidarity and integration of the ingroup, group identity and esprit de corps; and (2) motives postulated as inherent in the individual or 'human nature'.

(A) Status hostilis, bloodrevenge, reprisal, retaliation, lex talionis, vendetta, extended feuding, hereditary enmity, 'revanchism', redress of wrongs and grievances, grudge, hatred, vindictiveness, envy, jealousy, spite, hostility, etc.

(a.1) based on talion law for murder, manslaughter, injury, insult, humiliation, repudiation, vituperation, scorn.

(a.2) based on talion law for transgressions of the sexual mores; adultery, rape, abduction of women, elopement, conflicts over bride-price.

(a.3) for territorial transgressions/intrusions.

(a.4) for alleged malicious 'black magic', sorcery, witchcraft.

(B) The Warrior Cult as modus vivendi; prestige, honor, status, glory, dignitas, vertue, pride, machismo, male supremacist complex; National honor, grandeur, supremacy, superiority, etc.

(b.1) Animistically-inspired raids for objects and insignia of prestige and 'mana'; manhunting, headhunting, trophy hunting, scalphunting, 'counting coup'.

(b.2) War as (component of) rite de passage; war as proof of virile self-image and ultimate supreme test of masculinity (machismo syndrome; male supremacist complex).

(b.3) War as exaltation, sportive event, 'social vitamin', fascinating adventure; 'war gloating', display of martial skill and military bravado, flight from boredom and ennui, adventurism and urge for action; to gratify sexual lusts; to prevent decadence, degeneration and/or moral decay; to intensify national dynamism.

(b.4) War in order to diminish internal conflicts, strife, turmoil, rivalries (i.e., export of conflict; to unite a people under one banner against a common enemy).

(b.5) War as Ventilsitte (safety valve) for internally generated aggression, hatred, rancor, malice, sexual jealousy, tensions, frustrations, grief, etc.

(b.6) War to inspire awe, to spread terror, to give the enemy 'a reason for mourning'.

(b.7) Obedience (Soldiers fight predominantly out of obedience, but as a primitive war motive it is probably of minor explanatory power).

(C) Magicoreligious, ideological and legalistic (ius gentium) motives:

(c.1) 'Ancestor cult'; placating a bloodthirsty pantheon, pacification of the spirits of slain warriors; animism.

(c.2) Fear/terror-inspired ethnocentric-xenophobic warfare.

(c.3) Arrogance-inspired tribalistic superiority delusion: 'Chosen People Complex'.
(c.4) Magicoreligious and *ius gentium* transgressions; war as punishment for violation of armistice, oath, treaty, law, right of hospitality; desecration and profanation of sanctuary; murder of negotiators, envoys, ambassadors; refusal of extradition; collaboration with the 'enemy'; desertion of allies; commitments; kinship duties; 'teaching another state a lesson'.

(c.5) Belief in divination and/or predestination.

(c.6) Magicoreligious 'acquisitiveness'; raids for victims of ritual sacrifice or ritual anthropophagia.

(c.7) Cultural imperialism and violent (religious, ideological) proselytism; to spread a doctrine, religion, ideology.

(c.8) Eschatological and/or chiliastic motives; liberation of the world, liberation of oppressed peoples; to establish a millennium.

(c.9) Cataclysmic motives; war as a consequence of, and obedience to, the machinations of the gods; war as divine punishment for sins committed.

(III) ECONOMIC (ACQUISITIVE, PREDATORY, MACROPARASITIC) MOTIVES

(Greed, cupidity, *pleonexia*, acquisitiveness)

(A) Plunder, spoils, robbery, piracy, loot, 'booty and beauty', raids, marauding, croplooting, cattleheft, predatory incursions, rapine, pillaging, routing:

(a.1) Raids for means of subsistence; croplooting, cattleheft, plunder of stocks, predation for coveted artifacts, replenishing of treasury.

(a.2) Consumptive cannibalism.

(a.3) Capture of women and/or children for enlarging the gene pool of the population; prospective rape as incentive.

(a.4) Capture of slaves (for own use or for trade).

(a.5) Capture of recruits, arms and implements of war.

(B) Establishing or defending monopoly position of certain resources (drinking water sources, granaries, minerals, fishing waters, orchards, cultivated soil, etc.).

(C) Territorial expansion; invasions, land-hunger, Lebensraum, migratory urge, territorial conquest and expansionism, based on overpopulation, reproductive pressure or demographic disequilibrium, exhaustion or scarcity of natural resources.

(D) Economic imperialism, colonialism, subjugation, exploitation:

(d.1) Capture of raw materials, cheap labor, new markets, trade routes, outlets for investments.

(d.2) Collection of tributes and taxes.

(IV) POLITICAL-STRATEGIC MOTIVES

War as manifestation of *Libido dominandi*, lust for power.

(A) Land or locations as strategic desiderata; for fortifications, army camps, control of hinterland, military security, control of vital supply routes, to regain territories formerly controlled, to maintain or increase the credibility of commitments or threats in other areas.

(B) Utilizing weakness or underpopulation of the antagonist; power vacuum, power-gap; political opportunism; preventive or pre-emptive strike.

(C) To achieve political independence.

(D) To install or restore friendly regimes or governments in adjacent countries.
Political imperialism; power usurpation, expansion of political domain, spheres of influence and political dominance, satellites, coercion of alliance, imposition of power structure (dynastic wars, 'substitution' wars, etc.).

This table is a compounded inventory based on the following sources: Novikow (1896, 1912), Sumner & Keller (1927), Van der Bij (1929), Davie (1929), Steinmetz (1929), Durbin & Bowlby (1939), Malinowski (1941), Q. Wright (1942; 1965), Métraux (1949), Turney-High (1949), Loenen (1953), Harrison (1973), Divale (1973), Otterbein (1973), Garlan (1975), Henssen (1978), among many others; as well as historiographic accounts of early historical warfare such as Thucydides, Xenophon, Titus Livy, Caesar, Tacitus, Suetonius, Ammianus Marcellinus, Cassius Dio, Diodorus Siculus, Sallust, Polybius, and Plutarch.

The classification contains, under the common denominator and generic label 'motives', the self-professed motivations of individual warriors, groups, tribes, etc., or those attributed to them by ethnologists, anthropologists, or contemporaneous historiographers. The generic categories of motives as used in the table are identical to Q. Wright's (1942; 1965) categorization (5.2.1).

In the literature on primitive warfare, it is generally not very easy to discern what are considered to be the causes of war, the precipitating events, the 'drives toward' war, and the motives, the ulterior 'whys' underlying the entire process culminating in war. Motives generally are of two distinct types; either they are the motives reported by the participants involved themselves, and more or less accepted on face value by the ethnologist or anthropologist or other observer studying them, or they are the motives inferred by those students on the basis of a particular theory they adhere to, or the prevailing (or some idiosyncratic)

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14 In analyzing the genesis or etiology of war, distinctions have been made between ultimate and proximate causes or causative factors, precipitants, inducements, motives, reasons, determinants, pretexts and façades, preconditions, and situational 'triggers'. Concerning 'motives', it seems recommendable to notice the following distinction:

(a) 'Real' motives (if motives can be attributed to collectivities): it may be clear that the real motives of officials, power holders, army commanders, etc. (which may be of a highly strategic or political nature) may differ substantially from those of the rank-and-file, the common soldiers or warriors, who may be inspired more by prospective 'booty and beauty'.

(b) Moreover, the office holders, commanders, etc. are liable to cover up or conceal their real motives by translating them into ratiomorphic, culturally and ideologically sanctioned, and idealist terms. It is these codified motivations which will probably be reflected in at least some accounts of historiographers, not entirely lacking a touch of chauvinism or nationalism.

(c) Later commentators will pretend to 'look through' the codified motivations and to approximate the 'real' motives in their attributed motives. The attributed motives may implicitly reflect theories of war causation, or simply a moral judgment about culpability.
psychological paradigm or *Menschenbild*.
The former distinction parallels that which is called in modern anthropology the 'emic' and the 'etic' approaches. Both thoughts and behavior of the participants can be viewed from two different perspectives; from the perspective of the participants themselves and from the perspective of the observers. In the first instance the observers employ concepts and distinctions that are meaningful and appropriate to the participants; in the second instance they employ concepts and distinctions that are meaningful and appropriate to the observers. The first way of studying culture is called 'emics' and the second way is called 'etics' (e.g., Harris, 1980; see also 4.5.3).

In analyzing the motives of the warriors, we are *a fortiori* confronted with the emic/etic controversy. For example, Harris (1980) emphatically stated:

> Motives that the belligerents themselves cite for going to war do not explain the etic conditions under which wars recur... It may seem strange that the warriors who risk their lives in armed combat seldom seem to understand why they do so. But the masking of deeper causes by superficial psychological motives is advantageous for peoples who depend on war for their well-being.

> To be effective in combat, warriors must believe that the enemy, not the soil or the forest or impersonal population pressure, is at fault. Warriors who doubt their own cause are unlikely to be effective in hand-to-hand combat. Only those who are psychologically convinced that they must kill their enemies have a chance of winning (Harris, 1980).

Such a view smacks somewhat of 'western-centered' arrogance. Emic/etic distinctions may be useful for development of a (for us) plausible theory of (origin and causation) of primitive war. It is, however, rather pretentious, when asking the question why people actually fight, to deny them any insight in their own motives. For instance, Yanomamö warriors actually profess to fight over women and they are clearly aware of that. Chagnon (1977) relates how he explained to the Yanomamö warriors his disagreement with Harris (Chagnon, 1975; Harris, 1975) about the relevance of protein abundance in the genesis of their warfare, "and they laughed: 'Even though we like meat, we like women a whole lot more'" (Chagnon, 1977).

A further complication is that, generally in ethnographic accounts, no differentiation is made between individuals; the warriors are more or less considered to be a homogeneous category 'driven' by the same or similar 'forces'. Thus, *the* Yanomamö fight over women; *the* Jivaro wage war for obtaining enemy heads; *the* Iroquois battle for control of the fur trade, etc. Levels of political development add other dimensions to motivation, as Ferguson (1984) argued: Differentiation of a society into groups with different positions in the political and economic structure raises the possibility of
divergent interests in war. A dominant segment may attempt to mystify or conceal its true interests by wrapping them in a cloak of patriotism or religious fervor. Their actual goals may involve political control within or beyond the polity’s frontier more than any direct economic benefits of a campaign. And with the advent of the state, rulers can compel people to fight for them, which substantially narrows down the question of motivation to that of obedience to authority and indoctrination to obedience.

Darwin and Spencer, but most vociferously Bagehot (1869), Kidd (1902) and McDougall (1915), argued that self-control, discipline, law-abidingness, subordination and obedience to authority must have been the products of fierce and ruthless ‘military’ group selection (Cf. Bigelow, 1969). Only when this first step had been taken, within-group cooperation - and, therefore, success - in military endeavors would have been possible.

Obedience to authority, subordination in a command hierarchy, and the ‘agentic shift’ have been rediscovered in psychology by Milgram (1965 et seq.; Cf. Prosterman, 1972; Zimbardo, 1974; A.G. Miller, 1986) as powerful - and to many people embarrassing - inducements to brutality and cruelty, as long as the ‘agent’ perceives that the command comes from a legitimate authority. In the context of primitive war, the issues of indoctrinability and obedience were reexamined by Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Campbell (Ch. 4), and Shaw & Wong (1989; See Ch. 6). I am inclined to concede that inculcation of blind obedience, compliance to military authorities, of readiness to die without asking why, and the elevation of these habits to the status of highest virtues, cannot fail to propagate irrationality (See especially Dixon, 1976), but the relevance of obedience for the understanding of primitive war is, I submit, limited to those levels of sociopolitical organization where compulsion, coercion and forced conscription exist, i.e., chiefdom and (pristine) state. The warrior, as I tried to explain in the beginning of this chapter, is patently not a soldier.

Indoctrination, on the other hand, may play a prominent role in the making of the warrior. Where longitudinal and reliable data are available, it appears that the making of a warrior is a time- and energy-consuming process (and not the smooth and organic unfolding of some alleged ‘innate’ tendency in that direction). Chagnon (1968) presents evidence, for example, that even in an extremely belligerent and violent society such as the Yanomamö, boys fear violence, and that elaborate training and indoctrination is required to turn them into ‘fierce warriors’: "They are pressed into the fighting by their adult superiors, but are given privileged positions in raiding parties until they acquire the necessary skills and experience... Usually a boy does not take an active role in raiding until he is seventeen years old, and even then he may be so frightened that he will fake illness and return home before the enemy village has been reached. Yanomamö boys, like all boys, fear pain and personal danger. They must be forced to tolerate it and learn to accept ferocity as a way of life".

Nevertheless, two central problems remain: (1) "Why would an individual
participate in competition/warfare even when she or he may expect no private gain?" as Shaw & Wong (1989) formulated the first problem. And even may risk death, physical injury, and other severe costs, one might add. For the warrior to accept these costs may be due to indoctrination, induced altruism and self-sacrifice. It is more likely, however, that it is a self-serving strategy. And (2) Has there indeed been selection for (general or specific) indoctrinability and/or obedience in the course of human evolution? In the next chapter I shall return to these cardinal questions.

What I prefer to call motives of warfare is equivalent to what Otterbein (1973) called the Goals of War approach: The notion that wars are caused by men who are attempting to achieve certain goals at the expense of others. "Some analysts believe that the goals exist within the minds of individual warriors, while other analysts believe that the genesis of the goals is the culture itself". And he presents the following précis:

Those subscribing to the view that the goals pursued by means of warfare are to be sought in the minds of the warriors include Fathauer (1954: 115), who argues that the Mohave of the American Southwest were motivated to go to war to satisfy magico-religious beliefs that were integral to their culture; Vayda (1969: 219), who believes that to understand the early phase of Iban headhunting satisfactorily, one must consider the thoughts and feelings of these Borneo warriors; and Naroll (1966: 17), who in a cross-cultural study of primitive war concerns himself with "what the members of a war party in a particular culture have in mind when they set out for the attack".

Those who believe that the goals of war spring from the culture itself include White (1949: 132), who eschews psychological explanations and argues for a culturalogical explanation of war; Newcombe (1950: 329), who contends that Plains Indians went to war because their sociocultural systems obliged them to; and [H.C.] Wilson (1958: 1195), who sees in Mundurucu warfare a cultural imperative requiring these South American Indians to recruit new members.

For empirical purposes it does not seem critical to maintain this cultural-psychological dichotomy, as Vayda (1969: 212) labels it. A similar point of view is expressed by [M.W.] Smith (1951: 359). When a goal is a part of the culture of the people, it is a value; when the goal becomes internalized in individuals, it is a motive. Thus a value and a motive are the same; the difference between them lies in the mind of the analyst. If he focuses upon the culture, he calls the goal a value; if he focuses upon individuals, he calls the goal a motive.

Six 'reasons for going to war' are delineated in Otterbein's study: Subjugation and tribute, land, plunder, trophies and honors, defense, and revenge. These
six, he contends, represent a classification scheme for grouping a wide range of possible goals.

Several general studies of primitive war provide lists of the various goals of war found in various cultures. Swanton (1943), who regards revenge as the leading war motive among primitive peoples, lists in addition social advancement, excitement, religious obligation, capture of women and slaves, plunder, appropriation of territory, trade, defense, and fear. Turney-High (1949) discusses these same goals and others at length under the headings of sociopsychological motives, the economic motive, and military values. M.W. Smith (1951) groups causes of American Indian warfare into "four major sets of distributions": Feud or simple reprisal, social contests, shame-aggression, and mourning-war.

Many case studies of specific societies emphasize the importance of the goals of war in their descriptions of warfare. For example, according to Swadesh (1948), the Nootka of the American Northwest Coast fought for multiple reasons, including revenge, slaves, plunder, heads, status, and occasionally territorial rights (Academic battles of truly epic proportions were fought over the motivational complexes underlying Northwest Coast Indian warfare, Iroquois and Huron warfare, Plains Indian warfare, Californian Indian warfare, South American Indian warfare, etc. etc. - mainly concerning issues of material [i.e., economic] versus nonmaterial objectives. See e.g.,: Codere, 1950; Lowie, 1954; Trigger, 1962; Harris, 1968; Otterbein, 1973; Ferguson, 1984, 1990a; Kroeber & Fontana, 1987).

Probably the best known global typology of primitive war motives is Q.Wright’s (1942) categorization (See, 5.2.1), which is a classification both of forms of warfare as well as the corresponding motivational constellations. Elsewhere in his opus magnum he lists as ‘drives toward war’: Food, sex, territory, activity, self-preservation, society, dominance, and independence. Divale (1973) lists as ‘causes’ of primitive war: Revenge, adultery and wife-stealing, infringement of territory, and witchcraft. The latter, however, he does not consider to be a genuine ‘cause’. Other succinct formulations of war motives are the Hobbesian triad: Competition, diffidence, glory (Hobbes, 1651); W.James’ (1910): Lust, coveting, aggression, man’s irrational nature; Sumner’s (1911): Hunger, love, vanity, fear of superior powers (or ghost-fear); Thucydides’ (I, 76): Security, honor, self-interest; Davie’s (1929): War for economic motives, for women, for glory, and for religious reasons; and Andreski’s (1964): Power, wealth, and prestige.

Particular goals of war can become so important to the members of a culture that they influence and dominate many other aspects of life. The more general version of this approach, relating a war pattern to some aspect of culturally patterned beliefs and attitudes, received its major theoretical elaboration from Benedict (1934). Voget (1964) applies this pervasive-cultural-pattern approach (also called patterns-and-themes approach) directly to the study of warfare. He
argues that warfare may be "primary institutionalized pattern" of a culture, by which he means that the pattern effects integration in two ways: 

"(1) by structuring roles and (2) by spreading its substance through other aspects of the culture". He shows that warfare was the primary focus for the integration of Crow Indian culture. Spicer (1947) demonstrates that the 'warlike' Yaqui of northern Mexico "integrated warfare into their culture in a fashion resembling Pueblo Indian Apollonianism" (Otterbein, 1973). Burch (1974) attributes Northwest Alaskan Inuit (Eskimo) warfare to their "Spartan ethic", and Hallpike (1977) relates New Guinea Tauade warfare to their "Heraclitean cognitive orientation". See also Burch (1974), and Ferguson’s (1990a) criticism of this approach.

Related to this cultural-value approach is the search for particular or modal personality types (e.g., Kluckhohn & Leighton, 1946; Kluckhohn & Murray, 1949), in connection with patterns of childhood socialization (e.g., Whiting, 1941). One such modal personality in primitive societies is, of course, the fierce warrior. Ferguson (1990a) summarizes this literature as follows:

People who make war often have belligerent personalities (Berndt, 1962; Chagnon, 1977; Koch, 1974). But the relationship between aggressive personalities and war is hardly a necessary one. People with normally pacific personalities can be quite brutal in war (Ellis, 1951; Heider, 1970; Murphy, 1957; Robarchek, 1990; Wallace, 1853)... oftentimes aggressive fighters are kept out of or are secondary in making a decision to fight. (The 'hotheads' may be young men, bachelors, who have less to lose and more to gain from combat than older family men [Baxter, 1979]). Even very aggressive persons can find outlet for their feelings in non-violent actions (Codere, 1950).

Then there is the question of where these attitudes come from. Several studies discuss orientations to violence. All are consistent with the view that attitudes are products of (different) social circumstances. Generally, individual bellicosity would seem to be of secondary and derived significance. However, in specific cases of high politico-military tensions, unusually aggressive individuals, especially leaders, can take actions which precipitate new hostilities (Biocca, 1971; LiPuma, 1985; Trigger, 1976) (Ferguson, 1990a).

In the remainder of this chapter the main motives of primitive warfare, as documented by numerous ethnologists and anthropologists, will be briefly reviewed, without giving much consideration to whether these are to be considered genuine motives, or 'ascribed' or 'attributed' motives, or self-deceptions à la Harris.
5.3.1 Blood Revenge: *Lex Talionis*

Revenge is so consistently and so universally reported as one of the principal motives and causes of feuding and war that it requires detailed analysis. According to Divale (1973), the principal and paramount purpose of primitive warfare was revenge against an earlier injustice or killing perpetrated by the enemy, and the sole object was to kill the enemy. As economic or territorial conquest motives were generally absent, except with groups at the chiefdom or higher levels of cultural evolution, the principle of blood-revenge maintained primitive warfare— it was the motor that kept the whole process going. But, as Moore (1978) observed: “[R]evenge alone cannot be the explanation for revenge warfare. The motive is circular; it explains what keeps the system going, but it does not explain the complex itself”.

Feest (1980) notes that revenge, at first sight, generally seems to be only a minor motive, but tends to become the primary reason if there is no other way of resolving the conflict. The question of who originally started the conflict is of little importance. All that matters is that the latest attack has to be countered. Feest does not, however, address the question why that is all that matters. The *Lex talionis*, the law of blood vengeance demands that blood be shed for blood. In its unmitigated form it is rigid and inexorable. Thus an endless chain of retaliation is started, one death commanding another, and blood revenge passes into a blood feud, which may last for years. Consequently, a situation is created from which there seems no escape: "Indeed, many savage tribes find themselves so involved in blood feuds and the resulting intertribal wars that they are totally unable to extricate themselves" (Davie, 1929). This is valid especially in societies with small and closely related decision groups (e.g., Langness, 1973; J.B. Ross, 1984; Ferguson, 1990a). The discovery of a way out of this dilemma, especially through the idea that blood revenge can be settled by compensation, by a property payment, is, as Davie (1929) stated, the ‘grandest case’ in the mitigation of war (See Ch. 7).

The relationship between recognition of kinship-group ownership over strategic resources and the incidence of feuding is undeniable. The North American Plateau and Great Basin societies, for example, made few claims to private property and the incidence of feuding was consequently very low. Among the Northwest coast societies, on the other hand, from the Tlingit to the north to the Cocopa on the south, there always was some feuding going on over fishing stations, water rights, oak trees, and other issues (Jorgensen, 1980). Curiously, in this area the societies that recognized private ownership of strategic resources had the most rudimentary political organizations.

Tylor (1871), Steinmetz (1892), Westermarck (1906, 1934), Holsti (1913) and Numelin (1950) were among the first who tried to explain the phenomenon of
blood revenge. They all emphasized its \textit{litigatio} aspect (as opposed to the \textit{certatio per vim} aspect of war), the 'Rule of Vengeance' as an instrument of primitive law, and even the embryonic beginning of international law, \textit{ius gentium}: "In the primitive law of vengeance of blood, [the student of law] sees society using for the public benefit the instinct of revenge which man has in common with the lower animals. By holding the whole family answerable for the deed of one of its members, the public brings the full pressure of family influence to bear on each individual as a means of keeping the peace. No one who sees the working of blood-vengeance can deny its practical reasonableness, and its use in restraining men from violence while there are as yet no judges and executioners. Indeed among all savages and barbarians the avenger of blood, little as he thinks it himself in his wild fury, is doing his part toward saving his people from perishing by deeds of blood" (Tylor, 1871).

In a similar vein, Numelin (1950) contends: "Far from being an expression of the supremacy of brute strength, a sign of constant war against all and everyone, blood revenge indicates a reaction of the self-esteem of more or less sovereign kinship organizations, that is, an expression of a feeling for law and morals, aiming at re-establishing balance among the wronged. Where there was no ruling authority, the individual family and the great family, the tribal group, could influence the matter by a threat of blood revenge; for the very fear of retaliation could have a restraining effect on the passions. It is even possible to see in the 'clear, inescapable message'... of blood revenge, in which the social conscience of the community was collected, a starting point for the law of punishment".

More recently, Masters (1964) has again drawn attention to the role of retaliatory violence (self-help and the talion law) in maintaining the legal (and moral) order: Whatever the logical merits of Hobbes's conception of a 'state of nature', he states, it does not seem to follow, at least among primitive peoples, that the anarchy of social life without a government produces a violent war of all against all. Quite the contrary, it would appear that violence in such primitive societies often serves the function of maintaining law and order according to customary procedures (at the same time allowing kin groups to get rid of their 'bad seeds'). The possibility of violent counterretaliation may stabilize rivalries and limit conflicts when there is no governmental arbiter to enforce law and order (Masters, 1964).

Westermarck (1934) asserted that the duty, indeed obligation, of blood revenge is in the first place regarded as a duty to the dead, not merely because he has been deprived of his highest good - his life, but because his spirit is believed to find no rest until the injury has been avenged, the loss been equalized, the equilibrium restored, the exchange reciprocated in kind: "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth".

The belief in animism, which attributes all disasters to human or parahuman agencies, and the human tendency to displace hostility and to project self-guilt upon a scapegoat, according to Durbin & Bowlby (1938), combine to suggest
identification of a hostile out-group as the agent responsible for disasters. Any
dead or other disaster in a tribe is therefore likely to be the occasion for a war
of revenge. And Davie (1929) explained the peculiar psychological
amalgamation of obligation, justice and honor as follows:

Blood kinship is the basis of the peace-group. Outsiders are strangers,
*Blutfremde* or blood aliens, with whom peaceful relations are impossible as
long as unity of blood is the only known bond. Blood relationship involves
the duty of blood revenge, the injunction to avenge by death the murder of
one’s blood relatives, even their death in battle.

If the survivors fail in their duty, the enraged ghost will haunt them all their
lives. Ghost-fear, transcending all other forms of fear, assures the
fulfilment of this obligation. Blood revenge, therefore, is fundamentally a
form of propitiating the ghost or soul of the departed. It is from fear of the
angry ghost that the crime of murder derives much of its horror in primitive
society and that revenge is so persistently sought (Lippert, 1887; Frazer,
1890; Sumner, 1906; Sumner & Keller, 1927). Thus the duty of avenging
the death of his nearest relatives is the most sacred and holy duty that a
savage is called upon to perform, and he never neglects or forgets it.

Other motives enter to support and strengthen this obligation. It comes to
be considered a point of honor; the murdered man’s relatives think that
their honor has been blackened and that the stain can only be cleansed by
blood. Public opinion and the desire to stand well amongst one’s fellows
also enforce this duty. Should a man leave it unfulfilled, ‘the old women
will taunt him; if he were unmarried, no girl would speak to him; if he had
wives, they would leave him; his mother would cry and lament that she had
given birth to so degenerate a son, his father would treat him with
contempt, and he would be a mark of public scorn’ (Tylor, 1909). Blood
revenge is set in motion not so much by murderous lust as by family
affection (Davie, 1929).

Why should the human personality yearn to compensate for its humiliation in
the blood of enemies? Turney-High (1949) adds the following psychological
ingredients to complete the picture: "The tension-release motive plays a part
here: Revenge loosens the taut feeling caused by the slaying or despoiling of
one’s self, clan, tribe, nation. Even the hope for revenge helps the humiliated
human to bear up, enables him to continue to function in a socially unfavorable
environment. Fray Camposano (in Church, 1912) wrote of the Mojos of
southwestern Amazonia to Philip II of Spain that 'The most valiant were the
most respected and their patience under injuries was only dissimulation for
subsequent vengeance’. Revenge, or the hope of revenge, restores the deflated
ego, and is a conflict motive with which mankind must reckon with
universally" (Turney-High, 1949).
Ferguson (1984, 1990a; Cf. Ferguson & Farragher, 1988) has drawn attention to the political, instrumental (non-)use of blood revenge. Revenge, he argued, often has been offered as an irreducible basic motivation. Perhaps it is, to some degree, but it needs more consideration. Although a desire to strike back at someone who has wronged us may seem so understandable that it needs no further discussion, the great cross-cultural variation in permissible revenge reactions, and in situations that call for revenge, indicate that this motive is an eminently variable response.

Revenge truly is an important motivation in many war patterns. When it is, however, that fact itself needs to be explained. But even where the motive is prominent, revenge rarely is sufficient to explain why a war occurs. The invocation of vengeance is an assertion that "they started it", a claim that "we are in the right"; a clean-conscience maneuver. One might therefore expect to find it in informants’ statements. "[R]evenge-seeking often cannot possibly operate in the automatic form suggested by ethnographers or every member of the society would be killed (see Peters, 1967)... revenge requirements are frequently and obviously manipulated by decision-makers, with offenses ‘forgotten’ or ‘remembered’ at convenience (Berndt, 1962; Vayda, 1960; and see Balee, 1984; Ferguson, 1984). Analyses of revenge are on firmer ground when the goal is examined not as an autonomous cultural value, but as an element of tactics calculated to ward-off future attacks and serve other interests (Mair, 1977; Vayda, 1960) (Ferguson, 1990a).

One way to approach this topic would be to investigate the material consequences of taking or not taking revenge in a given social context. Small attacks and counterattacks can constitute a probing for weakness in more serious confrontations. Larger retaliatory strikes may be necessitated more by questions of survival than sentiment. Whatever the independent role of pure revenge motivation, it seems to decline in importance as war comes to involve larger and more complex social groups (Ferguson, 1984).

Retaliatory violence and frustration-aggression displacement (5.2.7.2) are also often assumed to serve a particular integrative and cementing function within a society: Social solidarity.

One of the most common observations to be found in the literature is that among primitive peoples warfare is the primary means for maintaining, consolidating, or strengthening the internal cohesion, solidarity and integration of the group, reinforcing or invigorating group identity and esprit de corps. Warfare is supposed to preserve social solidarity, according to Q.Wright (1942), "(1) by keeping alive the realization of a common enemy who will destroy the group if it is not prepared to resist; (2) by strikingly symbolizing the group as a unit in a common enterprise; (3) by creating a certain discipline and subordination to leadership; (4) by providing an outlet for anger in activities not hostile to the harmony of the group; (5) by preventing the
amalgamation of neighboring groups into units too large and heterogeneous to function unitedly with the available means of communication and civic education; (6) by sanctioning the tribal mores; and (7) sometimes by limiting population, particularly the male population, to a figure adapted to the economy and mores of the group" (Q.Wright, 1942). Camilla Wedgwood (1930), in her study of warfare in Melanesia, first expressed this in functional terms: "One of the important functions of war is to increase the social solidarity of the opposing communities".

Harris (1978) criticized the ‘war as solidarity’ theory, according to which war is the price paid for building up group togetherness. But, he asked, would not verbal abuse, mock combat, or competitive sports be less costly ways of achieving solidarity? The claim that mutual slaughter is ‘functional’ cannot be based on some vague abstract advantage of togetherness. Finally, there can be little doubt that one of the possible effects of primitive warfare can be increased group cohesiveness, but that is a far cry from elevating this potential effect to the level of a ‘function’ or motive.

5.3.2 Vanity Fair: War for Honor, Glory, Prestige

Among the scarce commodities that can be acquired by warfare are status and prestige. In primitive societies, success on the warpath is often the key to leadership (Feest, 1980). Societies relying on the military capacity of their adult males may be expected to bolster their resolve through enhancing the esteem of warriors. Successful fighters will have prestige. Many will internalize, or at least project the combative values they exemplify (Ferguson, 1984). Indeed, one of the most common motivations reported is the association of ego-validation of masculinity with valor and ferocity in combat. Along with this goes the assignment of at least some prestige and power to the successful warrior. "Social prestige has repeatedly fed on death in human history" (Kennedy, 1971). War furnishes a ready means of bringing distinction to one’s self, "for the military virtues have ever been honored and extolled. The women prefer men who have given proof of their prowess, they receive the returning warrior with songs of praise, they feast him and crowd around to listen to his exploits. All this appeals to man’s vanity and gives him additional motives for fighting" (Davie, 1929).

In certain societies the alleged reasons for hostilities and the enemies themselves were less important than the system of values connected with warfare. Warfare was the principal means of acquiring prestige and high social status; consequently, pretexts for wars were eagerly sought, and expeditions and raids were part of the normal functioning of the society.
Sumner & Keller (1927), Davie (1929) and Turney-High (1949) have emphasized the importance of primitive war for war honors, glory and 'vanity'.

What Rochefort (1658) wrote about the Carib may well be applied to most primitive societies: "Their aim in war is not to make themselves the masters of a new country or wrench spoils from the enemy; they have as their only purpose the glory of defeating them and the pleasure of avenging on them the wrongs which they have suffered".

Kroeber (1948) suggested that among the Indians of the eastern United States warfare was motivated "principally by individual desire for personal status within one's society".

Lowie (1920) says that "with the Plains Indians the quest of military renown was as hypertrophied as ever has been the lust for gold in our money-mad centers of high finance". Many of the mounted Indians of the Great Plains - the Dakota (Sioux), the Crow, the Cheyenne - kept a tally of their acts of bravado in war. A man's reputation lay in counting coups. They gave the most points not to the warrior with the highest body count, but to the one who took the most risks. The greatest feat of all was to sneak in and out of an enemy camp without being detected. In Plains Indian warfare, with few exceptions, the coup proper greatly overshadowed scalping, or even killing, as a deed of merit.

Often loosely applied to all recognized war deeds, the term (French coup, a blow) correctly designates the touching of an enemy's body with the hand or with a special stick. On the same enemy the Cheyenne, for example, permitted three men to count coup, the first toucher taking precedence; the Crow, the Assiniboin, and the Arapaho allowed four men to score in descending order of merit. Nearly everywhere the coup definitely outranked the killing of a man (Lowie, 1954).

In the case of the Crow it was not death as such that brought honor, but bravery (as defined by the Crow). A Crow would risk his life, for example, to cut loose a picketed horse in the midst of an enemy camp when he could easily have driven off a whole herd from the outskirts (Howell, 1975).

Personal advantage was also a prominent motive of war in Central and South America (Métraux, 1949).

A man's reputation as a warrior does not have to be based on actual warlike exploits. It may be much more convenient to have the reputation without the dangers involved in acquiring it. Among the Yanomamö, for example, an individual warrior's reputation of fierceness is, to a great extent, based on bluff and make-believe; a show of ferocity. "Young men are competitive and attempt

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15 "Our own chevrons for service, campaign badges, medals, and so forth, are but modern forms of war honors" (Davie, 1929).
to show their capacity for rage, usually by temper tantrums that are ostentatious and faked. As they grow older and acquire wives, they vent their anger on the hapless women by beating them, burning them with glowing firebrands, or even shooting them in the buttocks with a barbed arrow. One of the implications of this behavior is that the man will be equally fierce with male opponents, and so they acquire a reputation for ferocity without much potential harm to their own persons" (Chagnon, 1968).

Personal ambition, especially among chiefs, and intergroup rivalry are motives arising in the main from 'vanity', Davie (1929) states, and they not infrequently lead to war. "Insults to chiefs" and the "despotism or ambition of chiefs whom the malcontents hope to settle by a blow from behind in the turmoil of battle" are ranked among the causes of war in the Fiji Islands (Thomson, 1908).

'Vanity' plays another role in primitive warfare; it is the chief incentive to the taking of trophies (5.3.4.3). A trophy is simply a proof of the warriors success in battle, it is evidence of his valor, it marks him as a distinguished and powerful person.

5.3.3 Warfare as Callisthenics and Catharsis: Game-like wars

Howell (1975) has argued that there are at least three kinds of 'war': (1) conflictive, marked especially by balance of forces and tendency toward resolution; (2) without conflict, due to lack of balance of forces or "no effective resistance"; and (3) nonconflictive, the "kind in which neither side is particularly interested in a more or less permanent disengagement". It is the latter "which is so widely distributed in the anthropological literature, and the type which may be described as a kind of game with moderately high stakes". His approach is reminiscent of Rapoport's (1960) distinction between 'fight like' and 'game like' wars.

Rappaport (1968) provides a detailed exploration of intergroup relations among the Maring-speaking Tsembaga and their neighbors in New Guinea. These societies have a fairly complex system of interrelationships, with groups which are close and groups which are traditional enemies. And in the latter case, if for any reason a group is spoiling for a fight, even a minor incident can precipitate one.

The Tsembaga Maring (as do numerous other peoples) distinguish between minor and serious fights. In minor fights the offended party issues a challenge, after which allies are recruited and a battleground is selected and cleared. The clearing operation involves both sides but these avoid any encounters in

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16 Many societies all over the world distinguished between some kind of conflictive, issue-related 'real' war and something akin to the game-like 'minor fight' which was regarded as primarily recreative. Some peoples, such as the Australian Murngin (Warner, 1930, 1937), distinguished as many as six types of 'warfare'.
advance of the appointed hour for the fight. At that time the sides line up to fire arrows and sometimes spears at each other (some informants claimed that hand-to-hand weapons were not even brought to the scene of the fight). Large shields form a barricade from behind which the men pop out to shoot, then leap back to safety. But some men deliberately exposed themselves to enemy fire to show their bravery; casualties were not numerous and deaths were infrequent, "for the unfletched arrows of the Maring seldom kill". Rappaport suggests that such minor fights may serve to end a quarrel before it gets out of hand. They permit time for "tempers to cool while satisfying the bellicose imperatives of manhood".

Turney-High (1949) was appalled by the evident lack of military sophistication of North American Indians and other warriors who nearly always yielded to "the temptation to accomplish useless little victories, the slaughter of one man or the crushing of one small party... so that more often than not no real advantage is acquired by the victor nor permanent injury done to the defeated". Kroeber (1923) reported that the California Indians "delivered mass fire, but the extreme range made it notably bloodless. They even went so far as to take poorer arrows to war than they used in economic hunting".

With the Californians and Columbians war was really a form of amusement; it consisted merely of duels, and the two "armies" danced and sang at the battle. It was good fun and they enjoyed it (Breysig, 1907; Kroeber, 1925; Hoebel, 1949). Such reports inspired Turney-High to charge that most Californians "were too cowardly to make fighting men".

But in such examples there is no evident interest in seeking a resolution by either victory or a peace pact, because the purpose of the war games is to demonstrate bravado, if not courage (Howell, 1975).

War for adventure or sport is commonly reported among primitive peoples. Certain Australian tribes occasionally sent out expeditions, ostensibly to procure medicinal plants and minerals such as red ocher hundreds of miles away. They usually had to fight their way through tribes on whose territory they trespassed and returned with thrilling tales of adventure rather than with valuable commodities.

Malinowski (1920) writes of the Trobriand Islanders: "The mere fact of fighting as a sport, and the glory derived from a display of daring and skill, were an important incitement to warfare".

"Among peoples who esteem the military life, expeditions are sometimes launched for the sheer fun of it. Young Plains warriors were actually disappointed when older chieftains called off prospective fights through peace parleys. War can be loved by those who play it as a game and are willing to pay the croupier, Death" (Hoebel, 1949).

The Californian Yuman tribes apparently needed no immediate provocation because they fought for the pleasure and excitement fighting produced (McCorkle, 1978).
These milder forms of war have also been interpreted as providing an opportunity for working off aggressive impulses without danger to the social solidarity or economic welfare of either of the contending parties (e.g., Howitt, 1904; Hoijer, 1929; Wedgwood, 1930).

It has been observed time and again that war may provide an escape from debilitating tedium and ennui, from the monotony of the routine of everyday life, frustration, and existential insignificance. "War is one of the most effective devices ever invented for this cathartic purpose" (Turney-High, 1949).

As Andreski (1964) remarked: "For a vigorous man, war may appear very attractive as an alternative to exhausting monotonous work and grinding poverty. The 'heroic' narrative poetry from the Iliad and the Nibelungenlied to the Mahabharatta is full of glowing pictures of the life of warriors, amusing themselves with gambling, wine, women and song, and basking in glory, which stands in strong contrast to the abject fate of toilers".

"Men like war" Davie (1929), and more recently van Creveld (1991), stated rather apodictically and generalizingly. "They often fight for the love of excitement or the mere lust of fighting. While it is true, as someone has said, that anyone will fight when he is mad enough, it is also a fact that men will fight when they are not aroused, but just for the fun of it. War offers diversion and relief from ennui. It provides a mode of escape from the monotony of a dull existence. Primitive life seems to afford scantly amusements and means of recreation; the savage is so engrossed in a severe struggle for existence that his life leaves little room for diversion. Hence men like to fight. The most exciting things they know are hunting, herding, and warfare. These are the occupations they enjoy, and their pursuit affords a considerable measure of satisfaction and pleasure".

Turney-High (1949) emphasized the psychological attractiveness of the sheer fun of recreational warfare especially if it is combined with the cathartic function of tension-releasing warfare\textsuperscript{17}: "War is the most exciting exercise in the world. The real struggle of fighting is more thrilling than the mock opposition of games; the real man-hunt is incomparably more stimulating than the slaughter of animals. War is the great trigger-release of pent-up emotions,

\textsuperscript{17} Turney-High (1949) also relates victory-gloating to this tension-release mechanism: "Having conquered an enemy, there are no reasons why nonliterate tribes should have then indulged in gloating, orgiastic victory dances, except that tensions were thereby released. Such victory, scalp, and other dances afforded opportunity to tribes righteously to vent all possible spleen against a defeated foe, his scalp, one of his captive members, and his very name, regardless of the source of the ill-humor. Victory has ever been strong medicine. The victory dance restored the equilibrium of the ante-bellum frustrations and those caused by the war as well. They were also a necessary rite of passage indicating the return to normality of statuses which had been seriously disturbed by the war".
and it is apparent that more than one tribe has realized this. The Winnebago, for example, recognized that war affords an excellent release when the load of sorrow becomes too great to be borne (Fletcher & LaFlesche, 1906)". Among the headhunting peoples of the Philippines, such as the Ilongot, a death in the household, and the subsequent period of mourning, was among the chief conditions that would make a man wish to "relieve his heart" (Rosaldo, 1970; LeBar, 1975) by raiding for a head. "Many tribes, indeed, were more realistic in conceiving of war as a flight-from-grief device\(^{18}\) than we are" (Turney-High, 1949).

War stories are still the most entertaining stories, and in order to spin yarns there must be wars. Wissler's (1906) discussion of the Blackfoot makes this clear. With them the military yarn was the most important form of entertainment, and the Blackfoot insisted that it be a true one. Plains life was probably very monotonous, and therefore the successful warrior had not only provided pleasure for himself in manhunting but was a public benefactor in relieving the ennui of his fellow-tribesmen. Much primitive war was more of an athletic than a military exercise. Of course, one sought to kill a human and risked being killed himself, but dangerous games have always been the most fun, especially those which look more dangerous than they are. When a Plains warrior got more honorable coups for slapping a living enemy in the face, for being first to whip a corpse, for taking a bow or blanket from a living man than for slaughtering a hundred troublesome enemies in ordinary battle, he was indulging in an athletic event, not war. California informants admitted as much to Kroeber (1925). They knew that war looked more dangerous than it was. These tribes knew how to make stone arrow points, for they used them in hunting. Yet, they carried headless arrows to war. Warriors would return from an engagement bristling like pin-cushions. Their wives would pull out the simple wood arrows, and they would live to fight another day. Landtman (1927) points out that the inter-clan and intra-village hostilities in Papua were exercised with much self-restraint. They were generally held at

\(^{18}\) Among the Plains tribes, 'suicide squads' might vow to fight to the death. Such Dog Societies as they were often called, or Inverted Warriors, who staked themselves to the ground existed among the Arapaho and Kiowa (Mooney, 1896; Lowie, 1909), the Gros Ventres, Mandan, and Blackfoot (Wissler, 1906), the Cheyenne (Dorsey, 1894), and the Oglala Dakota (Wissler, 1912). "The works of Lowie (1935) and Lindeman (1932) on the Crow show that such no-flight men did not have to be organized into mutually stimulating associations. For any number of reasons, or for just plain Weltschmerz, a young Crow might 'vow his body to the enemy'. His parents might grieve for him as one dead, but nothing would deflect him from his purpose of dying in an attack against hopeless odds at the first opportunity" (Turney-High, 1949). On the other hand, a man who did not feel particularly attracted to the status of warrior and/or the bloody business of warfare could make himself useful by impersonating a woman (berdache).
night by the light of torches held by women. The observer might think that the battle was frightful from the noise and expenditure of rage, but deadly missiles were aimed at the legs and deaths were rare.

Unless viewed from the standpoint of a game, Turney-High (1949) comments, the whole thing seemed impossibly futile.

Harris (1978) has criticized the 'war as play' explanation of primitive war. If people can be taught to value war and to enjoy stalking and killing other human beings, one must also grant that they can be taught to hate and fear war and to be revolted by the spectacle of human beings trying to kill each other. Both kinds of teaching and learning actually do take place. So if warlike values cause wars, the crucial problem becomes that of specifying the conditions under which people are taught to value war rather than to abhor it. And this the 'war as play' theory cannot do. Also Ferguson (1984) is skeptical: "It often is stated that war is enjoyed as an exciting, sport-like activity... Be that as it may, it seems implausible that this alone would motivate someone to risk his life. When war involves serious costs and risks to life, individuals are liable to be reluctant to move to the front line" (Ferguson, 1984).

5.3.4 Magico-Religious Motives

The linkage of primitive war with magico-religious beliefs and practices is quite expectable. War, Ferguson (1990a) explained "is a virtual magico-religious magnet".

Davie (1929) subsumed blood revenge, human sacrifice, and headhunting under the special religious causes/motives of primitive war. Indeed, a strong case could be made that the origin of primitive war itself is religious in nature, a theory elaborated by Reinach (1913): The spirits or gods have to be placated, coaxed to take interest in the cause of their mortal servants, and not turn hostile to it. This is done by means of sacrifice, especially the commemorative proof of victory; the trophy. The trophy is the *ex-voto* of the gods' favorable interference in the affairs of primitive man.

Religious and magical notions, according to Hoebel (1949), probably rank next after revenge drives as the predominant motives in primitive war. All headhunting, for example, is tied up with supernaturalism and the belief that dead men's power can be taken with their heads.

Most of the spirits and gods in the primitive world are conceived as malevolent and hostile, as ever ready to harm the living (a fascinating fact still urgently in need of an adequate psychological explanation).

Religious motives for war usually take the form of divine commands or precepts. These must be followed out to the bitter end; there can be no
deviation, lest the gods be angry and bring dire misfortune (Davie, 1929):

Having no conception of causality, of natural laws and forces, primitive peoples ascribe all phenomena which they cannot understand to the agency of spirits. Especially do they attribute the ills of life to supernatural powers, for the most part malignant. In order to escape misfortunes, therefore, they must appease the evil spirits - by sacrificing to them, by providing them with the things they desire, and in general by performing all the obligations which the cult or care of the spirits enjoins on them.

The spirits are particularly anxious that the living keep up the old ways and customs. If their descendants deviate from the traditional folkways or mores, they become angry and show their displeasure by sending calamities of all kinds. Fear of the ghosts is thus a sanction to the mores; it assures their continuance (Davie, 1929).

Apotheosized warriors and chiefs usually become war gods. War gods are invariably depicted as bellicose, terrible, and bloodthirsty: "They demand human victims; hence war is waged to satisfy them: they delight in war; hence hostilities are begun for their pleasure. In these and other ways they incite to war, and they honor in afterlife those who have excelled in military prowess on earth" (Davie, 1929). The notion of an 'elysium of the brave' or 'warrior walhalla', where the souls of brave warriors indulge in carnal pleasures, may indeed be considered conducive to warfare, as much as the notion of a post mortem paradise was conducive to the crusades and 'holy wars' of Christianity and Islam.

To please the Fijian gods, for example, to be received after death in their paradise, it was necessary to have a firm record of carnage. "Upon his arrival in the other world, the double [soul] of a Fiji islander should be able to boast with good reason of having killed many people and destroyed many villages: these were his good works. He must be worthy of the gods whom he rejoins in the next world, and who, for the majority, were the incarnation of diverse atrocities..." (Letourneau, 1895). The slaughter of many enemies was considered most likely to propitiate the deity (Erskine, 1853; Thomson, 1908). According to Tremearne (1912), the belief that the spirit of a slaughtered enemy will attend the slayer in the next world increased the warlike activity of the Nigerian natives.

Primitive peoples do not, as a rule, fight on account of religious or ideological differences; that noble motive was reserved for civilized men.
5.3.4.1 Belief in, and Fear of, Magic and Witchcraft

A common source of hostility among primitive peoples is the belief in (black) magic, sorcery and witchcraft, also based on the notion that the spirits are the cause or agency of all phenomena. Another principle relevant in this connection is the post hoc ergo propter hoc. Both are apparent in the following account related by Davie (1929): The Motu of southeast New Guinea have a superstitious fear of the neighboring Koitapu, to the magical power of whom they attribute any calamity befalling them. In 1876 they lost much of their sago in a storm at sea, their frail canoes being unable to withstand the rough water and carry the cargo. They charged the Koitapu with bewitching their canoes and killed many of them in revenge. Again, in 1878, after a prolonged drought, for which they held a Koitapu village responsible, they attacked the village and killed all they could (Lawes, 1879).

Most New Guineans believe that misfortune is always due to sorcery or witchcraft. The belief that sorcery is practiced by persons in other communities contributes to intercommunity tension and hostility. Sorcery accusations precipitate attack against the sorcerer or his community, and may start a feud or a war. The individual sorcerer need not be named, only his settlement; any member of the settlement is then exposed to attack to achieve vengeance (Paula Brown, 1978). See Huber (1975) for an excellent account of the role of sorcery, which is always the arcane work of alien villagers, in Anggor homicide and war.

The belief in the ability to cause sickness and death by magic and witchcraft is thus a frequent and serious cause of feuds and war. How serious the consequences of this belief are may be seen from Mary Kingsley’s (1897) statement that "the belief in witchcraft is the cause of more African deaths than anything else. It has killed and still kills more men and women than the slave-trade".

The fear engendered by the belief in the secret sorcery attacks of ‘enemies’ has been aptly described by Whiffen (1915), who writes about the South American Putomayo River Indians in general: "This state of endless warfare is based not on avarice but on fear. They fight because they are afraid of each other, and see no protection but in the extermination of their neighbors. Every ill that befalls a man they set down to the evil intent of an enemy". Eventually, such a situation cannot but erupt into preemptive attack and internecine war. It is inherent in the trap psychology of every virulent war complex.

Divale (1973) has objected to the notions of witchcraft and sorcery as being the cause of primitive wars. He holds that it confuses cause and effect. "The relevant point is that charges of witchcraft and sorcery were usually directed against individuals or groups where prior disputes were present. It is suggested that witchcraft be viewed, in respect to warfare, as a mechanism for maintaining group solidarity and hate for the enemy, rather than as a cause of
primitive war".
But whether regarded as a causative or as an attributive factor in the genesis of primitive war is rather a matter of emphasis and perspective; the consequences are real and lethal.

5.3.4.2 Human Sacrifice
The purpose of human sacrifice is to please or propitiate the gods. In return for such favors, the living expect certain advantages, usually the avoidance of misfortune and calamity or the success of some important undertaking, for instance a hunting expedition or war. The transaction actually is a bargain; if the gods send good fortune or at least withhold evil, Man will see that they are kept supplied with all they need or desire.
"The significant point in the sacrifice of captives is that a rather high culture, indeed a civilization of sorts, has usually been attained before such practice has had any place in the complex. There had to be definite deities to whom sacrifice was directed, and specific, personalized gods were not characteristic of the simpler cultures. Such gods demanded organized, trained priesthoods with complicated rituals. In contrast with this, sacrifice of war captives has been a great rarity when the highest religious ministrant has been a shaman or 'medicine man' seized with vague spirits, not gods" (Turney-High, 1949).
The Aztecs of Mexico waged war primarily to secure victims for Huitzilopochtli, the insatiable god of war (Prescott, 1843). Practically all prisoners of war were sacrificed, the number amounting to at least twenty thousand annually (Bancroft, 1875; Biart, 1900, Cook, 1946). Other hierocratic societies practised human sacrifice on a far lesser scale.
Lopreato (1984) regards the phenomenon of human sacrifice as the purest type of victimization: "To deprive others of their life is one of the most effective means of increasing one’s own fitness. This statement is especially true when the sacrificed are young males whose elimination releases for the victimizers the reproductive partnerships of women who would otherwise be unavailable. At the same time, human sacrifice is often, not always, linked to religious and other cultural ceremonies that justify the sacrifice, and in this sense we may speak of a biocultural interplay".

It appears, then, that the sacrifice of war captives was not characteristic of the 'simpler' cultures. This does not mean that captives were not tortured or sometimes even slain. Kroeber (1923) reports torture by several 'simple' Californian tribes, such as the Maidu and Gabrieleño, as a preliminary to execution. This was only spleen-venting, according to Turney-High (1949), the release of tensions and emotions caused by the death of relatives and the other nuisance activities of the enemy. It had no religious meaning.
The headhunting culture complex is found in certain parts of Africa but is more widespread in Indonesia, New Guinea, Melanesia, and parts of Polynesia, Micronesia, India, and South America. Headhunting has been reported to be a frequent practice in over 90 percent of horticultural societies (Lenski & Lenski, 1970; Lopreato, 1984).

The fundamental idea underlying the custom of headhunting is to obtain possession of a spirit by holding the object in which it is supposed to reside (Kenyah of Borneo: Haddon, 1901; Kalamantan Dyak: Furness, 1902; Sea Dyak: Gomes, 1911; Wa of Indo-China: Risley, 1903; Jivaro: Karsten, 1923, 1935). The skulls, carefully preserved and decorated, are regarded as a protection against the spirits of evil, and may even be coaxed to send blessings to the possessor, his kin, or his community. Without them the people could not enjoy peace, plenty, prosperity or comfort.

Prestige and power motives also enter. The possession of many heads distinguished one as a valiant warrior. Headhunting was, for example, a major avenue to prestige and renown among the Kalinga (Barton, 1949; Dozier, 1966), the Ilongot (Rosaldo, 1970), and all other headhunting peoples of the Philippines (Kroeber, 1928; LeBar, 1975).

The Jivaro warrior of Ecuador not only sought honor and fame when he took an enemy head but positive economic advantage. The captured head (‘tsantsa’) became an object of magico-economic advantage. His behavior towards the ‘wakani’, the enslaved spirit of the man whose head he had taken, was definitely practical, for the slayer became invested with great insight into the domestic affairs through its ownership. The Jivaro could also trade a shrunken head to Westerners for a rifle (Karsten, 1923, 1935; Turney-High, 1949; Ferguson, 1990a).

Headhunting was also a means of ingratiating one’s self with the opposite sex, for "if a man has taken the head of an enemy, he is made much of by the women, and, if unmarried, mothers and fathers are anxious to secure him for a son-in-law" (Hose, 1894). Heads were even used as bridal gifts (Furness, 1902). Haddon (1901) said of the headhunters of Sarawak that "there can be little doubt that one of the chief incentives to procure heads was to please the women". In many headhunting societies it was absolutely obligatory for a man to have captured a head in order to marry. Among the Kiwai of New Guinea a ‘non-killer’ was allowed to marry - if a woman would have such a husband at all - but he had to live in the men’s club house and had to refrain from intercourse with his wife (Riley, 1925; Landtman, 1927). But for most peoples marriage without a head trophy was out of the question.

Barton (1930), in his study of Ifugao headhunting, noted that headhunting also served the ‘latent function’ of providing "relief from the monotony of daily
life". Durham (1976) reasoned that the cultural tradition of headhunting among the South American Mundurucu had the effect of decimating neighboring peoples competing for scarce protein, while Lopreato (1984) regarded it as a "cultural accretion of the urge to victimize, enhancing the Darwinian fitness of the perpetrators". The American Northwest Coast peoples staked heads on poles in front of their settlements as a signal of the group’s ferocity to potential enemies (e.g., Ferguson, 1984).

Headhunting expeditions could thus serve to demonstrate superiority over others, and at the same time to increase the warrior’s store of supernatural power, which he took from the enemy he has killed. Since supernatural power is the scarce commodity sought and an important way of acquiring it was by taking the heads of enemies, headhunting expeditions came to be regarded as essential for maintaining cosmic harmony, or to ensure fertility and masculinity (Feest, 1980; Meyer, 1981).

For the Iatmul of the middle Sepik River, New Guinea, for example, headhunting, sexuality, and the fertility of nature were associated. Phallic ostentation, male pride and machismo, and aggression were closely linked in the Iatmul stereotype of the male role. A man was supposed to be competitive and hot-tempered and he adopted histrionic mannerisms. In order to prove himself a ‘real man’ for marriage and procreation, a young warrior had to take an enemy head. This was a means of obtaining more of the spiritual life-force believed to reside in the head, thus increasing the tribe’s power and fertility at the enemy’s expense (Bateson, 1936; Cf. the Asmat [Zegwaard, 1959], and the Jivaro [Karsten, 1935, 1967]).

According to the Jivaro way of arguing, social order is based on moral order, and the latter is composed of a series of demands and obligations derived from a set of beliefs about souls and esoteric power and the way to obtain it. Only Jivaro own the souls and control the power, and killing another Jivaro is a means by which power is attained, hence a claim to be judged as Jivaro is to kill another Jivaro, or in Karsten’s (1935) words:
"It is characteristic of the Jivaros that they especially wage war against tribes belonging to their own race and speaking the same language. To such an extent has this been the rule for centuries that the word shuara, 'Jivaro Indian', has become synonymous with the word 'enemy'."
Ceremonial headhunting was an endemic phenomenon in the area in question; a recurrent and expected event. Trophy hunting was considered highly rewarding in the Jivaro social ranking, indeed the very essence of being a Jivaro male. Intertribal warfare was a different undertaking from trophy hunting, the primary purpose of the former being the protection of the latter. The extension of territory as such was no goal in itself (Siverts, 1975).
Although headhunters attached great honor to the possession of a head (i.e., somebody else’s), they were not always particular about the means of securing it. Treacherous means or even purchases were often permissible. Indeed, the head of a woman or child might suffice. Thus, among the Naga, a common method - and a perfectly honorable one - was to lie in wait near the water ghat of a hostile village and kill the first woman or child who came to draw water. In apportioning honors, no distinction was drawn between the head of a man or that of a woman or child (Godden, 1897).

Since the desire for heads was never satisfied, and every headhunting foray led to reprisals, expeditions and counterexpeditions were never ending. The effects of headhunting have been especially serious in the Solomon Islands, where tribe after tribe has been completely wiped out as the result of a long series of headhunting expeditions (Hardy & Elkington, 1907). When Rubiana was captured by the British in 1891, the beach was found absolutely littered with skulls, the cherished accumulation of years (Somerville, 1897).

Trophies of all sorts have been recorded in the literature: Skulls, scalps, skins, leg or arm bones, male genital organs, and above all captives. Female captives are seldom counted as trophies, but are rather part of the booty to be enjoyed, not a point to be added to the score. An adult male in the prime of life is often considered the best trophy of all. This was true of North American Iroquoian groups (Trigger, 1969) as well as of the Tupinamba (Moore, 1978). Scalping was particularly common in North America and rare elsewhere (though not unknown; it has been reported of the Scyths [Herodotus], and the Ostyak, Vogul, and Samoyed [Czaplicka, 1914]); leg and arm bones (made into flutes) and skins (made into drums) have been mainly recorded in the South American region - obviously a musical continent.

Feest (1980) has argued that war customs such as headhunting (and cannibalism) are more meaningfully viewed as religious practices which provide the impetus for a permanent state of war, rather than being war motives themselves.
5.3.5 ‘Twixt Eros and Thanatos’: Sex, Women and Warfare

Women, said Divale (1973), were the most frequent cause of feuding and warfare among primitive peoples. "The most common arguments were charges of adultery involving the irate husband and his wife’s lover, but equally as common were disputes over bride price (the wealth given to the bride’s relatives by the relatives of the groom). Divorce also often caused wars. If a woman wanted a divorce or if she ran off with another man, her husband and his relatives would want a return of the brideprice. The bride’s family might refuse, and in the event that the groom felt cheated, this constituted a reason to go to war" (Divale, 1973). Among the Kapauku of New Guinea, for example, almost half of the wars stemmed from the latter cause (Pospisil, 1958).

Already Holsti (1913) pointed out that "relations of a matrimonial kind" have often been a cause of disturbance within and between groups of primitive peoples: "In fact, in the origin and maintenance of matrimonial relations, certain authors have seen a direct cause of incessant warfare". Breaches of the sex mores - rape or adultery - by nonmembers of the group are perhaps, together with murder of a group member, the most common causes of feuds and wars (Davie, 1929; Hoijer, 1929; van der Bij, 1929; Q.Wright, 1942). "Squabbles about women" were a chief cause of war in New Zealand; another was land. Hence the Maori proverb: "Land and women are the roots of war" (Buller, 1878; Tregear, 1904). In other parts of Polynesia wars were frequently caused by adultery, breach of promise of marriage, and marriages between members of hostile tribes (Ratzel, 1896). Nearly all the native fights in Australia were over women. The abduction of women, rape, elopement, and the refusal to surrender a girl promised in marriage were the most common causes (Curr, 1886; Letourneau, 1895; Tindale, 1974).

Also among the Dani of New Guinea conflicts over women, including abductions, are the most frequent cause of feuding and war (Larson, 1987). In many of these societies, conflicts are exacerbated by the relative scarcity of women as a consequence of polygyny (Andreski, 1964; Feest, 1980).

But not only squabbles about women, ‘matrimonial’ or not, has been an abundant source of intra- and intercommunity conflicts, the capture of women from other communities - remember the Sabine maidens seized by the men of Romulus - has been so as well, be it for recreative or procreative purposes. Men probably have fought for and over women since time immemorial. To abduct or capture the women of other groups has been a common practice and one often regarded as highly meritorious (Sumner & Keller, 1927; Davie, 1929; Q.Wright, 1942). Letourneau (1881; 1895) and Durbin & Bowlby (1938), among others, held that the chief interest served by the capture of women from other tribes is the gratification of sexual passion. This, however,
as Davie (1929), among others, objected, is quite secondary to the economic motive. "Primitive man desires women mainly as workers or slaves. The more women he has to labor for him, the more secure is his position in the struggle for existence. They are an economic asset for the work they do and the children they bear" (This latter aspect is, of course, the crux of selectionist/evolutionary theory).

But why not combine business with pleasure? "The propensity of sex is inferior in motive power only to the need for food", Andreski (1964) states, "And sometimes the means of satisfying it may constitute the object of the struggle. Female slaves were always one of the most alluring kinds of booty. Wealth and power, moreover, may be desired because they enable one to indulge in sexual pleasures".

And Turney-High (1949), in his customarily eloquent style, states: "If it is conceded that the reflection of the self in the mirror of the general community is important enough to impel a man to risk his life, the prestige mirror of Aphrodite has even more emotional import. Sex is an important consideration in work, play, eloquence, or war. Whatever the ethos of the group, prestige-conferring activity is sought avidly by the male that his glory may shine in the eyes of his own and other men's women" (Cf. van Bemmelen, 1928). These types of prestige war are often directly encouraged by the women.

Among the Yanomamöö, displays of masculinity, such as fighting prowess and 'waiteri' (ferocity) are admired by Yanomamö women, and particularly aggressive men have an advantage both in soliciting the sexual favors of larger numbers of women as well as depressing the temptation of other men to seduce their wives (Chagnon, 1979). The Yanomamöö are famous/notorious for their fighting over women, and Chagnon is, not amazingly, one of the proponents of the "Why-fight-over-bananas-if-you-can-fight-over-women"-theory of the evolutionary origin of war (Ch. 4).

California presented a veritable mosaic of small tribelets, cultures and languages (Kroeber, 1925; McCorkle, 1978; Jorgensen, 1980). Especially in regard to the theory that women are the ultimate cause of warfare, the following account of the fate of female war captives is not particularly supportive. Among the Yurok, young women sometimes were carried off as captives but were likely to be returned to their kin at time of settlement (Wallace, 1949). Among the tribelets of the southern Athapaskans (Mattole, Nongatl, Sinkyone, Lassik, and Wailaki), no prisoners were taken, but some groups killed children and women, particularly if they had taken part in the conflicts (Elsasser, 1978). Among the Costanoan, captives were usually killed; only young women were spared (Duran & Fortuny, 1958), while the Quechan (Yuma) and Mohave sometimes took female captives, but it was considered dangerous to have intercourse with them. Only the Pomo (Loeb, 1926) and the Nisenan (Beals, 1933) are reported to regularly incorporate captive women into
their own tribe through marriage.

Wholesale, massive and/or systematic rape of the vanquished female population (e.g., Brownmiller, 1975) seems to be more characteristic of contemporary ‘civilized’ wars than of primitive wars: In the dawn attacks on isolated settlements it is much more commonly reported that the entire vanquished population is slaughtered irrespective of age, sex or combatant status. This appears to be the case from the band-level to the chiefdom level of sociopolitical organization. If rape occurs at all, it is the more or less personal initiative of one or more of the participants in a small raiding party, and more often than not the hapless victim is killed afterwards. For example, when a group of men from the South American Patangoro and Amani met a beautiful woman from another village, they first collectively raped, and then killed her, considering this to be an insult to her relatives (Kirchhoff, 1948).

5.3.5.1 The Warrior Cult

In primitive societies, wars, raids and feuds are primarily or exclusively male ‘occupations’ and obligations, although exceptions to this general rule have been documented. The famous or notorious Amazons of South America and classical Greece are probably not entirely mythical. The female of the species seems to have engaged in warlike exploits in Angola, Canary Islands, Amazonia, Patagonia, Central America, California, Hawaii, Australia, Tasmania, Arabia, Albania, and among the Ainu, Apache, and (occasionally) Cherokee (Davie, 1929; Q.Wright, 1942). In most of these cases, however, the role of the women is confined to company, sutler and entertainer, supporter and ‘cheerleader’ for the benefit of the hard core of male warriors. The Dahomean women-soldier garrisons, on the other hand, have been reported to fight more bravely and more cruelly than their male counterparts.

The fact that the warrior role is virtually confined to the male is so obvious that very few scholars have considered it worthy of contemplation or scientific enquiry. Having established that the conduct of war is quintessentially a male occupation, Kroeber & Fontana (1987), provide an interesting psycho-social theory, which, they state, is rooted in human cultural evolution.

Kroeber & Fontana do not believe in the conventional argument that it is because of the physical superiority of males over females, neither do they believe the warrior role is the result of some instinctual perverseness in the character of males which inclines them to acts of violence, although they are aware that males - even as children - are more aggressive in all societies in which the phenomenon has been studied. But it is a large step from what may be innate inclinations toward individual aggression to ritualized, socially sanctioned, institutionalized group warfare.

Kroeber & Fontana are instead persuaded that the reason why men are the chief proponents of warfare as well as the warriors is to be discovered in the nature
and evolution of culture, more specifically, the Neolithic Revolution. Before that time, males, as hunters and as gatherers who worked the distant perimeters of their group’s territory, were essential partners in the maintenance of family and community life.

With the advent of agriculture (especially horticulture) and the domestication of animals, however, it became evident that women often could perform most or even all essential community chores: Tend the hearth, bear and raise children, and plant, cultivate, and harvest the calories needed to stay alive. The worth of males, their dignity as human beings, their existential validation, was challenged to the utmost. A major response appears to have been a shift from man the hunter (and killer) to man the warrior (and killer); from man the physically strong hunter and gatherer working the distant boundaries of his own territory to man the statesman and world diplomat. The new statuses may well be what Luckert (1981) has called "facesaving pretense".

Thus, Kroeber & Fontana believe that the deeper reason - and one that might help explain the persistence of warfare as a modern phenomenon - may lie in the disequilibrium in the sex divisions of respected societal roles which resulted when males became less essential as hunters and gatherers, and their subsequent need to re-validate their existential status as dignified human beings.

The selectionist explanation of why males are the warriors, in contrast, is that throughout evolutionary history, men have been able to gain reproductively by coalitional violence and warring behavior; women almost never have been able to do so (Low, 1990; Tooby & Cosmides, 1988; Chagnon, 1988; See Ch. 4). This argument, Low stipulates, does not reduce to an assertion that women are bound by the constraints of pregnancy, nursing and child care. If that were true, sterile women and post-menopausal women might broadly be expected to engage in intergroup conflict, as do other primate females (See Ch. 3). Furthermore, patrilinearity fosters men’s, but not women’s confluences of reproductive interests in war, because related men but not women live together. Adams (1983) has pointed out that under these conditions, women face a conflict of interest with their husbands (their husbands may be making war upon their fathers and brothers), and argues that women’s formal exclusion from warfare in so many societies may have its roots here.

Nissen (1961; 1971) has emphasized the role of women and the differential sexual development of men and women (Kinsey et al., 1948; 1953) in a theory of the role of the ‘sexual constellation’ in a society’s disposition to warfare: The fact that sexual activity in the female is relatively restrained in the period of life when sexual activity in the man is strongest, that is, in early youth, leads, in connection with the polygynous monopolization of young females by older males, to the result that the young men come to be a relatively isolated group in society. At the same time when all other groups have a social and legal place
for their sexuality, the group of younger men is permanently sexually deprived. This has the consequence, according to Nissen, that a deep complex of bitterness, resentment and misogyny is created in the young man. Society therefore had to deal with the problem of holding the young men under discipline. The most 'natural' way to do this was by taking up the young men in the men's club, and the (homo-erotic) cult of masculinity. In this way the men were bound together in an organization which has been called the (secret) male society or 'male bonding' (See Schurz, 1902; Tiger, 1969). The secret male society existed in many primitive societies and had an important place in most of the great civilized states in Asia, Africa and other parts of the world. It was, with respect to its practical policy, built upon the ideas of comradeship and leadership. It was, with regard to its structure, a mechanism which is most suited for conducting wars (Nissen, 1961; 1971).

Vanggaard (1969) discussed the role of phallic aggression in hierarchical male relationships, characteristic of various warrior societies (Whiting [1965] and LeVine & Campbell [1972] would interpret this as a form of 'protest masculinity'; see Ch. 6). In such societies men (attempt to) assert their supremacy over women by aggressive phallic ostentation (See also Webb, 1983), rampant machismo, and (sometimes bizarre) sexual taboos for the warriors, lest they be contaminated by female weakness.

In warlike African societies - indeed, in virtually all bellicose societies, virility and valor were interlinked as masculine attributes (Mazrui, 1975). In some African societies, special sexual rights were accorded to warriors. Among the Nandi, they enjoyed considerable sexual privileges, especially legitimate access to uninitiated girls who could thus be adopted as sweethearts.

Given the link between masculinity and warfare there could also be an easy link between violence and sexuality. A man taunted as weak in a sexual sense could seek vindication in martial prowess ("Leaders as well as followers may be anxious to fight or to institute bold policies tending to war as a compensation for sexual impotence or as an escape from distressing matrimonial conditions" [Lasswell, 1930]). In this regard the story of Shaka emerges as profoundly symbolic (Mazrui, 1975). He not only forbade his warriors to marry, but also to have any sexual relations at all with women until he gave them permission to do so after retirement from active military service. Shaka's adoption of this policy had its military rewards. The promise of a sexual paradise later on encouraged discipline, while maintaining hope for the future.

Daly & Wilson (1988) have drawn attention to the pervasive role of sexual competition and male sexual proprietariness and jealousy in the masculine universe of blood revenge, gang war, and homicides all over the world. The Freudians have emphasized the role of sexual jealousy in creating the ingroup anxieties which can be remedied by displacing aggressive impulses upon an outgroup (Durbin & Bowlby, 1938).

"The forms which sexual jealousy and disappointment take vary tremendously..."
in the cultures of the world; only their universality seems to be constant. War throughout the ages has been a method whereby the jilted, the snubbed, and the cuckolded could obtain release and restoration of self-respect" (Turney-High, 1949). Densmore (1918) says that a Teton Sioux, upon being teased about his girl’s infidelity, would go to war even though he knew the report to be false, and even though he was in no mood to fight. Before the fight he asked his comrades to tell the girl that he hoped he would be killed.

Women may be a ‘cause’ of war, not merely as the passive objects of capture, abduction, and the like, but also as active instigators. When warlike qualities are approved and admired in the men, the women glorify such qualities. By means of ridicule and approbation they exercise a large measure of social control in primitive societies (Davie, 1929).

Feminine social pressure often influenced the warrior to take up arms in a quarrel which might or might not be his own. "In the light of such facts, the opinion that women inherently hate war is not borne out by the facts. Why should they? In an unsuccessful war of defense women may suffer as much as combatants, but women have been, are, and so far as anyone can see, will be essentially civilians. But women are just as enthusiastic for aggressive war as their men, leaving civilized people out of the discussion; this is testified in hundreds of pages of field reports. If riches infallibly get social adulation, men try for that with the urging of their women. So with piety, and all the other socially desirable traits. If the patterns of culture emphasize military preeminence, the women are not far behind urging the male to fight" (Turney-High, 1949).

5.3.6 War for Land and Territorial Encroachment

In contemporary warfare, territorial defense and conquest figure prominently as causes and motives. In recent history, overpopulation and desiccation producing shortage of pasturage has induced many migrations of nomadic peoples, who, in their search to conquer new lands, clashed with the sedentary peoples, and instituted periods of general warfare (Robinson, 1900; Petrie, 1906; Carr-Saunders, 1922; Wrench, 1926; Davie, 1929; Sprengling, 1933; Lattimore, 1934; Q.Wright, 1942; Dixon, 1976). The Dorian conquest, the European Great Migrations, and the Viking expansions are some prime examples from recent history. ‘Earth hunger’ Sumner (1913) called it.

Territorial usurpation or conquest, and defense and maintenance of territorial integrity as causative factors/motives in primitive warfare and feuding have also been documented in many primitive peoples (although reports of wars for the explicit purpose of territorial conquest are very rare). The encroachment of one hunting tribe on the lands of another was, for example, a persistent cause of hostilities among the American Indians, who
"were very jealous of their boundaries" (Farrand, 1904). Near the mouth of the Mackenzie River, warfare arising from violation of tribal boundaries was incessant; anyone found hunting out of his own territory was slain. The disputed right of the Flatheads to hunt buffalo at the eastern foot of the Rockies was the cause of long-continued hostility with the Blackfeet (Bancroft, 1875). Poaching and trespass on the territory of another group without getting prior permission was a recurrent motive for feuding and warfare among the Californians (McCorkle, 1978), and the Plateau and Great Basin tribes (Jorgensen, 1980). The River Yumans were something of an exception in this area by dislocating the Kavelchadom and Halchidhoma (Kroeber & Fontana, 1987).

Among the natives of Cape York, Australia, hostilities arose among the various groups as soon as "incursions are made into each others’ territories" (Macgillivray, 1852). According to Tindale (1974) "Trespassing to hunt was one of the main causes of fights between tribes, as well as between persons of local groups within tribes al over Australia. This form of trespass threatened the limited and always hard-pressed fundamental sources for living". Territorial conquest and usurpation were, however, rare on the Australian continent, for the aborigines "would ordinarily not conceive of taking land of others. Each band’s land is sacred and spirit infested" (Kennedy, 1971). Among horticulturists the territorial infringement may take the form of planting a garden in another group’s area or of stealing food from another group’s garden (New Guinea Highlands: Paula Brown, 1978).

In geographically circumscribed and fertile, riverine areas, earth-hunger may be a prominent war motive, as suggested by Lathrap (1962 et seq.), Carneiro (1970 et seq.), Morey & Marwitt (1975) a.o.; though, as Ferguson (1984) has rightly pointed out, it is always difficult to distinguish between land acquisition as a goal of war and its acquisition as a consequence of war.

5.3.7 War for Booty and Spoils

"To the victors belong the spoils" is a doctrine probably as old as history. The products of the land, even more than the land itself, may invite aggression and furnish a powerful motive and cause of war (Davie, 1929). Men, Davie said, have always been enticed by the hope of getting something for nothing. Pillaging another group has seemed a realization of this hope and has been considered until recently a legitimate way of gaining a living. Novikow (1911) stated: "The idea that we can enrich ourselves more speedily by seizing the possessions of our neighbors than by working ourselves is one of the notions most deeply imbedded in the human mind". Oppenheimer (1928) very suggestively terms one's own labor 'the economic means' for the satisfaction of needs, and robbery or the forcible appropriation of the labor of others 'the political means'. "Pillaging is an easy substitute for the arduous task of actual production and
accumulation, and is further attractive because of the excitement of war and the variety it offers in the monotony of a humdrum existence" (Davie, 1929). Many nomadic tribes have made their entire living by robbing and raiding each other and preying on their (sedentary, agricultural) neighbors, and this was regarded as a perfectly normal source of livelihood, as legitimate as any other mode of self-maintenance. This 'Bedouin livelihood', as Lippert (1887) has termed it from its prevalence among nomadic pastoral peoples, has survived until modern times. It has been followed on the sea - piracy - as well as on land (Davie, 1929).

It is often asserted in the literature that predatory warfare is virtually universal, and that the prospect of booty and beauty is one of the foremost reasons why primitive men fight. Throughout the African continent, for example, wherever cattle raising was the chief occupation, cattle lifting was the most frequent casus belli (Ratzel, 1895; Steinmetz, 1907, 1929; Davie, 1929)\(^{19}\). When the horse was introduced to the North American Plains, horse stealing became a prime motive of war among the Plains tribes, such as the Omaha (Dorsey, 1884). The mobility provided by the horse stimulated the Ute, Apache, Navaho, Shoshone, Paiute, and eastern Plateau dwellers such as the Nez Percé, Flathead and Coeur d'Alene to raid peoples they had never encountered in the pre-equestrian period (Jorgensen, 1980).

Pig theft was, and still is, a typical incident of intergroup violence among the New Guinea Highland tribes (Paula Brown, 1978).

### 5.3.8 Cannibalism

The most fundamental cause of war, according to Davie, is hunger or the economic motive, and this ties war up straightaway with the competition of life. Indeed, according to Spencer (1885-96) and many other authors (Darwin, 1871; Ratzenhofer, 1898; Lagorgette, 1906; Novikow, 1911), wars about food have undoubtedly been the earliest waged between human groups. The most elemental 'economic motive' is therefore the quest for food. On the 'lowest' stages of societal evolution - the reasoning continues - men themselves are regarded as part of the food supply. Human flesh is animal meat, and cannibalism in such cases is part of the group's self-maintenance. The Aztecs of Mexico waged war chiefly to gather victims for their religious sacrifices, but the slain captives were afterward eaten at the religious feasts, and Payne (1892) maintained that war was waged for this purpose as much as

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\(^{19}\) "From this we have reason to conclude that previous to the domestication of cattle and the change this brought about in the occupation of the natives, the conditions must have been less warlike. Hence, the universal prevalence of cattle raids in Eastern Africa in the nineteenth century ought hardly to be counted among the facts brought forward — e.g. by Steinmetz (1907) — to prove the extremely warlike nature of early ages and primitive conditions in general" (Holsti, 1913).
for the former. See also the argumentation for this point of view in Harris (1977).

Be that as it may, it is very difficult to find comestible or consumptive cannibalism as an explicit war motive reported in the pertinent literature. One such report is by Church (1912) who states that the constant wars of the Amazonian Cashibo were for the purpose of obtaining human flesh. The reliability, as well as the validity, of such reports is hard to establish, however. More commonly reported are revenge cannibalism (or ceremonial ‘hate-venting’ cannibalism as Turney-High [1949] calls it, in which some blood of the victim is drunk or scraps of his body devoured as an act of defilement and insult), and what might be called ‘sympathetic’ anthropophagy; the consumption of part of the body of the slain enemy in order to magically partake of the supernatural power, strength or valor it contains. These are concomitants and consequences of war, however, not necessarily the motives for which the war was waged.

Man is, whatever else he may be, a pragmatic animal, and if opportunity knocks, why not answer its call? After all, the slain enemy is tasty meat on the barbecue too. "Most Melanesians claimed that their real motive was to insult their foes [by revenge cannibalism] and that they did not cannibalize for food per se. Almost all admitted, though, that roast enemy was savory and that they enjoyed it" (Turney-High, 1949). The consumption of human flesh - which, as culinary experts in the field testify, tastes rather moreish, but, as other experts testify, has only limited nutritional value - may thus be the result of war, and, in turn, become an attendant incentive to war:

"The slain may be eaten after a battle caused by other reasons than the desire for human flesh, and prisoners may meet the same fate. The fallen and captured are eaten lest good meat go to waste; man himself is the booty of war on an early stage. Prisoners are utilized as food, not as producers of food. Thus cannibalism becomes an incentive to war" (Davie, 1929). Consumptive cannibalism is considered to be intimately connected with the concept of war as man-hunt. Such warfare is "merely an intensified counterpart of the chase" (McGee, 1898). The weapons and the tactics are generally similar (Vaccaro, 1886; Letourneau, 1890; Deniker, 1900; Lagorgette, 1906; Seligman, 1910; Holsti, 1913; Frobenius, 1914; Davie, 1929).

At the time Davie wrote his opus magnum, consumptive cannibalism was considered just one predatory motive for war among many others, neither noble nor ignoble, and it was generally believed that cannibalism was practiced extensively by primitive peoples all over the world - as well as very early in hominid/human evolution (See Ch. 3). Davie did not have to be particularly gullible to accept the 'eye-witness' reports on cannibalistic feasts among the Tupinamba, Caribs, Botocudo, New Caledonians, Fijians, Maori, Australians, Papuans, Fang and many other peoples at face value.
As expounded by Arens (1979) in his Man-Eating Myth, there is not one
reliable first-hand ethnographic eye-witness report on cannibalism (other than 'emergency-anthropophagy'). The first reports by the Conquistadors of cannibalism in Caribbean and other South-American Indians were justifications for enslavement and massacre rather than statements of fact. Even the Hans Staden story is extremely suspect on closer scrutiny. The Tupinamba did not survive to confirm or deny it.

These observations are concordant with those of Elkin (1938; an anthropologist with experience in the field), and other ethnologists, that the war-mongers and the cannibals are always the other tribe.

According to Arens the references to cannibalism in the HRAF-files consist mainly of statements by authors who explicitly pointed out that the people they studied were not cannibals.

Furthermore, it strains all credulity to read, for example, that the inhabitants of a small Pacific Ocean island are "inveterate cannibals, manhunters and warriors". One wonders how such a population could have survived till now.

Though Arens may overstate his case, he justly points to the hazards of parroting 'authoritative' sources.

5.3.9 War for Slaves

"Everywhere", said Spencer (1912), "the tendency is for one man to make another man work for him". This applies chiefly to horti- and agriculture, tasks which are monotonous and arduous, and which men tend to avoid and like to force others to do. "Fighting, hunting, and herding are regarded by most primitive peoples as the only worthy occupation for a man, while tilling the soil is the duty of women or slaves. Consequently, the seizure of enemies as slaves is a prominent objective of warfare" (Davie, 1929).

Slavery may also be prompted by feelings of ethnocentric superiority, "the love of dominion which belongs to vanity" (Sumner, 1906), or the Urge to Victimize (Lopreato, 1984).

It is on the horti- and agricultural stage that slavery first develops into a real institution (Roth, 1887; Nieboer, 1910; Spencer, 1912; Davie, 1929; Sumner & Keller, 1927; Murdock, 1967; Lopreato, 1984; Richerson, 1995). Nieboer (1910) was the first to show empirically that slavery in any appreciable amount or degree does not occur until the agricultural stage is reached. Tribes which gain their livelihood by hunting or cattle raising have no real need for slaves.

Why should especially horticultural societies, in comparison with other subsistence economies, be prone to exhibit raiding and slavery (as well as headhunting, witchcraft beliefs, and cannibalism)? Richerson (1995) points out

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that in horticultural societies men seem especially parasitical because they do relatively little subsistence work (in contrast to the women who work the gardens), but arrogate to themselves the important political and military roles in the community, and arrogate to themselves the women as well (polygyny is common). With the problem of in-group violence solved by the internal political organization, the men in the horticultural societies are now free to turn to their more distant neighbors to parasitize. Fixed property is readily and abundantly available as booty, as are land and humans as potential slaves, and these all provide powerful incentives for raiding. Horticultural societies may, furthermore, not particularly like their neighbors, but they cannot move away. Maybe this is the reason why witchcraft beliefs become particularly developed among horticulturalists.

Lopreato (1984) suggested that slavery is perhaps more specifically associated with the invention of metallurgy. Thus, according to Murdock’s (1967) *Ethnographic Atlas*, as horticultural societies moved from the pre-metal to the metal stage, the percentage of societies practicing slavery increased from 14 to 83. "Chances are that human slavery is as old as human warfare. No doubt, however, with the advent of more efficient weapons and the associated emergence of property accumulation due to the cultivation of plants and animals, the victors had powerful reason to spare the vanquished and put them to forced labor instead. So, slavery at a grand scale is probably of rather recent vintage" (Lopreato, 1984).

Slaves may become of such economic importance that prisoners of war are invariably enslaved and a traffic in human beings grows up. The slave market is kept supplied by wars waged for this special purpose. The demand for slaves stimulated slaving expeditions on a grand scale particularly in Africa and the North American Westcoast. The unimaginable devastation caused by slave raiding in Africa was one of the many man-made disasters that have plagued this poor continent (See e.g., Wood, 1868-70).

Predatory warfare occasionally develops into 'group-slavery', mostly the systematic exploitation of sedentary tillers by pastoral nomads. An excellent example is furnished by the Masai, "true warriors and raiders" who kept a subject tribe to do their hunting and tilling (French-Sheldon, 1892). Davie (1929) provides the following examples for the African continent: "In Nyassaland, the Asenga, Atumbuka, and Achipeta are subject to the warlike and dominant Angoni, while the unwarlike Manganja have been enslaved by their neighbors, the Ajawa and Angoni (Moggridge, 1902; Stigand, 1909). The Bechuanas conquered the Makalahari and made them slaves (Holub, 1881). The Vaganda are likewise subject to the Vahuma; the Makololo hold the Makalaka in serfdom; the Masarva are slaves to the Bechuanas, Matabele, and Marsute (Livingstone, 1872; Ratzel, 1896). The Ba-Yaka enslave the tribes they conquer (Torday & Joyce, 1906). The Bakgalagadi are the serfs of the
Batlhaping, Barolong, and Bahurutshe (Willoughby, 1905), as are the Yalunka of the Sofas (Elliot, 1894).

5.3.10 Power, Conquest and Political Expansion

Politics is eminently the domain of the alleged universal power struggle between groups - be it at the band-level or the nation-state - as envisaged by the Realist School which has dominated Western political thought at least since Machiavelli and Hobbes. It is also the domain of intergroup conflict resolution. In this perspective war truly is a final court of appeal, 'the last resort of kings', when other adjudicative, diplomatic and international law procedures, have reached an impasse or a stalemate. This is the *ultima ratio* aspect of war (May, 1943).

Sumner & Keller (1927) have stressed this point in the following paragraph: "It should be clear enough that the primitive man, for the reason that he fought, was neither a degenerate, an obstinate and wrong-headed fool nor a knave. He saw nothing better to do, when he had reached the end of his short list of alternatives, any more than we do when we have reached the end of our somewhat longer list. His last resort was nearer the head of his list than ours because his list was shorter. It was often a list containing but one item. He did not know that violence is a crude way of settling difficulties and by no means always efficient; it has always seemed, indeed, to be getting results even when it is later seen not to have done so".

Like Utopianism in international relations theory, Realism has its intellectual roots in the older political philosophy of the West and in the writings of non-Western ancient authors such as Mencius and the Legalists (Shang Yang, Han Fei Tzu) in China and Kautilya in India (See especially Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1971; Rapoport, 1968).

According to Morgenthau (1948 et seq.), who is the Grand Old Man and best-known advocate of modern political Realism, the main principles of Realism are the following:

1. Realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.
2. Realism assumes that its key concept of *interest defined as power* is an objective category which is universally valid (but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all).
3. In power struggles, nations (or other political units) follow policies designed to preserve the status-quo, to achieve imperialistic expansion, or to gain prestige. All politics can be reduced to these three basic types: "A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power". Following Hobbes, Morgenthau sees the "ubiquity of evil in human action" arising from man's ineradicable lust for power (*animus dominandi*). Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man.
Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. Furthermore, human reason is subservient to the fundamental and irrational motive forces of human existence.

For most realists, balance-of-power theory is an integral and essential ingredient of their doctrine. Essentially, this theory is about the results produced by the uncoordinated actions of states (or other political units such as tribes, etc.) in an anarchic international political system, characterized by the absence of any powerful central authority. In such a state of anarchy, all actors necessarily resort to self-help. Striving for security, political units sooner or later confront the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma: All players of the game follow their own interests, so that they end up worse off than if they had cooperated to achieve joint interests. This is, as Falger (1987, 1994) put it, the true nucleus of international politics: In an antagonistic world any measure to secure or improve one’s own security is a direct threat to all other opponents (See e.g., Falger, 1987, 1994; Waltz, 1979; Wight, 1979).

This ubiquitous security-dilemma leads to mutual fear between political units, and "As soon as the *au fond* xenophobic fear of other groups is mixed up with moral and social feelings of superiority about one’s own group, it takes relatively little effort to escalate conflicts to violent levels of settlement" (Falger, 1987). In evolutionary biology the 'balance-of-power' concept was introduced by Alexander (1979), but apparently not derived from political Realism (he does not even mention the existence of this school of thought).

Such are the contours of the Realist paradigm, which is not, as e.g., Nobel (1985), Dougherty & Pfaltgraff (1971), and Rapoport (1968) have shown, without logical contradictions, internal inconsistencies, and unilluminating or elusive concepts. Especially the concept of 'interest defined as power' may be universally valid, it also is quite lacking in explanatory power, not only with regard to primitive warfare.

Blainey (1973) has argued that war and peace appear to share the same framework of causes. The same set of factors should thus appear in explanations of the causes of war and the causes of peace. This, however, is exactly what Realism cannot do, except in glittering generalities. Vasquez (1993) has cogently argued that instead of being an instrument of analysis, political Realism may itself be a factor in the pathway leading to the outbreak of contemporary wars.

"Conquest, the integral occupation of another cultural area by force, combines all the benefits of loot, slavery, and increase in political power" (Malinowski, 1941). Malinowski thus points to the interdigitation or the virtually inextricable amalgamation of political and economic motives, as did Loenen (1953) and Garlan (1975) in their analyses of classical warfare.

Effective political conquest, as the term is understood in civilized warfare, and
the desire for political domination are, however, virtually unknown among primitive peoples below the level of the chiefdom or pristine state, mainly because they lack the infrastructure and political institutions necessary for the integral occupation of another cultural area and the administration of a conquered people (Fritsch, 1872; de Quatrefages, 1884; Curr, 1886; Lippert, 1887; Ellis, 1890; Gardiner, 1898; Keller, 1906; Torday & Joyce, 1906; Tylor, 1909; Sumner, 1913; Havemeyer & Keller, 1917; Van der Bij, 1929; Davie, 1929; Hoijer, 1929; Q.Wright, 1942; 1965; Hoebel, 1949; Turney-High, 1949; Service, 1966; 1968; Steward, 1968; Turnbull, 1968; Anderson, 1968; Chagnon, 1968; Birdsell, 1970; Keith, 1972; Vine, 1973; Shepard, 1973; Meyer, 1977 et seq.; Carneiro, 1978; Harris, 1978; P.Brown, 1982). "The political motive for waging war is not a primitive one, nor has it often been found among primitive warriors. This trait has belonged principally to areas with fully developed or rudimentary (pristine) states [and empires] such as Middle America [the Aztec empire], the Iroquois League, Peru [the Inca empire], and Africa [e.g., the Dahomean empire] (Turney-High, 1949). Harris (1978) argued that the form of political organization which we call the state came into existence precisely because it was able to carry out wars of territorial conquest and economic plunder. But band and village warfare lacks this dimension. Band and village societies do not conquer territories or subjugate their enemies. In other words, the 'war as politics' explanation cannot explain warfare among band and village societies because most such societies do not engage in political expansion. Where chieftainship arises, however, with more complex social organization, and usually a pastoral or agricultural way of life, fights among rivals to obtain the chieftainship and wars initiated by the chief to augment his prestige, to check internal disaffection, and for political domination and conquest, are common (Hoijer, 1929; Davie, 1929; Turney-High, 1949).

Warfare for the purpose of laying other peoples under tribute can also hardly be considered a 'primitive' motive: "It belongs to such tribute empires as those of the Romans, the Inca, and the Chinese. It is the mark of civilized military robbery, too gradual and drawn-out, too refined, and too productive for primitive society to appreciate" (Turney-High, 1949).
5.3.11 Epilogue

1. A number of psychoanalytic theories, having as their explanatory core concepts like destructiveness, sadomasochism, Todestrieb and similar formulations are neither evolutionarily plausible nor psychologically very relevant for the explanation of primitive war. Other psychoanalytic theories, such as Paranoid Elaboration of Mourning theory, on the other hand, may provide insights into what I called in the beginning of this chapter the ‘psychology of the warrior’.

2. The concept of ‘war trap’ and the theory of trap psychology are eminently suited to describe and understand the situation in rampant war complexes.